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and distinct if and only if a certain relation holds between
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this relation obtains, one can use what Gewirtb calls the

method of difference.
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Objections

Gassendi accused Descartes of advancing

.

a.

merely

psychological criterion for acquiring knowledge (Gewirth, pp.
250-251)

Gassendi observed that a person can be firmly con-

.

vinced he is clearly and distinctly perceiving when in fact
he is not.

What Descartes needed and

what.

Gassendi claimed

he failed to provide is a method for distinguishing perception,

that is really clear and distinct from perception that is only

apparently so.
Descartes responded that he had provided the required

method and that in addition he had enumerated all the principal
ideas and had distinguished the clear from the

confused ones.

obscure-.-

and

He directed Gassendi to the place in the

Meditations where all prejudices had been discarded (Gewirth,
p.

Claiming that Gassendi's objection had been antici-

251).

pated and amply treated, he desisted, from further reply.

Gewirth s criticism
*

advocate

,

erf

Descartes

.

Gewirth points out that Descartes' definitions of

'clearness’ and ’distinctness

interpr stations

.

7

are.

vague and open co various

Interpreted straightforwardly

itions are so weak that they make every
(

G ew i rth

,

op

,

25 4- 25 7

Descartes cells
if the following
(

i)

v ls

(ii)
(,'

ii)

Playing the devil's

)

these defin-

clear and distinc

,

idea x is clear if and only

us, that an

three conditions are

present to the mi no

x is open to the mind
then

idea,

f

,

s avia lave ti n

,

and

mind is attending to x

(Gewirv.Vi

,

p

*

But according to Gewirth, Descartes also holds the
f o .1 1 ow i n g

principles:
An idea is "all that which is in our mi nd when we

(PI)

conceive a thing in whatever manner we conceive it"
(Gewirth, p.

256)

2

An idea is "all that which is immediately perceived

(P2*

by the mind"

(Gewirth, p. 255 )

„

seems to entail that every idea satisfies

(Pi)

(i )

t

and (P2)

A

that every idea satisfies (iii)
ing to Gewirth.

a
.

fares no better , accord-

(ii)

Continuing in his ostensibly critical role,

he suggests that we adopt as a straightforward interpretation

of (ii) the following:
the mind is able to recognise

(ii')

But (ii

)

seems to follow analytically from

(

pi

5

„

:

.

Thus, every

satisfies all three conditions and every idea is clea"

idea,
(

1

Gewi r th

,

p

256).

.

But is every idea likewise -distinct?

perc Lve

when and

di ;tir :tly

only;

Descartes says we

fhen we perceiv<

i<

1

lg

but

Charles Adam and
irtes
de D
Further
I, 45.
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L9J
po
Cei
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Pan T a mer y (Pci is
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be
ill
v?
edition
Tannery
and
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c L te<

!

fr

i

Oeuvi

itumi
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•

,
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352-393.
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we accept the following
e SO entailmento hold only
that what is "in’ the mind is "present to" the mind
premises;
an object on3.y if the mind is
i
<
the i

md

that

1

'

attending to that object.
J

When we conceive a thi ng in

a ce.rta.vn

manner

t

1

-

recognise

G

what is clear.

Patently the mind perceives nothing but what

it in fact perceives,

and both (PI)

and

seem to insure

(P2.)

that what the mind perceives when it perceives

But as every idea is clear, it follows that the mind

an idea.

perceives only where is clear
distinct

nothing but

i.s

(

Gewirth

Gew-i rt’h

!

s

p.

,

goal

against Descartes.
to Gassendi

;

2b 7)

and, therefore, only what

.is

.

Gewirth has now discussed two criticisms

.

The first is the criticism ho attributes

the second is the criticism he develops in his

role as devil's advocate.

against Des carte s
distinctness.

’

Gassendi’s -criticism is directed

criter i a

On Gewirth'

f o r a s ce r t a i n i n g c 1 e

interpretation

s

,

r ne s s

ar

:

Gassendi is accus-

ing Descartes of providing a merely psychological criterion
for distinguishing clear and

and confused ones.

Gewirth

'

d.i

stinct ideas from the obscure

criticism is more fundamental.

s

It questions whether the distinction Dev carte:-

clear and distinct ideas, on one hand
ideas

,

,

on the other, is a genuine one.

dr:,

vs between,

emd obscure and confuted

Playing

advocate, Gewirth argues that it follows from

tr.e

straight for

reading of Descartes’ definitions of ’'clearness" and
deas are c 1 e a

ness" that all

ct 2. 10

>

is

u-

'

an d d i 3 1 i n c t

distinct-

.

vindicate Desca rtes

i

“

rr

q do so,

he must, show that the cri ticism

tasks:

issend.i.

i

devil’s

c

in

li'

lie

be met and that the cri tici-sm he

a chair,
If. I conceive of an object as
it as a such and such,.
I recogni «e that obiect. as a chair.

7

himself suggests is actually unjustified.

Complexities in the pe rcepti ve act.

Gevirth

w.i

argue

Li

that both Gassendi's and his own criticisms are unjustified
for fundamentally the same reason.

They both fail to take

account of complexities in the idea and the perceptive act.

According to Gewirth, clearness and distinctness

"

intrinsic to the idea nor explicable in terms of

a

are neither

simple

relation between idea and perceptive act” (Gewirth, p. 258).
The same idea can be clear or obscure and distinct or confused

depending on how it is perceived.
is a "viewing as" situation.

"viewing as" situation is

The perceiving situation

What is distinctive about the

that, the

object of perception is

complex; it has both direct and interpretive contents
p.

258)

*

Gewirth

.

his point.

Gewirth offers two illustrations of

Accord-

when
ing to Descartes,, sense perceptions are clear and distinct
thev are viewed as sensations or thoughts or at

sj jn.u.cy

x.

.k

what

cense percepis helpful or harmful to the body, but the same

external
tions are confused when they are vi eyed as representing

things existing outside the mind (Gewirth

•

p.

our ideas of thought and extension era clear

258,.
arid

dioirnct er

view thou gnu nuo
obscure and confused depending on whet he r we

extension as nodes or as substances (Gewrrth, PP*

2. b.

un attempt
Gewirth' s interpretation of Descartes is

make sense of these examples.

t:.

Although Descartes himself: ’"ares

and the Anv.erp.et a-, e
no explicit reference to the direct

8

of ideas , Gewi. rth maintains

'..•.ontonts

we can make sense

that’,

of Descartes' examples only if we attribute to him the view

direct and interpretive contents (Gewirth, pp. 258, 264, 266,
and 271)

But what are the direct and interpretive contents

.

of our ideas?

The dir ect and inter preti ve contervts of ideas.

Gewirth

does not give us a clear account of the direct and interpretive

contents of ideas, but
of his view.

I

think we can construct an explication

Those acts of perception that can be character-

ized as clear and distinct or obscure and confused are complex.

They occur when one reflects on some content of his consciousness

—

sensation, a mental process, a concept, a thought.

a

The act of reflection involves an act of interpretation.

The

interpreting relation, is dyadic, holding between an interpretThe interpretation given is

ation and the thing interpreted.

the interpretive content; what is interpreted is the direct

content
tike the direct content, the interpretive content is a
>ntent of consciousness.

ike the d

ot consciousness

Tint,

i.

:

:

1

When one interprets some content

i

tl

percept

;

n

'

!

fc

o

ee p five elem

mts

9

distinguished:

the act of interpretation, the proposition
p

produced as a result of this

act,"

p's subject, p s subject
'

concept, and p's predicate concept.

contents of consciousness.

direct content but

All five elements are

p's subject concept represents the

not the direct content it represents.

is

The direct content is p’s subject; the interpretive content
p_"s

predicate concept.
Keeping these distinctions in mind, we may now look at

the examples Gewirth gives to illustrate his distinction

tween the direct and interpretive contents
examples:

He gives us

,

*

b.

i

sense perceptions and the id as of thought and

extension
Gewirt h

1

s

exam ple of sense percept ion

pain and ref lect on my pain,

direct content.
1

the pain

am in

I

am fee Ling become.-.

I

The interpretive con to at

put on the direct, content

When

.

is the

,

rLrrp o

.

Interpret at ions can vary depc.no

.

ing on what the direct content

is viewed as.

*

If the direct

content: is viewed as a sensation, my idea of my rain is cJc.w

but if

view

and distinct

,

someth i vg

rating in my foot,

e:

I

the.

fell,

pain as in my foot or

1 :i.)

then my idea is con fused.

But what, is the idea that Gewirth thinks is clear and

distinct or obscure and confused?
sense- s of

as an idea

T

*
1

,

-

1

an

.i

idea in the thj rd
o f cons c iuu.: no

.

.

t

need to distinguish thro

VJe

will re far to an

tea in the second
se;use

ror:

as an idea..

A pain

i

i

a

in

as an

fc

1

le

fi

id©a 0

•

,

.

s
avid

An idea, is any con

s

T

feel is

uch an

terra.

I dors,,

are

10

ideas as we

ord.i. nari

properly so called.
pain is

a

is an idea

.

^

ly understand iihem.

When

I

They

air©

concepts

reflect on my pain and judge that

sensation, the subject concept of my judgement
It represents my pain,

an idea., but it is not
1

the pain it represents.

The third sense of 'idea* is the one

that takes account of Gewirth's view that ideas are complexes

containing direct and interpretive contents.
pain and judge that my pain is

sensation,

a

mind a complex content of consciousness
ing and the judgement

—

am in

I

have before my

I

the pain

form about my pain.

I

When

I

am feel-

As a content of

consciousness, this complex is itself an idea^, and it contains
the subject and predicate concepts of the judgement

ideas ?
formed.
idea i

:

But it is also an

idea-,,

for it is a special type of

it contains direct and interpretive contents.

In a primary sense, it is ideas 3 that are clear and dis-

But in a derivative sense, we

tinct or obscure and confused.

and ideas., are characterized by clear-

can also say that ideas
-j

ness and distinctness or obscurity and confusion.

—

his concept

—

of his pain is clear and distinct just in

case his idea-, of his idea

One's idea

One’s idc.a 2

of his pain

—

of his pain is clear and distinct

his felt pain

—

is clear and dis-

tinct provided that his pain is the direct content of a clear
and distinct idea ^ of his pain

.

Ordinarily, Descartes does

not say he has a clear and distinct pain.
he.

Instead, he says

oerce ives his pain clearly and distinctly.
One might raise the following objection to the uccou.it

11

1

am suggesting on Gewirth's behalf.

Sometimes

make judge-

v/e

ments about things that are not or can never be present contents
of consciousness.

remember

I

I

could make a judgement about a pain

once had.

The subject of the proposition

would be that pain, but since the pain is not one

I

I

I

form

now feel,

it is not a content of consciousness and cannot be the direct

content of my idea^.

We get around this difficulty if we

formulate our judgements carefully.
is a memory of a pain,

What is before my mind

and my idea is clear and distinct if

judge that my remembrance represents a sensation.

I

In this case

the direct content of my idea^ is not my pain but my recollec-

tion of my pain, and the interpretive content is not Sensation
but Representation Of A Sensation.

Gewirth* s examp le of the ideas of thought

Gewirth's example of the ideas of thought and extension creates
further difficulties for his distinction between the direct
Referring to a passage

and interpretive contents of ideas.

"The ideas of the modes thought and

in Descartes, he says.

extension

...

'can be clearly and distinctly understood if

they be viewed not as substances

,

or things separated from

other things, but only as modes o f things
258

))

This

isage

>1

ir*

ai

(Gewirtb, pp

.

tant distinction.

i.i

pronoun ‘'they" does not have a cie ir re tercnce

.

it cor io

to the ideas of thought and extension, or it could

though
p rotations

1

:

t

’

Lves

We

3

rei:e:c

The
i<?

to

foi

12

(Interpretation

I)

We clearly and distinctly understand
our ideas of thought, and extension

only

if

we view these ideas as nodes

of substance.

(Interpretation II) We clearly and distinctly understand
our ideas of thought and extension only
if we view thought and extension as

modes of substance.

Gewirth does not help us to decide between Into rpvet at ions
and II, and

1

do not third' we need to decide between them..

I

They are compatible with each other and can be read in

a

way

that makes them consistent with the account X am developing
of Gewirth"

s

views.

Drawing on the distinction

I

made above,

we can formulate two legitimate accounts in which the idea
of extension can be said to be clearly and distinctly under-

On the first account one recognizes that what he is

stood.

considering is his idea.? of extension qua

idea.,

,

and he inter-

prets his idea as a mode of spiritual substance.

On the second

account one recognizes that what he is considering
of extension qua representation of extension.
he does not interpret extension as a mode

o-f

is

his idea.,

Being cautious,

material substance.

Caution is required because what is interpreted for Gewirth
7

is

.a

direct content.

See. pp.
7

And as

9-10 above.

See pp. 8-9 above

I

understand his view.

13

tn.e

direct content is always

a

content of consciousness.

The

idea of extension is such a content, but
extension itself is
not:
rt is a mode of material substance.
Choosing; an in terpret ive content.

We can now return

to the main point of Gewirth's statement regarding the
ideas

of thought, and extension.
O

j-

-nougat and extension

Gewirth said, "The ideas of the modes
.

.

.

'

can be clearly and distinctly

"understood if they be viewe d not as— cub stances

arated from other things
if tne vague pronoun

extension

qua. ideas..

,

'they
,

,

or things sep-

but only as modes o£ things

'

,

<

.

.

refers to the ideas of thought an

d.

then Gewirth's point is that we correct ly

interpret these ideas if we view them as modes of spiritual
substance, and we misinterpret
but as substances.

If,

them, if

we view then not as modes

on the other hand.,

refers to

’they’

thought and extension, we can take Gewirth to mean that we

correctly interpret our ideas o of thought and extension when
we view these ideas

as representing modes, and we misinterpret

these contents when we view them as representing substances.

Whether the direct content referred to by the pronoun

1

they

;

cr the idea of extension

is tne idea of extension crua idea
1

qua

id,

.p.

.

interpretations put on the direct content can vary.

If 1 adopt one interpretive content, my idea is clear and

distinct; if

I

adopt another, it is obscure and confused.

Here we have an instance where it is an idea,, that is
and
But the cl e a rn<
clear ind di.si
d tc
t
he
oi
this id<
ness
ideas ha vine as their direct contents ideas 0 of thought and
extension
1

1

:

i

-

the direct con tent

YlHXiliS:

.

Besides being able to give

different interpretations to a direct content
we can provide different direct contents for
pretation.

,

Gewirth thinks

the.

same inter-

Discussing Descartes' example of the idolater who

undergoes conversion, Gewirth says that the direct content of
the idolater's idea of God changes while what the
direct con-

tent is viewe d as
me.

,

namely God, remains the same.

It seems to

that Gewirth has something like the following in mind.

person A has an idea of

a

bearded old man who lives in the sky.

A judges that his idea represents God.

ritual enlightenment

.

Then A undergoes spi-

Now he judges that his idea of an in-

finite spiritual substance represents God.

concept

A

the interpretive content

—

The predicate

of A's new belief is

the same as the predicate concept of his old belief.

The sub-

jects of his beliefs ~~ the direct contents -- have changed,

however.

The clarity and distinctness of the idolater's idea

depends on the direct content to which the idolater applies
his interpretive content.

Gewirth

8

s

d efinit i on s of

1

clarity

8

and 'distinctness'

Whether we are interpreting a direct content

ox

.

supplying a

new direct content for an interpretation we already have, the
depends on whether some

clarity and distinctness of our idea
*

3

special relation between
holds.

the.

direct and interpretive content

Gewirth tells us that this special relation

relation of identity (Gewirth, p. 310)

.

i.

the

If the direct an

interpretive content of an idea are identical, then the idea

is clear and distinct.

But Gewirth's view cannot be right.

The interpretive content is always a predicate concept, an
iaea in the second sense.

Concepts are contents of conscious-

ness, but not all contents of consciousness are concepts.
any content of consciousness can be

a

direct content.

Yet

As an

earlier example showed, a pain can be a direct content of an
idea

,

"A

but a pain is not a concept and can never be identical
~

‘

to the interpretive content, the predicate concept, that inter-

prets it.
For Gewirth, an object of consciousness becomes

content when it is interpreted.

formulates

a

3.'t

a

direct

is interpreted when one

proposition p that predicates something of it.

Taken together, the interpreted content of consciousness and
the formulated proposition p constitutes an idea^ of that con-

tent of consciousness.

The interpretive content of this

is p's predicate concept;

the direct content £'

s

idea.,

subject.

Since p's subject is not always a concept, Gewirth will have
problems if he tries to establish an identity between d's
subject and p's predicate concept.
Me could

Perhaps Gewirth is speaking loosely, however.

have meant to establish an identity between the contents of
p s
*

predicate concept and the contents of

a concept

p’

representing the direct content

s ub.j e ct

co

Gewirth may have

failed to state clearly what he intended to say because his
language obscures an important distinction,

It

suppose that the entities referred to by the

t

is natural to

e rms

1

d i re c t

16

content

and 'interpretive content' belong to
the same ontological order.
But if I am interpreting Gewirth
correctly, the
direct and interpretive contents can belong
to different ontological categories. The interpretive content
is always a concept, an idea^; the direct content is always
a content of
1

consciousness which may or may not be a concept.

The proper

counterpart to the interpretive content of an idea„
is not
3
direct content.
It is, rather, the. subject concept

r

he

of the

propositional -component of the idea^.

This subject concept

represents the direct content but is not the direct content
it represents.

To help us to avoid equating the interpretive content
of an idea., with the direct content,

convention;

I

I

adopt the following

will refer to the direct content of an idea

,

bv

the lower case letters "direct content" and to the subject and

predicate concepts

of-

the propositional component of an idea-,

by the capitalized terms 'Direct Content' and

Content' respectively.

'

Interpretive

Using this convention, we arrive at

the following clarification of Gewirth's definitions of
'clearness' and 'distinctness';
(Di)

An idea
3

X
—

is clear

=
df

X's Secondary Content con~

tains everything contained in X's Basic Content
(D2)

An idea

^

X is distinct

X's Secondary Content con-

tains only what is contained in X's Basic Content
(Dl)

and (D2)

introduce Gewirth's d i s t i n c t i on be twe e n Basic

17

and Secondary Contents. 9

In the intepretation

I

am giving

oi Gewi-itii s account, an idea^ is clear and distinct
if and

only if the contents of the Direct and Interpretive Contents
are identical.

This identity can be brought about by modify

ing the content of either the Direct or the Interpretive Content

The content modified is the Secondary Content; the content

remaining constant is the Basic Content.
xn the case of the idolater

who undergoes conversion,

the Interpretive Content was basic.

What changed was the con-

tent contained in the Direct Content.

Originally the idolater

had an ide.a^ of a bearded old man who lives in the sky as the

direct content of his idea^ of God.

At this stage the Direct

and the Interpretive Contents of the idolater’s idea^ were

very different, and the idolater's idea very obscure and con-

But when the idolater changed the Direct Content of

fused.

his idea to the idea

of an infinite spiritual substance, he

narrowed the gap between the contents of the Direct and Interpretive Contents, and his idea became less obscure and confused

A problem with

(Dl)

ana

J_D2_)

.

In Principle XLVI

,

Descartes

tells us that whatever is distinct must also be clear.

The Secondary Content of my

and (D2) violate this principle.
j

dea

but;

m< iy

coni tin onl}

whal

(Dl)

Ls coni

aim

Ln

th

Bas

not contain everything contained in the Bas ic Content
9

*6e<
capitalize ‘Basic Con
are concepts,
Contents
Secondary
and
Basic
the
indicate that
com
©positional
pi
tne
or
concepts
predicate
the subject and
ponent of an idea.3
-

I

*

10

MR

I

,31

.

:

IB

I

see no way to get around this difficulty.

To retain his

account of clearness and distinctness, Gewirth will
simply have
to discount Descartes' remarks in Principle XLV 1

Gewirth

1

s

.

rep ly to his own criticism o f Desc artes

correct, Gewirth'

s

If

.

interpretation of clarity and distinctness

effectively undermines his ostensible critic ism of Descartes.
This criticism was based on Gewirth'
every idea is clearly perceived.
idea would be clear and distinct

arguments to show that

Gewirth grants that every
if-

conditions

jointly sufficient, but they are not.
ation

a

-

(i)

On Gewirth'

(iii)

were

interpret-

s

fourth condition must be added;

(iv)

the contents of x*

Basic and Secondary Contents are

s

identical

These contents need not be identical, however.

Interpretations

of the direct content can vary, or the direct content assigned
an interpretation can be modified.

Depending on the direct

content selected for interpretation and the interpretation sel-

ected from available alternatives, ideas 3 will or will not satisfy (iv)

.

In his role as devil's advocate, Gewirth has argued

that, on Descartes' definitions of 'clearness'
ness*

,

and

By adding

every idea is clear and distinct.

'

distinct-

(iv), how-

ever, Gewirth shows that the criticism he has raised is one

Descartes can avoid (Gewirth, pp. 253- 260).
A problem with Gewirt h
iticisn he gave Ln hi

b'

8

s

Gewirth

account.
de

l

-

Ivocat

account he gives of clearness and distinctness.

'

s

reply to the
hin

i

on

But as hrs

aiscussion of Descartes' example, of pain reveals,
are problematic.

and (D2)

(Dl)

Descartes holds that his idea of his pain

rs clear and distinct if he judges his pain to be
a sensation.

On the analysis I have given in Gewirth's behalf, Descartes'
idea^
cUiQ

j.s

clear and distinct only if the contents of the subject

predicate concepts of his judgement are identical.

But it

is plain that the contents of the concepts Pain and Sensation

are not identical.

Pain is a species of sensation, and it has

features that do not belong to sensations generally.

Presumably

an adequate idea representing pain would contain concepts repre

-

senting those features that distinguish pain from other forms of
sensation.

Sc-

Pain and Sensation do not have identical contents

Gewirth could reply that Descartes
not a counterinstance to (Dl)

and (D2)

.

1

example of pain is
and (D2) give a

(Dl)

general account of clearness and distinctness.

But when Des-

cartes says his idea of pain is clear and distinct, he does
not mean that his idea is perfectly clear and distinct.

In-

stead, he means his idea is one that satisfies the minimal

requirement for clearness and distinctness.

m i n im a 1

But what is this

r e q u i r erne n t ?

The mi nimal requir e ment

.

(Dl)

and (D2) give us an ac-

count of clearness and distinctness as such.

But Descartes

holds to a distinction between complete and. adequate knowledge.
Ideas can have infinite analyses which God can carry out but

which man as
a

a

result of his finitude cannot.

Since one knows

thing adequately only if he knows all its properties

,

God

20

alone can have adequate knowledge (Gewirth, pp. 264-2G5)

Having such knowledge

,

God can, for every idea He has, ascertain

•whether that idea is clear and distinct.

To find out,

only

I-Ie

has to compare His analyses of the Basic and Secondary Contents.

Lacking the ability to perform such infinite analyses,
human beings must ascertain their ideas to be clear and distinct
in other ways

If

.

I

judge that my pain is

idea^ of my pain is clear and distinct.
be so,

I

idea,

pain, then my

To recognize it to

do not have to perform an analysis, either infinite

or finite.

my

ray

I

recognize the Basic and Secondary Contents of

to be identical.

contents contain,

I

Sven though

I

do not know what these

know that identical concepts have identical

contents so that the Secondary Content of my idea contains all
arid

only what is contained in the Basic Content.

forming an analysis,

I

Without per-

am able to recognize my idea or pain

to be clear and distinct.

Although
ideas,

I

can always play it safe when

interpret

ray

the ideas- that result from such safe interpretations

are uninteresting.
of God,

I

I

If

I

judge that my idea of God is my idea

can be sure that my idea., of God is clear

a id

distinc

but such clear and distinct perception would scarcely satisfy
Descartes.

He would want to know whether his idea of God as

an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent
is clear: and distinct.

,

and perfect be

r-

Since mere inspection does not she

the Basic and Secondary Contents of this iuoa, of Goo to

identical, .Descartes will have to analyze these Contents to

<
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see whether the Secondary Content includes all
and only what
is contained in the Basic Content.

But in this case we can

suppose that an infinite analysis will be required,

And if

such an analysis is needed, Descartes can never ascertain
whefcher

has idea of God is clear and distinct
Ac chicling

i_o

Gewirth, however, Descartes believes we can

settle lor something less than perfect clarity and distinctness
In science we encounter knowledge that meets what Gewirth calls

the minimum requirement.

Gewirth says:

In the context of science, where the concern is with the
essences of things, the connection between the two contents must be necessary. The minimum requirement for
an idea to be clear, then, is that whichever content be
taken as basic, the other include what in the ueolies
is called the 'formal nature
(rat
object, and what in the Principle~i~~Ts caTled~the object's
'leading property, which constitutes its nature and
essence’ (Gewirth, p. 261).
*

Continuing, he says:

Similarly, the minimum requirement for an idea to be
distinct is that nothing contradictory to the essence
of its object be included in it? it is in this sense
that. Descartes defines a distinct idea as one which
'contains nothing other than what is clear
(Gewirth.
'

P

Zbi

j

think the

Although these two passages are somewhat vague,

I

following is a fair interpretation of Gewirth

account of

mivi

jmal clearness and distinctness:

1

s

An idea of x wi 1 1 be

scientifically or minimally clear and distinct if and only if
the Secondary Content contains nothing contradictory to the

essence of %, and, for every essential feature of

x,

the

11
Secondary Content contains a concept representing that feature

phis interprel

tion

i

s

\

pori

1

1

'

y

<

;

>le

and distinct perc ept ion be yo nd the
min -

i££2L®£®iHa

——

Ideas that are minimally or scientifically

clear and distinct can acquire greater
clarity and distinctness.
The clarity and distinctness of ideas can
be increased because
ideas possess explicit and implicit contents.
When the ideas

involved are not fictitious, they contain

"

a

ations” of which the mind is initially unaware
265-266)
o

i.

.

system of implic(Gewdrth, pp.

But the mind can progressively uncover this system

implications, and, by so doing, increase the clearness and

distinctness of its ideas.
Gewirth claims such increase would not be possible if
ideas did not have both direct and interpretive contents

(Ge-

wirth, p. 266)

Instead

He does not defend his claim, however.

,

he attempts to explain how the direct and the interpretive con-

tents function in the .process of increasing the clearness
and distinctness of our ideas.

He says:

The
ide
ihich remains fixed and unchanged thr<
the process in which properties previously unknown are
discpvc
'it* G
tot merely the initial direct
tent
nee
the 1 n t e :pr< five
cc >nteni
at tl
‘

’

.

•

-i

,

I

.

gives.
See p. 261.
I think Gewirth s definition, could be put
more succinctly, however: An idea of x is minimally clear nod
distinct: provided that the following two conditions held:
for every essential feature of x, the Secondary Content
(i
contains a concept representing that feature and
Secondary Content r<
Lned in i
(ii) n<
c jpt cor
sents a feature incompatible with an essential feature
'

)

,

of x.

Notice that the definition of minimal clearness and distinctness also violates west he scar ten says in Principle XLVI
See pp 17-18 above.
.
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with the direct content, is found to be necessarily
connected with the new properties, since these are
found
w°
necessarily connected with the initial content,
f
so that
the mind interprets each succeFdTng”property
to
be representative of the same object (Gewirth,
p. 266).
_

'

xhis passage is problematic for two reasons:

Gewirth seems to

be falling victim to the confusion of thinking it is
the

Interpretive Content and the direct content that are identical
at the outset

,

and he seems to be making the follow

ing claims
(Cl)

The initial direct content remains fixed and unchanged

throughout the process of amplification.
(C2)

The initial direct content does not remain fixed and

unchanged throughout the process of amplification
(since it "undergoes obvious increase").
(C3)

The interpretive content remains fixed and unchanged

throughout the process of amplification.
(C4)

The interpretive, content does not remain fixed and

unchanged throughout the process of amplification.
Gewirth seems to be asserting

(C4)

when he says "that the

mine,

interprets each succeeding property to be representative el
the same object."

The interpretive content is, accordin'-

to

Gewirth, the mind's interpretation of the direct content
h

are

direct content
iritt

•,

••

stc

i

goes

n<

:

repr sent ing th

>

f
:

ame ob j ect , it apj

that the interpretive content hae been amplified to include

Emph as 1 s mi ne
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the additional properties.

The cited passage seems to contain

two- inconsistencies
I

erhaps

leading.

v.e

can give Gewirth

!

s

remarks a more plausible

since Gewirth is trying to show us how we increase

the clearness and distinctness of ideas that meet the minimal
requirement:

we can assume that the following conditions

,

already obtain.
ana distinct.

There is an idea, of x that is minimally clear
—
3
This idea^ has a direct; content and a proposi-

tional component containing a Direct and an Interpretive
Content.

Although the direct content and the Interpretive

Content are not "equated" in the sense that they are identical,
they are equated in the sense that the conceptual contents of
the Direct and Interpretive Contents overlap in a crucial
area;

both represent the essence of the direct content.

When we increase.
increase, the clarity and distinctness

of:

a

minim-

id distinct idea, we begin the process with the
ally clear and

Direc t and

1 niterpre.tive
te rpre.t ive

a lly c le a r

id distinct
and
distinct.

Content used in making the idea minimWe can refer to these Direct and

as the init ial Direct and Interpretive
Inter preti' re Contents a

Contents

Gewirth thinks concepts can have. both explicit and implicit contents

.

The explicit contents are the contents one init-

ially recognized to be contained in his

.idea.

This explicit

content may include what, we can call essential concepts

concepts representing essential features of the object of our
idea.

The implicit contents of essential concepts are concepts

representing necessary features of that object,
mentions a person unschooled in geometry.

Gewirth

This person may

have an idea of a triangle as a three-sided figure (Gewirth,
p.

265)

t:enr.

The concept Trilaterality is both the explicit con-

.

and the essential concept of his idea.

Analyzing his

essential concept, the beginning geometrician realizes that

Trilaterality entails the concept Triangularity.
that

f.

We can

s,\/

ri angularity was implicitly contained in Trilateral.' ty

Having made an implicit content explicit, this person can add
to the explicit content of his idea of a triangle

representing

a

concept

a

necessary feature of triangles.

When the mind increases the clarity and distinctness

of:

one of its ideas.,, it does so by analyzing essential concepts

contained in the initial Direct Content of its ideas

The

contents of essential, concepts are themselves concepts repre-

senting necessary features of the direct content.

Once reveal

these contents of essential concepts can be added to what was

previously recognized to be explicitly contained in the ini tin
Direct Content.

Content

What results is an amplified initial Direct

the subsequent Direct Content.

-•

Since the initial
we are assuming

Interpretive Content is a content of an idea

to be minimally clear and distinct, this Interpretive Content
contain'!

;

.

th<

Direct Content.
in it Lai

Ii

esj >ntial

-

>ncepts contai

in the

;

id

:

;

al

Amplified to include this new content, the

terpretive Content becomes th

ive Content.

l

it
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Explicated in this way, Gewirth
sistent in the ways suggested.

1

s

passage is not incon-

When Gewirth claims paradoxi-

cally that the initial direct and Interpretive content does
and does not remain fixed, he is indicating in an enigmatic

way that there are five factors under consideration.
is the direct content itself.

There

Then there are the initial

Direct and Interpretive Contents and the subsequent Direct and

Interpretive Contents.

In one sense the initial Direct and

Interpretive Contents do remain fixed and unchanged throughout

the.

process of amplification.

They are, after all, pre-

cisely the explicit contents with which we began.

In another

sense, however, we can say that the initial Direct and .inter-

pretive Contents have undergone an increase, for the subsequent

Direct and Interpretive Contents are the initial Direct and

Interpretive Contents' increased to include concepts now recog-

nized to have been implicitly contained in an essential concept.
Since ideas representing necessary features of an object are

not inconsistent with essential features of that object and
since the concepts contained in essential concepts represent

necessary features, our idea remains minimal. ly clear
t.inct as its

anti

dis

clarity and distinctness is increased.

A problem with Gewir th
and distinctness.

Although

*

I

s

acc ount of minim al clearness

have labored to giro

a

lair

.
•

.

re ad in c of Gewirth'

s

account, his account remains problematic.

]

13 I disregard intensional problems in Gewirth' s formu.lat.ion
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He holds an idea of x to be minimally clear and distinct if
and only if the following conditions are satisfied:

every

essential feature of x is represented by a concept contained
in the Secondary Content,

and no concept contained in the

Secondary Content contradicts an essential feature of x (Gewirth
p.

261),

This formulation guarantees that the Secondary Content

will contain concepts representing x

'

essential properties,

but it does not guarantee that the Secondary Content will not

contain concepts expressed by predicates that are false of

x.

There are an infinite array of predicates that are false of
x but consistent with the predicates denoting the esse.nee of
x.

On Gewirth

1

account of minimal clearness and distrnctiv: s

s

one can have a minimally clear and distinct idea of x even

though the contents of his idea incorrectly represent x.
Clearly Gewirth'

s

definition needs patching up.

A revised definition.

Gewirth is talking about scient-

ific knowledge and the advancement of science when he sets
forth the minimum -'requirement and tells us how to incj ease

l

.,-

clarity and distinctness of minimally clear and distinct ideas
(Gewirth, p.

261).

In science, he says, "the concern is with

the essences of things"

(Gewirth, p. 261).

Additionally,

Gewirth contends that only those ideas that are not

i.j

ctiunal

contain a system of implications that deduction can reveaj.
As an example of such a nonfictions.! idea, he offers
idea of a
of a triangle, which is for Descartes the

essence
immutable nature having a determinate nature 01

„

28

p.

265)

What mathematical demonstration is concerned to

.

reveal is this nature or essence (Gewirth, p. 265)

The con-

tingent properties that this or that triangle may happen to

possess are of no interest to the geometer.

Since,

for Des-

cartes, geometry and mathematics provide the model for all

disciplines properly classified as sciences, we would be in
keeping with Descartes' views if we amended Gewirth 's definition
of minimal or scientific clearness and distinctness so that
the Secondary Content contained no ideas representative of

contingent properties.

Accordingly, we can say that an idea

of x is minimally clear and distinct just in case every concent

contained in the Secondary Content represents a necessary
feature of x and each essential feature of x is represented
by a concept contained in the Secondary Content.
II.

14

AN EXPOSITION OF GEWIRTH' S ACCOUNT OF HOW WE

ASCERTAIN CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS

Having provided his clarification of Descartes' notion
of clearness and distinctness, Gewirth moves on to discuss how
v/e

The

ascertain whether our ideas are clear and distinct.

main,

ingredient in the process he uses is the method of dif fer-

ence
^"^.Alternative 1 y we could say that the Secondary Content
>ressed by predicates that falsely descu
>thing
contain
While avoiding the criticism directed against. Gewirth. s
y.
.

.

>

ould
explicit formulation, this alternativ<
Gewirth
Secondary Content to represent contingent properties.
Gewirth,
pp.
See
does not adopt this alternative, however.

29

method of differ ence

Using the method of difference

we find out whether parts of ideas are
necessarily or contingently connected.
Gewirth uses Descartes' example of the idea
of a winged horse to illustrate how the method
of difference

works (Gewirth, pp. 269-270)
-

•

This idea contains the ideas

of being winged and being a horse, ideas that can be
shown

by the method of difference
1

to be contingently connected.

can think of horses that are not winged and of winged things

that are not horses.
Gewirth'

s

discussion of Winged Horse

suggests the

following account of the method of difference.

A person A

ascertains by this method that an idea of x and an idea of y
are contingently connected if and only if A recognizes that

there is a possible world in which x exists apart from y or
y_

exists apart from

x.

And

a

person A ascertains by the method

of difference that an idea of x and an idea of y are necessar-

ily connected if and only if A recognizes that there is no

possible world in which x exists apart from v or y exists apart
from

x.

It is not difficult to see how we use the method of

difference to find out whether ideas are contingently connected

A recognizes that there is a possible world in which x exists
apart from y if A conceives of such a world.

other hand,

not.

It is, on the

so easy to see how we use the method of differ-

269-270 and Alan Gewirth, "The Cartesian Circle," The Iholosophical Review, L (July. 1943) p. 371.

ence to find out whether ideas are necessarily
connected,
A
cannot inspect every possible world to see
whether x exists
apart f ron v in each.
If such inspection were required, A

could not ascertain by the method of difference
that his idea
of - is necessarily connected with his idea of
But we can
y.

suppose that Gewirth thinks A does

not.

have to inspect possible

worlds in order to recognize that there is no possible world
.L'.i

which x exists apart from y„

He could construct an argu-

ment to this effect instead.
Wha t the method of diff erence ac tually accomplishes

.

Gewirth thinks the method of difference is important because
it allows us to ascertain which of our ideas are fictional and

which are ideas of true and immutable natures, and, by the
process

same,

which of our definitions are nominal and which

,

essential.

are.

Having- ascertained this much, we can easily

complete

the.

from

obscure and confused ideas.

the.

process of distinguishing the clear and distinct
As Gewirth says-.

The question of how the clearness and distinctness of
ideas are to be ascertained is thus basically the same
as the question of how the mind, within the methodological! context of ideas and perceptive acts, can ascertain
that its definitions of objects-, which it employs as a
basis for evaluating the clearness and distinctness of
the equating of direct and interpretive contents, are
real and not merely nominal or arbitrary (Gewirth, p.
267

)

.

This passage contains the following claim:
(C)

The process by which we ascertain whether our ideas
are clear and distinct is "basically the same" as the

process by which we determine whether our definitions

are real" or essential.

Since the method of difference is the method Gewirth
believes

Descartes uses to determine whether our definitions
are
(C)

is equivelant to
(

C,

)

l

real,.

(O'):

he process by which we ascertain whether our ideas

are clear and distinct is "basically the same" as the

method of difference.

Althougn

basically the same" as the method for ascertaining

clearness and distinctness, the method of difference is not

applicable to ideas ^

.

As a part of the overall method for

ascertaining clearness and distinctness, however, the method
of difference can be applied to the Direct and Interpret!' e

Contents

ideas 9

—

of ideas o, and it can find out for us

whether these ideas 2 are fictional or whether they are ideas
of true and immutable natures.

Why the method of difference is useful.

whether an

i de

a^

To ascertain

of x is clear and distinct, we need to be

able to find out whether every concept contained in the Second
ary content of our idea

represents a necessary feature of x

and whether the Secondary Content contains, for every essentia
feature of x, a concept representing that feature.

Although

the method of difference is a method for distinguishing fic-

tional ideas from ideas of true and immutable natures,

Ge'wi

thinks the method of difference is the one we need, for the
ideas of true and immutable natures are in his view the ideas
that,

rcoresent essences.

Speaking of ideas of true and immutable
natures, he says:
If, then, the mind finds that it cannot
deny the parts of
roe as of one another and still be true to
the
each part directly presented to it, such ideas meaning which
are representative of objects which are essentia] natures
indepe
0 nt of the mind for their being what they
are.
The direct
contents of these ideas are seen as a result of this
method of difference' to represent the essence, or
least part of the essence, of the objects which they at
are
interpreted as representing ... (Gewirth, p. 270).
Here Gewirth is telling us that all ideas of true and
immutable

natures represent essences.

But are ideas of true and immut-

able natures the only ideas that represent essences, or are

there some fictional ideas; that also represent essential

features?

Gewirth
ator

*

’

s

discussion of the wax example and of the

i del-

idea of God suggest that he believes there are no fic-

s

tional essential concepts.

Regarding the wax example, he says:

And only in virtue of such a reductive process [of eliminating as contents of our ideas parts representing contingent properties) is the resultant perceptive act clear
(as attaining the es
ice of the object, in that th
content which is actually representative of the essence
of the object which it is interpreted as representing has
been made ’present and open to the attending mind’) and
d istinc t (as excluding everything
other than* what is
essential)
The wax is thus ascertained to consist essentially of extension and mobility, not of any peculiar
colours, sounds, and tastes; hence, at the conclusion of
the reductive process whereby the sense qualities are
removed, Descartes writes that the perception of the wax
’can be either imperfect and confused, as it was before,
or clear and distinct, as it is now, in so far as I at send
less or more t£) the things of which it consists' (Gewirth,
'

.

pp.

271-272}/

Hero Gewirth is saying that Descartes' original idea was obscure
15

Emphasis mine

33

cinci

confused because it contained fictional ideas representing

wax as having contingent properties like yellowness and
ness.

'Hard-

At the end of the reductive process, the idea that

emerges is still Descartes’ idea of wax, but it no longer contains fictional parts.

What remains is the idea of

a true, and

immutable nature, an idea having as its contents the ideas of

mobility and extension.

Jointly these ideas represent all and

only the essence of wax so that Descartes’ idea., when

proper.).

$

reduced, is clear and distinct.

It seems, then, that when

Descartes' idea,, contained fictional ideas, it was obscure and
confused.

But when the method of difference was used to reduce

what was fictional to an idea of

a.

true and immutable nature,

Descartes' idea n of wax became clear and distinct.
The example of the idolater's idea of God is similar,

but here Gewirt.h is more explicit.

He says:

Mot every idea which is interpreted to be representative
The idea will have these
of God is clear and distinct.
qualities only if ’we do not put anything ficticious into
it, but note those things alone which ‘are really contained
in it, and which we evidently perceive to pertain to the
nature of the most perfect being' (Gewirth, p. 259).
Our idea of God is clear and distinct only if "we do not put

anything fictitious into it." And we safeguard against putting
fictitious content into our idea when we make sure that we
include in the

t

content ideas representing only "the nature

of the most perfect being."

Hence, an idea of God is clear

and distinct only if its contents are not fictional.

Although the wax and God examples show that for Gewirth

O A4

>0

oortk,

icieas

are clear ana distinct only if they contain no

fictional ideas, these examples do not show that Gewirt.h believes all fictional ideas to represent contingent rather than

essential properties.

On the other hand if Gewirth believes

there are fictional essential concepts, he neither states nor

suggests that this is so.

Although Gewirth gives

nv.

irons

examples of ideas that are, or can be made, clear and Oislinc'

.

he never gives us an instance of a clear and distinct, idea

whose contents are fictional.

Aside from the ideas of

and God, which remain obscure and confused so long as they

contain fictional contents, Gewirth

1

s

examples

of:

clear and

distinct ideas are drawn exclusively from simple ideas and
from ideas of true and immutable natures.
By themselves, the wax and God examples support but do

not justify the conclusion that Gewirth believes the essential

concepts to be the ideas of the true and immutable natures.
On the other hand,
to Gewirth.

I

think it is safe to attribute this belie

f

For, if Gewirth does not equate the ideas of true

and immutable natures with ideas representing essential
natures, it is difficult to see why he thinks his method of

difference can help us to ascertain which of our ideas are

minimally clear and distinct.
The method Gewirth thinks Des<

minimal clearness and distinctness.

t

?ert

Having shown why Gewirth

thinks the method of difference helps us to ascertain which
of our concepts are essential, we can try to consLruct. a

description of the overall method Gewirth thinks Descartes
used to ascertain which of his ideas, are clear and distinct.

Gewirth says:
The reduction [of complex ideas to their simple
contents] attains this perceptual clearness and distinctness because it enables the mind, within the methodological context of ideas and perceptive acts, to 'distinguish
that which pertains to the true and immutable essence of
a thing, from that which is attributed to it only through
a fiction of the understanding.'
The contents of a fictitious idea, such as that of
a winged horse or of a triangle inscribed in a square, can
be clearly and distinctly conceived in separation from one
another, i. e. even if one part be explicitly denied of
the other, each can still be fully conceived without in
any way contradicting the signifigance which it presents
to the mind.
An idea will be representative of a true
and immutable nature, then, if the connection of its
contents is necessary, not contingent, so that they cannot
be sundered by way of a 'real' distinction;
'although
one can think of the one without poying any ai tent ion to
the other, one cannot, however deny it of that other when
one thinks of both.' 'Those ideas which do not contain
true and immutable natures, but only ficticious ones
compounded by the understanding can be divided by that
same understanding not only by abstraction, but by a
clear and distinct operation so that those which th
understanding cannot thus divide have undoubtedly not
If, then, the mind finds the.
been compounded by itself.'
of
ideas
of one another and v i i.l
it cannot deny the parts
be true to the meaning which each part directly presented
to it, such ideas are representative of objects which are
essential natures independent of the mind for being what
The direct contents of these ideas are seen,
they arej
to represent
as a result of this 'method of difference'
the essence, or at least part of the essence, of the
objects which they are interpreted as representing, so that
the direct and interpretive contents are equal to one
another Gewirth pp. 269-270).
,

.

,

(

,

It seems to me that Gewirth has something like the following
in mind.

A person acquires an idea., of x when he predicates

something of
tiring he

x.

This person is saying in effect that some-

recognized as having certain properties is or repre-*

sents a such and such.

The properties recognized to belong

to x constitute the direct content of
his .idea, of x.

This

:>

conta ins both a Direct Content representing x
and an
interpretation of x. The idea, of x will be clear and
distinct
.if.
and only if the given interpretation fits the
thing
idecj.3

inter-

preted in the appropriate way.

An interpretation that fits

represents all the essential features and only necessary features of the thing interpreted.
to fit in one of two ways:

One gets the interpretation

he can modify his interpretation

or he can change what it is that he is interpreting.

To make the appropriate adjustments

,

one must carry out

a reduction on either the Direct or the Interpretive Content.

The content reduced is the Secondary Content.

It is reduced

in the sense that it is altered in a way that makes it

representative of

a true

and immutable nature.

To get the

Secondary Content properly reduced, we use the method of difference.

We take the properties represented by the explicit

concepts contained in the Secondary Content, and we see whether

we can conceive of the object of the Basic Content as existing

without these properties.
as exi£ ting ap

1

fc

:r<

m

:h<=

Properties that can be conceived
ob

je< t

of the B

isi

-

Coi

enl

;

1

=

contingent properties of that object; properties that cannot
be so conceived are necessary features of that object and
are represented by the essential concepts

entail.

or concepts these

Having identified those concepts that represent

necessary features, we can pare down the Secondary Content

37

it contains just those concepts.

We have a difficulty, however.

Although we have ascer-

tained that the Secondary Content of our idea_ of
x contains
—
3
only concepts representing necessary features, we
have not

ascertained whether every essential feature of x is represented
by a concept the Secondary Content contains. Suppose I
have
an idea^ of x that includes explicitly in its Secondary Content.

concepts representing features F

~"1

method of difference,

,

f
~2.

and F. of —
x.
~*J

find out that F

I

necessary features but that F

and F

is contingent.

Usinc the
J

are among x’s
In finding out

^

this much,

I

have not ascertained whether F

tial features of x, and

3.

and f 9 are essen-

have not found out whether every

essential feature of x is represented by a concept contained
in my Secondary Content.

Gewirth seems

to-

assume that every essential property

of x is represented by a concept contained explicitly

Secondary Content.
language.

Lr

the

This assumption reveals itself in Gewirth-'

s

He refers to the process by which the Secondary

Content is adjusted as a process of reduc tio n

.

Evidently la

thinks the Secondary Content contains explicitly all the

essential concepts and may contain in addition concept-- representing contingent properties.

For this reason, he thinks we

make our ideas clear and distinct when we redu ce the Secondary

Content so that concepts representing contingent
are eliminated.

prep-

But can Gewirth assume that the Secondary

Content contains all

th c

-

c s sant i a 1

concepts

Plainly he cannot.
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II the Secondary Content of an

idea,.,

of x always contains,

for

every essential feature of x, a concept representing
that
tea-cure,

then, on the revised definition of minimal
clearness

and distinctness, every .idea^ is clear.

But this is a conclu-

sion Gewirth is anxious to avoid.

Although Gewirth does not address the difficulty
j..

arsing, we can suggest a direction he might pursue.

am

I

He could

try to argue that it is the Basic rather than the Secondary

Content that contains in its explicit contents all the
essential concepts.

I

do not know how Gewirth would go about.

supporting such a claim, but if he could support it, he can
ascertain clearness and distinctness in the following way.

After having reduced the Secondary Content of his idea

of y
3

until it contains only concepts representing necessary features
of x, he could carry out a similar reduction with respect to
the Basic Content of his idea.

Once this reduction is comple-

ted, he will have remaining as the explicit contents of the

Basic Content only concepts representing necessary features
of x.

Among these will be all the essential concepts.

Although

Gewirth will not know which ones these are, he can find out.
The reduced explicit contents consist of some concepts that
are not entailed by any others that they do not entail.

1

5

Having identified these, Gewirth can now compare the explicit
contents of the reduced Basic and Secondary Contents.

tha

If the

Using this formulation, we "Leave open the possibility
mutually entailed concepts represent essential features.
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Secondary Content does not have all the essential
concepts
contained in the Basic Content, it is obscure. But
if it

contains them all, it is clear.
By applying the method of difference to the
Secondary

Content, we can find out whether our idea is distinct or
confused, and by applying the same method to both the Basic
and

Secondary Content, we can find out whether our idea is clear
or obscure.
G ewirth

*

s

a cc ount of the prin cipal i deas

Gewirth thinks

.

Descartes used his method of difference in the Meditations to
arrive at clear and distinct ideas of God, the mind, and matter
(Gewirth, p. 273)

.

It is these ideas Gewirth thinks Descartes

was referring to when he told Gassendi he had enumerated all
the principal ideas and distinguished the clear and distinct

from the obscure and confused ones (Gewirth, p. 273)

,

Once

the method of difference reveals the essential concepts con-

tained in the principal ideas, we have standards of comparison
that allow us to determine whether alternative definitions are
real or nominal

(

Gewirth

r

pp.

272-273)

.

In this way we can

within the context of ideas and the perceptive act ascertain
which of our ideas are clear and distinct.
A ps ychologica l c omponen t in Descar tes

f

cr iteri on for

as cert ain ing minimal c lea rness and distinctness

psychological or subjective aspect to Descartes

difference

,

however.

.

’

There is a

method of

In the case of fictional ideas,

the

mind has the ability to conceive of the parts of the idea as
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lepresent.j.ng things that could really
exist separately.

But

the mind lacks this ability when it
attempts conceptually to

disjoin the parts of an idea of a true and
immutable nature.
Whenever tne mind uses the method of difference
to achieve such
a disjunction, the logic of the
idea constrains the mind to
acknowledge that the parts it seeks to disjoin are
inseparable.
The method of difference is self-defeating in these
cases.

Every attempt to disjoin the parts of such an idea
helps to
convince uhe mind that these parts are necessarily connected.
As Gewirth says:
xhe factor determining which ideas are representative of
the essences oi various objects, and hence clear and distinct, consists in that which the ideas themselves cornu el
the mind to perceive after it has reduced them to their
elements and tried to separate and combine them in various
ways.
There is, indeed, a psychological aspect of the
method, also, as is shown, for example, in Descartes'
description of intuition as 'a pure and attentive mind's
conception, so facile and distinct that there remains no
doubt concerning that, which we understand.'
But this
facility and indubitableness are regarded by him as effects
rat ner chan as causes of clearness and distinctness in
the logical and perceptual senses, as culminating the process whereby the mind recognizes the contents of ideas to
be of such sort that it is unable to perceive them in any
way other than the connection before it (Gewirth, p. 2 76)

Although the mind ascertains whether an idea is clear and distinct or obscure and confused by determining whether the parts
of the idea can be disjoined by the mind, the ability or inabil

ity of the mind to separate the parts depends upon how the part
are connected in fact.

The mind's subjective or psychological

state subsequent to its application of

the.

method of differ-

ence depends at least in part on the logical features of the
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idea under consideration.

In short, Descartes' method for

ascertaining which of our ideas are clear and
distinct is not
j.or Gewrrth
"divorced from all logical considerations"

(Gev

irth, p.

253)

III.

goals*

Wo now turn to a critical examination

of Gewirth’s article.
'"O

Gxtide his own

CRITICISM

—

Gewirth has three fundamental goals

criticism of Descartes,

criticism on Descartes’ behalf,

'

to answer Gassendi

5

and to show how it is poss-

ible that obscure and confused ideas can be made clear and

distinct.

In Gewirth'

s

view, we can realize these three goals

only if we subscribe to the thesis that ideas have direct and

interpretive contents.

But as

I

want to show

,

the distinction

between direct and interpretive contents cannot accompli ish
as much as Gewirth supposes.

introduced.

Other distinctions need to be

Gewirth did not get clear regarding these other

distinctions, however, and as
fails to achieve

-che

a

result his interpretation

goals set for it.

Let us recall Gassendi's criticism.

Gassendi objected

that Descartes had not provided a method for identifying which
•

of our ideas are clear and distinct.

As we noted earlier,

Descartes' reply was too cryptic to be convincing.
J

y

.L

"I

Q
o

1

9

See pp. 4-6 above.
.

See pp. 3~ 4 above.
See p.

4

above.

’i

°

Recognizing

A?

tho need

j.or

an elaboration of Descartes'

reply, Gewirth

attempted on Descartes' behalf to
show that Descartes had
provided the requisite method.
Ge w i rth’^ de fense of his distincti on
between direct and
ter^rel^ye contents.
A major contention in Gewirth'
s elaboration of Descartes' reply to Gassendi
is the claim that
we must attribute to Descartes the
distinction between direct
ana interpretive contents.
In defense of this view, Gewirth
seems to offer two lines of justification:

—

(Jl)

Descartes

reply to Gassendi will succeed only if

Descartes recognizes a distinction between direct
and interpretive contents.
(J2)

J.

here is adequate textual evidence to support the

claim that Descartes did draw a distinction between
direct and interpretive contents."'’
1

do not intend to quarrel with (J2)

The evidence that sup-

ports it does show that Descartes believes we have ideas on

which we put interpretations.

On the other hand,

I

do want

to show that Gewirth has not given us satisfactory grounds for
(Jl)

.

implies that Descartes' reply to Gassendi will fail

(Jl)

unless we attribute to Descartes a distinction between direct

and interpretive contents.

Gassendi claimed Descartes had no

way to decide between conflicting claims of clear and distinct
perception
20 Se<

1
1

.

the di

es

repli

th

had

j

ion of how the same .idea can be clear
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method for distinguishing clear and distinct from obscure and
confused ideas.
a method,

Gewirth agrees that Descartes provided such

but he thinks that the method functions adequately

only if Descartes makes use of a distinction between direct
and interpretive contents.

But is Gewirth right?

E vidence to sho w that we do not nee d the distinction

between dire ct

int er pret ive contents in order to use the

arid

method of d ifference effec tively

.

The method of difference

functions primarily to distinguish essential from nominal

definitions on the one hand and ideas of true and immutable
.

.

natures from fictional ideas on the other.

o

1

The latter ideas

have contingently connected parts and are therefore not repre-

sentative of the essences of things.

22

Ideas of true and

immutable natures, on the other hand, have necessarily con0 -3

,

nected contents and arc representative of essential natures,'
Gewirth cites the idea of

a

winged horse and

a

inscribed in a square as examples of fictional ideas.
can ascertain that these ideas

are.

triangle
'"

q

fictional simply because

we can really distinguish their parts

.

We can think of wings

existing apart from horses and vice versa, and we can think
of triangles that are not inscribed and of inscribed figures

and distinct or obscure and confused depending on what
" v i ewe d as”,
pp 7-8 ab ove
.

21„

See p. 30 above

22
23

above

See p.
Ibi d,

>4

/

Ibid.

it

is

that are not triangles.

Signif igantly

,

in these examples the

.

disjoined parts are not the
direct and the inter
tents.
They are rather the explicit
contents of the idea'"
In his discussion of how
we extend clearness and
distinct
ness beyond the minimum
requirement, Gewirth says:
»
This
variation in degree [of clearness
and distinctness] reveals
another distinction, in addition
to that between direct and
interpretive contents, required to
give clearness and distinctness a normative basis. This
other distinction
is between,

the explicit and implicit
contents of an idea”
/u4)

>int out that from a si

•

ici1 vantage point

(Gewirth, p.

ctly

j

choice

an idea is precisely and exhaustive]'/

that content of which the mind is
at any time aware
(Gewirth, p. 2f5)

.

This content is the explicit content.,
nut

an idea may contain an .implicit
content of which the mind .v,
not presently cognizant.
Gewirth cites Descartes' example, of
a

person who is unlearned in geometry.

This person thinks of

a triangle as a three sided figure and
does not realize that

his idea contains implicitly contents that
geometrical

demonstration can reveal (Gewirth, p. 265)
'

'

:

lied th

whether the ideas of
iii

a

sQUaic were

present awareness

r

a

f

s

to det

i rr

ine

winged horse and a triangle inscribed

ictiona.j.

—

thod of d i

;

,

we simply took the contents in

'being winged*

,

'being

a

horse',

'being
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a

triangle'

,

and 'being inscribed in

a

square' -- and deter-

mined whether we can think of the
properties represented by
these ideas as existing in separation
from each other. The
contents involved in this operation were
the explicit contents,
and a n accurd.e description of how we
determined that the ideas
in question were fictional would
make no reference to direct
cr interpretive contents.
Can the same point be made with respect to
ideas of
true and immutable natures? It would seem so.
Consider again
the idea of a triangle.

If the person unschooled in geometry

has the idea of a triangle as a three sided figure,
his idea

represents a true and immutable nature because the method of

difference shows us that we cannot conceive of a triangle that
is not uhree si dec. or of a three sided figure that is not

triangle (Gewirth,

p.

2 70)

.

a

In this .instance the contents

shown to be inseparable by the method of difference are once
again the explicit contents
a

three sided figure,

'

'being a triangle' and ’being

and references to direct and interpret-

ive contents seem eliminable

Since we do not need to refer to direct and interpretive

contents to describe adequately how we ascertain which of our
ideas are fictional and which represent true and immutable
natures, we may be able to devise an account of how we ascer-

tain clearness and distinctness that does not require the

distinction between direct and interpretive contents.
A rival account.

Against Gewirth 's account, we can now
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offer a rival interpretation

(RI)

.

According to the RI, one's

idea is clear and distinct just
in case it is an idea of a
true
and immutable nature.
One can ascertain whether his idea
represents a true and immutable nature
or essence by using the
method c£ difference. But one can
effectively use this method
witnout. relying on the distinction
between direct and interpretive contents. Consequently, Gewirth's
distinction seems
unneccesary

My point in putting forth the RI is
RI is the correct interpretation.

It is,

not:

to show that the

rather, to show that

the RI is an least as good, and perhaps better,
than Gew rtb
:

interpretation so that

(Jl)

'

s

is false.

Gewi rth thinks the wax exampl e supp o rts his account.

Defending his interpretation of Descartes, Gewirth argues that
Descartes

1

example of the wax requires a distinction between

direct and interpretive contents.

On Gewirth's interpret at ion

of the example, various sensed qualities are represented

wax.

:v:

Ks a result there is both a direct and an interpretive

content.

Descartes applies the method of difference to these

contents to show that the wax can exist apart from all the

secondary qualities taken to be contents of the wax.

Gewirth

s ay s

This "identity" of the wax throughout the changing of the 0
direct content, which is greatly emphasized by Descartes,*"
,

or

^Gewirth misplaces

modifier here,
What Descartes
identity of the wax despite the changes it
never alludes to the direct content of. his
is misleading as a result.

a

and his statement
emphasizes is the
Des carte
undergoes.
idea.
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^

W

can be understood onljf through the
interpretive aspect
doctrine of
2£
[7 2 F— Tt"
EeSSsk
i sd
perception is help cc
ant that the reductive process can
be viewed in the methodological context,
as going from
accidental to essential attributes of the same
object
ana not from one set of .ideas to another
wholly unrelated
thereto. Tne process consists, then, in gradually
divesting the direct content interpreted as
representing a certain object of the forms external' to that
object, i, e
of those qualities with whose denial the
object can still
be conceived, so that there is no necessary
connection
between the object and those qualities. The end of the
process comes when a direct content is attained which
survives every reductive device, remaining so long as the
object can be conceived, and without which the object can.
no longer be conceived. This direct content is hence
necessarily connected with the interpretive content wherebv
the mind L-hinks 01 the object in question, and constitutes
the essential definition of that object (Gewirth, p. 271)

H

'

.

dow the wax exampl e is expl ained on the
is mistaken here.

(RI).

Gewirth

Although we do need some distinction

internal to ideas and the perceptive act if we are to explain

how the wax can be conceived to be self- identical throughout
the reductive process, the distinction we need does not have

to be the distinction between direct and interpretive contents.

Gewirth has already given us two additional distinctions.

In

his discussion of how we extend the clearness and distinctness
of our ideas beyond the minimal requirement, Gewirth made use
of the distinction between explicit and implicit contents and

presupposed the distinction between initial and subsequent
contents (Gewirth, pp. 264-266)
If we used these distinctions instead of the distinction

between direct and interpretive contents, we could ascertain
'Emphasis mi ne
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the clearness and distinctness of
our idea of wax in the
following way. We could say that our
i
s of yellowness, hardness, fragrance, etc. constitute the
initial content of our
idea.
This content might represent the essence
of wax or it
•.

might not.

We must use the method of difference to
find out.

Taking each part of cur idea in turn, we see
whether we
can conceive or the wax existing apart from the
property
represented by the constituent idea.

If the represented pro

party and the wax can exist apart, we know that the property
in question is not part of the essence of wax, and we
exclude

the idea representing that property from the subsequent content,
Tj.

lis

process continues until we are left with

a

subsequent

content that represents properties inseparable from wax.
a

As

result, our subsequent idea represents the essence of wax

and is clear and distinct, and we achieved this result without reference to direct or interpretive contents,

A repl y to the

_(RX)_

account of the wax example

«

By way

of reply, Gewirth might ask how we know it is still wax of which

we are thinking when we divest the initial content of some of
its parts.

He might urge that we could not know that we are

still thinking of wax throughout the reductive process unless

we had another idea of wax

the interpretive content

—

which, remains constant and acts as the standard against which

we measure and adjust our initial idea

—

the direct content.

Let us examine carefully the reply we have imagined

Gewirth to offer.

Initially at

t

my idea of wax contains
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constituent ideas x
-1

*

,

n-1

at a subsequent content x
-1"

Let U3 sa Y that at t„
T

*

.

v

an<3

arrive

I

x

allege that this
subsequent content better
represents the essence of
wax because
an idea representing a
contingent property previously
believed
to be part of the essence
has been removed.
I make this claim
because I can eliminate x and cHn ^
anci stl11 conceive of
the thing
represented bv“ x
^
as existing or, as
Descartes would
—
n-i
say; as a complete thing
•

• •

'2n-l<

\

.

r

Gi anting that

,x _
n 3

_

G evj.r th could counter that
if

wax was,

I

represents a complete thing,
did not know at the outset what

could not know that the complete
thing represented by
Suppose, for example, that x represents
~l'""?-n-l is wax
I

‘

t]jG

pr ° perty of raobilit
Y

.

an essential property of wax.

when

I

remove

from my original idea, the resulting
idea x^, „., x
coulct Still represent a complete
thing, but the thing represented would nor be wax. When we exchange
one content represen ring a complete thing for another
representing a complete
c

we have no way of knowing that the complete
things represented by these two contents are identical.
To know
citing

,

this, we

a.ole

to ascertain that the difference between the
two

contents resulted only from a change of parts
representing con-

tingent properties.

But we cannot know that only contingent

features are involved unless we know the essence of the
object

represented.
mn.-t

a vJ.e

In going from x

i

,

...,x

to determine that x

part of the essence.

In short

to

x,

,

I

~n~l
does or does not represent
ri

I

need an .interpretive content.
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raises new problems for Gewirth

'

s

If taken seriously , this reply may
perhaps be as
damaging to Gewlrth s interpretation as
to the HI.
Just how
is the fixed interpretive content
in the
:

wax example supposed

to function as the needed standard
of comparison?

vague on this point,

lie

Gewirth is

assures us that we need a fixed

interpretive content, but he does not tell us
what this content
must contain.
1

k seems

-° me that we can make sense of what Gewirth
is

saying only if we suppose that the interpretive content
contains the essence and that the contained essence is somehow

revealed to the mind

Then by consulting the list of essenti

p r op e r t i e s re ve a 1 e. d to me by the interpretive content,

discover whether

property of wax.

x

—

represents an essential or
If x n appears on the list, x
'

a

I

i

can

contingent
represents

part of the essence; if not, it represents a contingent property

27

but

content?

nos?

do we come by the analysis of the interpretive

There appear to be two possibilities.

Either the

essential definition is just there in the interpretive content
and available when we reflect on it or the essential definition
is ascertained by some process.

If the first disjunct were

correct, the interpretive contents of our ideas would be pre-

sent and open to the mind.

To ascertain essential definitions,

27 I assume, of course, that x
like that of being a round square.

is not an impossible idea
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the mind would only have to attend
to the interpretive content
of its ideexs

On this view, we would not need
the method of difference
order to ascertain essential
definitions, and Gewirth's and
Descartes’ emphasis on the role of the
method of difference
ln acquiri:n g essential definitions
would be pointless. Also,

m

if direct introspection of an
interpretive content suffices

to reveal its essential definition,
then Gassendi was just!

fied when he criticized Descartes for failing
to provide an

erfeenve procedure for deciding between two philosophers
who
disagree regarding an essential definition.
the only way around Gassendi’s criticism is
to fall back

on the second possibility and to contend that we
ascertain

essential definitions contained in the interpretive content
b Y applying some method to this content.

If Gewirth adopts

this alternative, nc would have to specify what method he has
in mind.

It is either the method of difference itself or some

other method.
tel.J

If it is some ether method, he is obliged to

us what the method is.

he is trapped in a circle.

If it is the method of difference,

By hypothesis, we cannot reveal

the essential definition contained in the interpretive content

unless we use the method of difference.

But in using the

method of difference, we must, Gewirth tells us, have
*

•

interpretive content.

This fixed content,

I

a fixed
9 Q
0

have argued,"'

must represent the essence and must in some way reveal this
o o
"
°

See p

„

50 above

essence to us.

Consequently, the method of
difference cannot
reveal to us the essential
definition contained in the
interpretive content unless we
already know the definition
we are

setting out to reveal.
Let me recapitulate.
1

Against Gewirth 's interpretation,

have offered a rival interpretation

(RI)

29

which did not

require the distinction between direct
and interpretive contents to give an account of clearness
and distinctness.
According to the RI an idea is clear and
distinct if and only
if it is an idea of a true and
immutable nature, and
,

one can

determine whether an idea is clear and
distinct by using the
met nod of difference to show that the
explicit contents of the
rdea are necessarily connected.

I

noted that Gewirth could

counter that one cannot show that the contents of
an idea are
necessarily connected unless there is a fixed interpretive
coimenu,

i

replied that such

a

fixed interpretive content

would have to contain and reveal the essential definition of
the thing in question,
o:oj.y

I

then pointed out that there were

three possible ways to ascertain this essential definitior

Jxifcot introspection ,

method.

the method of difference

,

or some other

The first approach left Descartes open to Gassendi's

criticism, the second led Gewirth in a circle, and the third

required Gewirth to show that there is a method besides the
method of difference for determining essential definitions.
29

See pp

.

45-46 abo v o
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Nothing in Descartes or in
Gewirth's interpretation of him
uggests however that there is
such a second method, and I
conclude that Gewirth's interpretation
fares no better than
the El in explaining how the
wax could remain self-identical
throughout the reductive process.
,

,

The failure of Gewirth’s defense
of mj_.
Gewirth is
faced with a dilemma here.
In assessing various interpretations of clearness and distinctness
in Descartes, he could
be stringent and demand that a satisfactory
interpretation
explain how wax remains self-identical
throughout the reductive
process, or he could be lenient and not demand
that interpretations explain so much.
If he adopts the former stance,
he

wilr be forced to reject his own interpretation
along with the
al

,

o.nd lie

will have failed to do fend Descartes against Gas-

sendi's criticism.

If, on the other hand, he adopts the latter

alternative, he removes his objection against the Rl/
his defense of (Jl)

collapses.

1

'

and

Without introducing the dis-

tinction between direct and interpretive contents, the Rl

t

it

seems, can account for as much as one can hope to explain

about clearness and distinctness in Descartes.
^ y to de cide

bet': e’e n

the

(

RI

and Gewirth's account,

Gewirth need not accept these conclusions, however.

While

admitting that his interpretation explains no better than the
Ri how wax remains self -identical throughout the reductive
30 See

pp.

48-49 above
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process, Gewirth could insist
that his interpretation is
the
better one. We have not as yet
tested the RI against the exampies that Gewirth used to frame
his own theory in the f i r s t
place.
If Gewirth' s interpretation
were, but the suggested
alternative were not, able to account
for these, examples,
Gewirth would have good Grounds lor
retaining his own interpretation over against the RI
ITimlb

Gewirth

1

s

acc oun t fail s for simple

i deas

.

The

reader will recall that Gewirth cited
two examples, one regardi.ng ideas of sensation,
the other the ideas of thought and
extension.
In each case the idea was clear and
distincu or
oos cure and confused depending on the interpretation
selected

According to Descartes, ideas of sensation and the idea:
of thought and extension are simple ideas,

0

*"

and

that simple ideas are problematic for Gewirth'
S p e a k i n g o f s imp 1 e s

s

turns out

interprets ion

Gewirth says:

Unlike composite ideas, in which it is possible to discriminate from one another not only direct and interpretive
contents, but also various parts of the direct content,
the necessity of whose connection with one another in the
idea is not self-evident, the simple, natures cannot be
misinterpreted, for it is impossible to discriminate in
them a direct and an interpretive content. To think of
these simples at all is to think of them completely, and
hence clearly; similarly, their very simplicity makes it
difficult for the mind to confuse them with, i.ei interpret
them as, anything 'other' than themselves, so that thev
are perceived distinctly as well (Gewirth, pp. 268-269).
In this passage, Gewirth makes a number of dubious claims:
O

T

Rules, pp

.

41-42, and Princ

.

XI, VI 1 1

,

p.

238.

lho simple natures have no
discriminate direct and

(1)

interpretive content.
(2)

(3)

The simple natures cannot
be misinterpreted.
Whenever one thinks of a simple
nature, the simple
idea representing that nature
.is

(4)

clear.

All simple ideas are distinct.

Each of these claims is false.

Gewirth's own examples to

show that ideas must have direct and
interpretive- contents
are counterexamples to (2).
But in the quoted passage, (1)
entails (2) so that (1) .is false as well.
If I have not misunderstood what I take to be the very core
of Gewirth's article, Gewirth holds to all the following.
Not only can sensations be interpreted but they can have any
number of inter-

pretations.
ule
cuiy

'

furthermore, they can be misinterpreted and often

Misinterpretations can occur because one is free to seLec
interpretation whatever, and the chosen interpretation

need not contain all and only what is contained in the
direct
content or all and only the essence.
Take pain as an example.

^

When

I

represent pain as a

sensation, my idea of pain is clear and distinct.
need not

be.

clear and distinct. "If

I

But my idea

represent pain as having

an external cause like itself, my idea becomes obscure and
confused.

33

32 See

Like
pp.

-^See pp

.

(1)

and (2),

7-8 above.

9-11 above.

(3)

and

(4)

are false.

Gewirth himself recognized the falsity of
v/hen in a

and

(3)

(4)

footnote he admits that one can have both an obscure

and confused perception of pain.

He says, "When the direct

content is the basis of evaluation (as in Descartes’ example
of the clear but confused perception of pain in Princ,,

ideas are usuall y clear

question"

but their distinctness may

,

(Gewirth, p. 260).

Why Gew irth asserts
of

(1)

-

coine

I,

46),

into

34
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-

(4)

.

Since Gewirth'

s

assertion

seems to run counter to fundamental tenets he is

(4)

seeking to establish, why does he assert
seems to be this.

(1)

--

The answer

(4)?

If he does not treat simple ideas as

special cases, he thinks his analysis fails.

For Gewirth,

clearness and distinctness consist in a relationship between
direct and interpretive contents and are ascertained by a method
that determies whether part s of an idea are necessarily or

contingently connected.
ideas as unanalysable

.

But apparently he regards the simple

Because in his view they have no parts,

the method of difference is, strictly speaking, inapplicable
If this method is the only method available for

to them.

ascertaining whether our ideas are clear and distinct, we could
not determine which of our simple ideas are the clear and

distinct ones.

However, if

(1)

would apparently be resolved.

were true, Gewirth

'

s

problems

Gewirth could argue that

(1)

entails that the direct and interpretive contents of simple
34„

E mph a s i s
,

m me.
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ideas are identical, so that all simple ideas are clear
and

distinct
As we already noted earlier, however,

Additionally, the conjunction of

(1)

(

i

and

\3)

,

(4)

entails

(2)

with Gewirth's definition

of clearness and distinctness entails

have shown,

(1)

(3)

and.

(4)

But as

.

I

contradict explicit claims Gewirth

makes elsewhere in his article.
Gewirth's difficulties here derive from his insistence
on a direct and an interpretive content.

He insists on this

distinction because he thinks that without it Descartes cannot
defeat Gassendi's criticism.

But the claim that all ideas

have distinct direct and interpretive contents entails the

view that all ideas are complex.

The only way around this

result is to allow that some ideas

the simple ones

indistinguishable direct and interpretive contents.
is to assert

(1)

That the

and

,

(RI)

(2)

- (4)

•---

have

But this

follow.

also fails to account for simple

To highlight the difficulties with Gewirth's interpretation,
we have examined

a

rival interpretation, the RI

.

According

to this interpretation, we gain nothing by introducing the

distinction between direct and interpretive contents into
our analysis of how we ascertain which of our ideas are clear
and distinct.

The method of difference by itself does as

much as Gewirth's more elaborate procedure to distinguish the
clear and distinct from the obscure and contused complex ideas.
The question is, Can the method of difference succeed vuere
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Cewirth's method fails?
'

n effectively
r-m
can xt
determine which

of our simple ideas are
clear and distinct?

Admittedly it cannot.

However, once we are no
loncer
constrained to seek for
clearness and distinctness
in a relation
between the direct and the
interpretive contents of simp
ie
and unanlyzable ideas, wo
are in a better position
to provide
a method tor ascertaining
which of our simple ideas
are clear
and distinct.

W

L

!

est

to

.accoiint.

Y..

"

1

fails for simple ideas,

tng back to

1

.

<

i

fun

.

i

all

it is

u

One of Descartes

primary objectives is to give us
a method
Tor avoiding errors of
judgement.
Before prescribing a method
for avoiding error, however,
one should understand how errors
arise.
While Cewirth is correct when he
points
'

out that for

Descartes all ideas represent something,
it is not true that
all errors result from
misrepresentation. There are in fact
two sourcGo Oj. ei roi for Descartes -misrepresentation and
incorrect or insufficient analysis.
Gewirth's interpretation
runs afoul of simple ideas because he
fails to recognize this
distinction
Ideas are the constituents of judgements.

When the

ideas used to form a judgement are incorrectly
or insufficient!

analyzed

,

a

judgement containing them might well be false.

But even if it were true that only complex ideas
are susceptible to incorrect or insufficient analyses J5
35

so that all

In my view a simple idea can in a sense be incorrectly
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simple ideas are what

I

call 'analytically clear
and distinct’,

it would not follow that
all these ideas are clear
and distinct
per se. Take my idea of pain.
Even if this simple idea is

analytically clear and distinct, it
is what I call
representationaliy confused’ if, say, I
represent its cause as external
my mind.
ro oe clear and distinct, an
idea must
be both

analytically and representationally
clear and distinct.
What Gewirth has given us* is a
definition of representationai clearness and distinctness and
a method for ascertaining analytical clearness and
distinctness.

We also need, how-

ever,.

definition of 'analytical clearness and
distinctness'
ana a method for ascertaining
representational clearness and
dxstinctness
Gewirth fails to provide these because he formulates his interpretation on the basis of
inadequate models.
a

.

To

an ive

at his definitions of

'clarity*

and 'distinct-

ness', he confines his attention to what Descartes
says about

simple ideas.

When Descartes discusses the clarity and dis-

tinctness or obscurity and confusion in simple ideas, however,
he is almost always referring to what

clarity ana distinctness.

I

call representational

But Gewirth fails to distinguish

between representational clarity and distinctness and clarity
and distinctness per se.

As

a

result he thought he was giving

an account of the latter although he was really giving an

account of the former.
Since the simple ideas are the models on which Gewirth

analyzed

See below, pp,

i

65-169
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based his account of clarity and distinctness, it
is not
surprising that these ideas do not provide counterinstances
to Gewirth'

s

definitions.

On the other hand, these ideas do

become problematic when Gewirth applies his method for
ascertaining clearness and distinctness to them. They are
problematic because they differ in important respects from the models

Gewirth used to arrive at his method for ascertaining clarity
au<^ di s

a

u xn ^ i_ne s s

.

lo illustrate the method of difference

—

method of analysis, Descartes took as his examples ideas that

are manifestly analyzable.

He applies his method to complex

fictional ideas and to complex ideas of true and immutable

natures

ideas of a winged horse and a triangle inscribed

in a square, on the one hand,

on the o trier.

and ideas of a triangle and wax,

Focusing attention on Descartes' favorite, exam-

ples of how we ascertain analytical clarity and distinctness,

Gewirth made the mistake of thinking that the way in which
such complex ideas

are.

shown to be clear and distinct is the

way in which all ideas are shown to be clear and distinct.
He did not test his belief against the simple ideas, however.
If he had, he would have realized he had made a serious mistake

On his view the method of difference shows all simple ideas

to be clear and distinct, but Gewirth .knew full well they can
be obscure or confused if misrepresented.

Failing to distinguish analytical from representational
clarity and distinctness, Gewirth tried to stretch the use of
his method of difference.

Although this method was designed

61

to ascertain which of oar
ideas are analytically clear
and

distinct, Gewirth vaguely
recognised its limitations and
tried
to make it do double duty by
adding onto the method a superfluous procedure for comparing
direct and interpretive contents.
But this addition does not
suffice to allow us to ascertain
whether our simple ideas are clear
and distinct per se and
Gewirth' s attempt to vindicate Descartes
from Gassendi's
criticism is, therefore, incomplete.
,

Although incomplete, his attempt has
merit.

He pointed

to a distinction that has been virtually
ignored by subsequent

commentators on clarity and distinctness in
Descartes.

All

j.oeas

are representations,

ses.

Gewirth *s definitions of 'clarity' and
'distinctness'

and at least some ideas have analy-

recognize the role of representation in making,
ideas clear
anQ 6-stinct.
And his discussion of how we ascertain clearness
and distinctness indicates the importance of the
analysis of
an idea in making that idea clear and distinct.

Although

Gewirth did not himself explicitly recognize the distinction
between analytical and representational clarity and distinctness, he helped to make this distinction recognizable.
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P T E R

KhNNx'S DISCUSSION OF DESCARTES’
ACCOUNT OF
CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
Cha following chapter is divided
into three sections.
Xil the first two
secfcims 1 consider Kenny's
disenssion of
clearness and distinctness in Descartes. 1
Section I it expo-'
si Cory;

review Kenny’s arguments to support
his view that
Lescart.es
account of clarity and distinctness is
incoheren
I

'

In

'

11

'

!

;

1

criticise Kenny’s argui snt

c

id

Kenn :V has not demonstrated chat Descartes
is contused

thai:
a bo

'

t c 1 a r 1 y an d dis t i n t n e s s
.1

bectron III concerns Kenny's discussion of De
sc arte 3

’

method tor ascertaining 'which ideas are clear and
distinct.
Kenny thinks Descartes is guilty of a circularity.
But

Kenny

arguments

s

are.

f

CIiE ARNES

Descartes

try to show, unconvincina

I

EXPOSITION OF KENNY’S ACCOUNT OF

I-

.At

as

AND DT STINGINESS

the end of his chapter “Ideas/’ Anthony Kenny considers
•

account, of clearness and. distinctness

There

.

arc

two points to be made about the scope of Kenny's discussion.
1

in

(Ns

1

rk

h< >ny

Ke nny ,

Desc;

A

t
’

Stui

<

;

r

.

,

,

oi

'

;

1

pp
Grices to Kenny's book will appear in the text.
.

1

1

:

-

,

]

Oj

Ke

ln '‘

u°

ascertain is the exact
nature of
clearness and distinctness
insofar as these are
properties of
ideas such as sensations'
'Kenny, p. 121)
lnotoad
of asking what Descartes
means when he speaks of
clearness and
distinctness, Kenny is asking
what it is for a simple idea
to be doer ai, distinct.
Second, Kenny argues that
Descartes'
account is incoherent (Kennv r>
i_i
k
p.
but
the account Kenny
has in mind encompasses more
than Descartes' definition
‘

.

1

•

-

,

f

of

clearness and distinctness.

Kenny says:
The fullest account of c lari tv
and riHiv- r rr0 e
3
given in the P rincipl es:
The knowledge upon which a
certain and inconi rovejudgement can be formed, should not
alone be clear
bt.- also aistmct.
I term that clear which
.is present
and apparent to an attentive mind,
in the san
w
as we assert that we see objects
clearly when being
tne regarding eye, they operate
upon it
v-i-J. surficient strength.
But the distinct is thaSO prec;L3e c?nd different from all
other ob-;ec.
J
~
1 COnuains
Wlthin itself nothing but what is
clear,
^ne n for instance, a severe pain is
felt, the
percept. ion of this pain mav be very
'iLear
and
•for ail that not distinct
/because' idll
ruseu oy the sufferers with the obscure dually cociudaement
that, they form upon its nature;
assuming’ as they do
that something exists in the pain affected,
similar
Lo tae sensation of pain of which they
alone are
clearly conscious. (AT VIII, 21; HRI 237)"
vVe are told
however that we may have a clear knowledge
of our sensations if we take care to include
in the
ments we form of them only that which we know to be iudg^precisely contained in our perception of them and of
which
we are intimately conscious. Thus, "there is no
reason
that we should be obliged to believe that the pain, for
example, which we feel in our foot, is anything beyond our
.mind which exists in our foot."
We can avoid error if
we judge that there is something, of whose nature we are
ignorant, that causes the sensation of pain in our minds
(Kenny, pp. 121 - 122
'

i.

~

'

~

-

'

-

1

.

fc

,_

,

,

,

)
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elements in Desrai-fod
n
^s^arces

^

2
<Ke

1

Focusing on

J±r±h-

—

o 01r

pain, Kenny says that
"there so-,-, here
136
SSParate elSmentS A “ D
es. account; the
pain,
P6rCePti0n ° r: the Pai
«'
judgement about the pain"

—

-

22 >-

—

viaw Descartes

_

fco

entiate between pain and
the perception n
01t +-v
the pain when, in
MS aCCClUlt hS attributea th
" Properties of clearness
and
distinctness to the perception
but not to the pain.
Likewi s e
Descartes seems to distinguish
,
oerceotion and judgement.
perception
Judgement involves an act n f win
of will; perception
does not (Kennv,
'

,

p.

122)

.

h£LHjL..-

cuuxcism of Descartes* account.

Although there
do seem to be three separate
elements in Descartes' account.
Kenny argues that Descartes'
account is confused because
"the
perception of paw ... is not
a genuine intermediary
between
occurrence of pain and the judgement
on pain" (Kenny, p,
23
o illustrate. Descartes*
ueb
con^nci nn Kenny examines
contusion,
Descartes’ answers to two questions;
.

-L

)

,

I.

t.-

.

(QD Can pain occur without being clearly
perceived (Kenny,
p.
(Q2)

123)?

Can clear and distinct perception
occur without
judgement (Kenny, p, 123)?

According to Kenny, Descartes' answers
to these questions are
incons is tent
’

.{

(
2I-L

'

S

J

fin

Regarding (01), Kenny says:

in

1

:artes

’

to

e
hand he [Desc
feelas orc^
savs
ays thattnal " when
>
great pain, he haq artes]
.a man
= xr ^t
on the other
erce
P
Ptior. of pa in"
hand, he says that
of our sensations
W<
have - clear perception
?
only if
ment about them
efully
restri ot our judc-e~
"^<*“18 3
and
t° observe
COnditi °n most
(Kenny, p ^3)
”
difficult
Lenny s view,
Descartes seems to be
e cjuiltv
guilty of an moons
ishc>n
y
on the one hand,
Descartes is telling us
that
severe pains are clearly
perceived.
On the other hand,
CarteS reI" arkS
P between out p ains
judgements about our pains
seem to suoqpt,,f that ...
we can have
severe pains we dr,
r,rt- c
‘° not
iearly perceive.
Acrordinu fr
nt-tutumg
r
i.o Kennv
Descartes holds that we
neror-n
perceive our pains clearly
only if we
carefullv rest
' -ri r*+- OU * judgements about
then.
But Descartes

u

'

,

J

.

—
,

.

“

'

^

w

tons

“

us that it is very

dimwit

to restrict our

judges,

3PPrOPriate

severe pains are not
exceptional
ln ThlS re9ard
Descartes himself tells us
that people are
apt to misjudge the origin
of their pains. When such
misjudgeAnan ts occur, one’s
perception of his
L “
pain
din iis obscure
nhc-u
P
even
though the pain he feels is
severe.
-

•

-

-

According to Kenny,. Descartes'
answers to (Ql) are inconsistent here because there
appear to be two elements in
Descartes' account when in fact
there is only one

-

J'

SnL

p,:i;Lrj

*

;(enny Puts his

the

occur-

argument as follows:

-Chore seem to be two
elements i n claret'
fhqf
A
object
or perception be manifest
V
and t-hrfc the perceiving
facultv
be at to nth vr
case ofr Bight, such a distinction "
no hhp?V. die case of
r-»S-*>.(e,
pain, it is illusory
Des
lS
what,
would
WUU
LU
be
oe
the
cne
difference
-h-’T
be
tho
between
he r,n-. 1n iv Perception
pcr^ep Lion o.l
of a manifest pain and the
th<= clear
r-ioav
perception of
jj.
an obscure pain.
Yet it must be possible
•

,

•

’

'

^

m

m

.

,

'wc]Sr^GrS?h
.

'

...

~
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to ma^e out such a
difference if the dl «..+.•
tne occurrence of a
°tmction between
pain and i-hl
’ U
perception of a pain is
a genuine one (Kenny,,
p. 124
)

The pain can be manifest
or not manifest; the
perception o*
the pain attentive
or inattentive.
On the assumption
that
Descartes reoards nai n
t
b
analag °us to Sight, our
idea of
parn is obscure if and
only
- t,
1 °
one
tho following
nt n*
y jf
oi the
three conditions hold:
we instinctively perceive
a manifest pain:
(li) ” e attentive ly
perceive a non-manifest pain;
(iii) we inattentively
perceive a non-manifest pain.
According to Kenny, however,
(i) and (ii, are not
really different.
Both are satisfied when our
pain is mild and neither
SatlSfied When our P ain is severe.
It is the mildness or
severity of our rain +-bnn
.i-u-j.
rien
that determines whether our
idea
of; pain is clear.
(i)

“

}-

‘"

,

'

By introducing the attentiveness
of perception into his
account: of clearness and distinctness,
Descartes added, Kenny
believes, a superfluous element.
If he had simply said that
"
ca]I that clear which is manifest,
his answer to (Ql)
:C

**

would have been unequivocal.

As Kenny puts the point, "To

perceive a pain cieariy simply is to have a
severe pain"
(Kenny, p.

124}

.

Kenny finds in Des carte s
Let us now turn to Kenny’s discussion of
(Q2)
Descartes* comments on (Q2)

.

1

answers to Q2

Arguing that

are inconsistent, Kenny says:

67

On the one hand,
we learn f-w „
arG
posed to give our
nature so disassent to tV
that we cannot
C ^early Perceive,
possibly doubt' Iff tneir f
21
truth" (at VTII
I, 2361.
vet rl f
„
’
whole procedure of
b<uuj ' does
the
methodic
SSlS
withhold one's
56 that one can
judgementhven aljOUt
abont'^f
Cj-ear (Kenny,
whac
seems most
pp, 123-124) ?
<

The method of doubt
lie

c,.n

WU1

°f 3

*

i

=
a

™
u
method
•

whereby one suspends
judgesuspend iudqement
t
because judgement
-no
is

that iS free t0 affi

Presents to it.

™“

Even though we have

an act

d

-y

what the understanding

clear perception, we
can refrain from
affirming that things are
as we perceive them.
in claiming that we
cannot possibly doubt the
truth of what
we perceive, Descartes
appears to be
c gui
yu j.uy
Ifv of
nf an inconsistency
a

•

,

Here, again, the source
of Descartes' confusion
is
according to Kenny, to be
found in his incoherent
account of
clearness and distinctness.
Descartes thinks there are
three
separate elements when in “
.
act there are
just two.

According

to Kenny , percent i on lb- v,~+.
p
not
-i

'

pair,

<*

genuine intermediary between
the

and the judgement on the
P ain.

As Kenny says:

jud

'
1S ko mate ?
the correct
feel is ca
by
I know nit
J1 J ccrr ® c '-/ rash
wSatT"'
judgement
-^
"what I
feel -I*; so-nthino -n' ? foot
9
,y
.The
difference
between
a
distmii- n5;
COn i:Usea perception is explained
precise
1
in terras
ju<
gement
7
9
the 'perception
is not distinc? '?’ i ?
rs
confused by the sufferer* wi
«i
,
w uli 1 1 ODScure
fua
iU(3cfGrnpri+*
9
“ ht -^ ma
forTn
'
Upon
Y
its
nature" (AT III 21V.;
t
L
fp J/
(Kenny, pp. 124-125).

t

L

*

f

„

,Wha t

^d

1

.

J ‘

*

-

:

o“n

*

,*

i.

.

r

»

'

'

’

If Descart es had not confused
the act with the object of per'-

ception, he would have given an unequivocal
answer to (Q2)

° perceive a pain
distinctly
i~
‘

.

•

.

t
JJdge tru ly about
one's oain
'
Pam, clear
and distinct
perception
‘
cannot " C r
without judgement.
'

Kenny

'

S

'

(02,

^

il

™

int6rPre ati0n ' DeSC
bSCaUSe hlS a

tio L; SS 13
lnCOherent

« teS

“

'

—
answers

(01)

a-

and
dis-

tod his -count is
incoherent becau ”. e
;
C ° nfUSed 3bOUt
thS dlsti t ion
between the act and
th-_
h
obiect
of Perception.
Once this contusion
is eliminated,
lowever, a coherent
definition of cle-nn
clearness and distinctness
" clil be attain ed.
According to Kennv
nny an 1Qea
i
is clear just
" n case at
as manifest, and
it is
18 dxstlnct
3 ust in case judgemerits formed about
it are true.
-

-

‘

<

'

•

11

*

CRITICISM OF KENNY'S
ACCOUNT

OF CLEARNESS AND
DISTINCTNESS

My response to Kenny's
criticisms
ricisms of Descartes*
n
account.
0± CWrnoss and
distinctness has three parts.
I

,,iil

show
<J>

uh5t bos cartes

(2)

that Descartes

!

'

try to

answers to (Ql) are consistent,

answers to

(

02 ,

are consistent, and

that Kenny has failed to
show that Descartes' account
clearness and distinctness
is incoherent.
(3)

o.t

According to Kenny, Descartes
holds the
i.o 1.1 owing views
with respect to (Ql.)
;

(P:

"Tier; a

man feels great pain, he has
a very clear

69

perception of pain." 2
(cj)

he have

clear percent- on 01
our sensations only
if
A7e careful ly
restrict our Jjudgement
a b-mt them
m
about
and
this is a condition
most uiiiicmt
difficult to observe."
u
0
Together with other iir.nl
+
Pll - lt:
Premises,*4 ( q ) is supposed
to
entail not-(p).
a

•

•!

'

’

^

i «-.•

In P ° lnt ° f
'

p

'

J‘

s

Ken ny
11

ip’)

!

Descartes asserts neither
paraphrase of

s

When

facfc

•

,

'

for inotai.ee
inst a-nr-n

a

,

ception of this pain

(p)

nor

(q)

severe pain is felt, the
per-

may_ be

very clear.
."5
Descartes is saying here
is that it is possib
le that a
severe pain, be clearly
perceived. tea for the sake
Qf
want,,, us co assume*
that there is such a
clearly perceived pain.
.

AH

.

w

(

°n

q)

'

iG

° "hei
l

iianci

sags found in the Principles

is Ke nny’s paraphrase
of a pas-

'

nv~
i e
luis

•

passage reads as follows:

an to wiiich^e^tia^likewise '
have^^clear

kn-v

m

r “ c '-^ sej-Y contained
our perception of then
o'
p
scions
It S, howe^f^osfdlfnSuIt
* ntimate1 ^
b
ervt this
condition, in regard to the'
sensei
be
al
a
- JLast'
f
-east,
because
we,
everyone c f us hiw
t
dV e juacje.a from
our
i youth
=
/
up
t-bi-ir.
that
"
"
~
-Lingo ox wtu.cn we nave been
accuq^ompri
-*

.

T

.

'

*

'

i

x

.

j..,,

-

hil Se

5

P

f^ ^.r
V.

idea which we' hate.

0

See p. 65 above.

*Ibid

See p. 63 above.

Emphas

HR

I

,

p.

247.

4
,

.i

s

Emphasis mine.

nSatl0n ' that

s
vSee p.

mine

>

65 above,

-

y

the

.
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On the basis of
what Descartes says
-n
in this
i
L 'us
passage, I do not
see how Kenny can
iustifian
justifiably attribute
(g) to Descartes.
(,„
states a necessary
condition for havinn
navmg
cl
clear £erceptio n
_
U 111 ^ie
passage, Descartf'q
rtts States a
sufficient conditipn for having clear
knowledge
-

.

.

.

"

--i-

+-

.

Although Kenny has
misinterpreted Descartes
here, t
think we can crive ^ na r f
5
Partlal 6Xpianation for
Kenny's confusion.
will refer to the
passage cited above
uu c a&
as Passage
case
1, and the
passage cited below as
passage
,* u r
2
g
Let
compare what Des carte:
says about clear knowledge
in each of these
passages.
Xl5 Pa ” 8a9C X
We aCqUire clear
knowledge as a result of
restricting our judgements
so that they assert
nothing other
than what we actually
perceive.
Here clear knowledge
,

.

'

•

'

is

acquired subsequent to
judgement.

situation is reversed.

In passage 2, however,
the

Descartes says:

all their
lives perceive
Dt
Properly.
For the knowledge upon whirt'a
2J2M?
>n_t..n a
t.ei
tain and inconi- rmren-f i wi
^
*** formed should
not alone be clear but* also'
distinct??

U

~

^

Mere Descartes refers to clear
and distinct knowledge as the
knowledge upon which certain and
incontrovertible judgements
are based so that the clear
and distinct knowledge to which
D

I>,.r

U.„

it.

y

i

ei.ej.ring in

passage

2

antecedes judgement.

Kenny cites the second sentence
i*“ See
'"'I'
of this
passage.
p. 03 above.
'

'
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There

^

tW °

™

t0 inte

Descartes remarks.
We'
can assume that
Descartes in P assa e
2 means by
g
clear ar,
lotmct knowledge ‘correct
erce ption
percent!
nr,
P
or we can regard
clear and distinct
i
knowledge
as a fourth element
to be intro,
,
UCea lnto Descartes'
account of clearness
edine
an
d distinctness.
r
ana
Since Kenny savs that
»
dt +-V,
*
5
" here seem to
be three separate
ele.non.i_e in. Descartes'
account" (Kenny
.,
nu 7 P
n
we can si;rr t
that Kenny took Descartes
in passage 2 to be
using the terr .
'clear and distinct
knowledge' and 'correct
perception' synony
ou.sly.
And with inqfi
3
^---on Aenny probably assumed
that
be s carte s' references
"
cledr^ knowledge in passages
1 and 2
were unequivocal. When
closely read, however
c vti
"hese
_nese passages
show that Descartes was
using the term clear
knowledge’ in
l-feic.. ^ oe„s
Ln passage 1, ’clear
knowledge' does
noc mean 'clear perception
as Kenny supposes,
1

'

'

>

f

.

^

•

,

v

'

->

•

,

'

*

t

,

,

t

1

M

.

-

5

1

V0 Cj cUTO. X

,y 2 !_ .
l

,.

c
yfn
-^-ai.es

T~\o

<'>

j3

5

-i

i

allegedly inconsistent

answers to <Q2) are as follows:
(r>

We are b *’ na t’are so disposed
to give our assent to
things we clearly perceive,
that we cannot possibly
doubt cf their truth.
“

U) One can withhold one's judgement
even about what seems
most clear.
is a direct quote from Descartes,
and according to Kenny,
DfcSCdiues
of doubt presupposes (s)
Jointly ( r ) and
(r)

8

bee p.

65

above.
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^s)

are supposed to enLaiJ
a contradiction.
-

and

(r)

(s)

are not incompatible

howe—
now
«vei.

,
(

.

say that we cannot
doubt the truth
util G
°

urn

clear.

•

r>v.<-

seems-,

.

,
)

does not

most clear

~ M. U.~„ tm

“ ”” ** » ”
». can

p

r

««oa reasons !or

,h

On the other hand, we
cann-- ^„Ki.

clearly and distinctly
perceive. 3

iUUcThere

-•'>

,

„«

„

-•..at

...
no

we genuinely

rrmn-

i neon si

'

'

•

in claiming that we
--~
rv,-x<... r
c.n
dotot west seems te st clear
but cannot
doubt what is clear.
>

,

-

,

Regarding Dgscarteja' account
of clearne ss and distinctUe “ n > s criticism of
Descartes' account is in two
carts.
In the first part Kenny
argues that the distinction
between
the pain and the perception
of the pain is not genuine.
In
the second part, he argues
that the distinction between the
p-.. option o,
ha pain and the judgement on
the pain is no .
genuine.
I consider each part
in turn.
.

—

2iil£.

dis tinction between the pain and the oe-t

ES^-

Ac* ordi *W to Kenny, there

soar,,

t

...

to be three separate

elements in Descartes’ account of
clearness and distinctness:
1

merit on the

-

-

sensation.

cc Pt«ioii ol

Ue

But is there

sensation, and the judgea genuine distinction

between the sensation and the perception
of the sensation?
It seems as if there is.
Sensations have properties perceptions
D

Although (r) is a direct quote from Descartes,
(r) is
taken_ out of context.
It
Lain
coni
cartes is talking about clear and
percept- on. Taken by itself, (r) is for Descartes a
false
proposition

73

h™,

„.a

«,

„

b.

„ ,„

if

„ ti

attentive or inattentive.
As instances of sensat-ionc

0etWee "
C ° Ula

^

iiqk

•

'

^cartes-

^
pains

„„„„„
f „„Wam

seem problematic for

account, however.
° 0CUrrenCe

° f C ° UrSe

“

-There seems to be no
difference
d the
ption of a pain. Descarte,

P—

COUnter ‘hat the difference
consists in
this:
the oceurrent pain is
manifest or not manifest;
the
perception of the pain attentive
or inattentive.
!f this were
Descartes' response, he
would have to be able to
show that there a genuine distinction
between an attentively
perceived
non-manifest pain and an
rnattentively perceived manifest
pain.
But. ...enny tells us,
"Descartes nowhere suggests"
what the
b f it_-.ien.ee would be
(Kenny, p. 124}
'

'

j.

bet us look at this criticism
carefully.
Kenny flunks
that we can make no sense of
the distinction between an
attentively perceived non-manifest
pain and an inattentively perceived manifest pain. But
Descartes' failure to

suggest what the distinction might
be does not show that the
distinction is not genuine. 10 tie might
be able to make sense
c-f the alleged distinction
if we. could make sense of what
it
p° in - Of fact, Descartes may have given
the ex Vi i" nY r qU reS- Slnoe K “ n/i ” does
mean? h
? i
-o' and since Descartes does
J-c.enc..r.iv Wjiv.L predicates
he takes to be synonymous with
f
,

.

n

-

aescnpcion Kenny required although Kenny was unable to
j.ecogn.i.ze
uie

Descartes' account as an explication
do tween mani festness and attentiveness.

of.

'

relationship

74

is for perception
to be attentive ana
ror Da
for
'n to be
t
P ain
manifest.
_
.

-amt. we know what we
mean by 'attentive'
au.tnLive as
a- opposed
,
to inat~
tentive Perception', ana
I think we can
plausibly distinguish
between a manifest pain
ana a non-manifest
pain.
We couia, for
example, regard a manifest
pain as a severe pain
Pam
and a non-manifest pain as a mild pain.- 1
'

1

-

Let us consider an
example.

am watching a particularly
exciting television show,
and the identity of the
killer is
about to be revpgip.-i
jj. j-u,*
ea
lhls vary moment, however,
X feel a
mild pain somewhere in my
chest, but I do not know
exactly where.
1 am concerned because
a friend my age has just
died of a heart
attack, and I want to be sure
the pain in my chest is not
symptomatic of a similar attack.
As a result I divert my
attention away from the television
program, and I concentrate
on my pain.
It would seem appropriate
to say that, in doing
kbio, I am attentively perceiving
a non-manifest
I

-

pain.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the
pain becomes acute.
Bu t now I recoil
i

eat onions,
nions and
an
,

I

remember that

I

had onions for dinner.

Th ese cons i derat.
to f ind out the
rulbbi jig

mv

In such

C

am now

•c

i

1

1

olie^'-'
v
-"

ca Go,

na.tte.nt i

o

.

Lnce Kenny is prepared to identify severe pain
with the
ear icea of pain and mild pain with the obscure idea
of pain, I
do n?t think he would find implausible the distinction I am
drawing
,:‘>

.

c.

-
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m

presenting the above
illustration.
rteS " SeS tte te S

™

“

thC

WhlCh thSy

an,

"

““

am not claiming
'

I
1

Hy e::amP leS

attentive

'

in

X am trying
that therS iS a
.°
P lausibl - '«v of making
out the
distinction between
ween f ho
nG unclear percent
on «.p
„
inception
of a
manifest pain
and the Clear Percepti
°n * f
obscure pain- so that
KennVs
suggestion that „e cannot
distinguish pain from the
perception
Of pain is false.

t° E

W

“

'

'

11

1-

-i

“

~

~~
_

“

-°

P-

—

^Heen
ESin-

the

To sh

Eerc^ion

™

of the pain and

that there is no genuine

difference between the
perception of the pain and
the judgement
on the pain, Kenny focuses
on the passage where
Descartes
tells us that perception may
be clear without being
distinct.
In this passage,
Descartes claims that the
perception of pain
is not distinct because
the judgement formed on the
pain is
istaKon.
On the basis of this claim,
Kenny concludes that
"to perceive a pain, distinctly
is simply to make the correct
cautious judgement 'what I feel
is caused by I know not
”
what'.

^

.

.

„

The kGy Passage to 7hich kenny
alludes in his
13 Clcec: above on Page 63 above.
-

thio

Uci

sage

m

is

misleading, however.

ci

ti< ism

Kenny’s way of citing
It appears that the pas-

question is one unbroken portion of the P
rinci ples

12 See p,
-

63

above

See p. 67 above

..
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Actually Kenny is
citing two separate
Principle one .imrned^xmcipies,
afa1lf ,
lately
following the other.
Each
Pr-, P ie ln th
= Principles
,.
has
ahheading. The heading nr n'
las a
~
g 01 Principle
is -What
,-

.

•

•

"
.

®

•

,.

-

-re

1003 ° f

ClSarneSS

'

“d

-

Oescartes

a

clear

g^."^

distinctness , but h2
does not
mention his example
of pain
-,
Thl
P
lhifc
example is »ed in
Principle
xtvt
„„ e heading
of this Principle
reads as follows*
'

'

-

~~~
~~~

.

.

J.

It

~

2£ Eiin that a perception

SiSSE without being distinct
--r-—
.

,4

.

hoEli il cam
4

jjav

b7

e distinct unless

“

Th±S headi “* expresses
plainly Descarte
intention
Having defined 'clearness'
and 'distinctness' in
the Preceding Principle..
Descartes is moving on to
consider
10 .is thdi. no.! d be ween
clarity and distinctness.
He
wan
-o -how- by means of
the example of pain that
one can
have a clear but confused
perception. To this end,
Descartes
offej-n an argument I
reconstruct as follows:
*

.

'

±J

ciear:

1

'

3

.

(2)

(-/

4

)

am having.

form a false judgement
about the' pain

I

am having-

x

an having.

(1)

(k)

!

0t antail

the.

Premise

pain

—

and (3).
’

—

Premise

dc not distinctly perceive

U) dOSS
premise

I

I

1
(

Perceive a pain

----

(

3 ).

from

(2)

from

(1)

,

(3)

Descartes needs the additional

77

00 If

fo rm a false
judgement about what I
perceive,
then I do not distinctly
perceive the thing about
I

which
Kenny thinks

But

formed that judgement.

(1)

follows from

To perceive a rain riicHn^i
distinctly is simply to
judge that
the pain has a cause.

0:)

is equivelant to
)

Plainly

(k*):

if I distinctly perceive
a thing about which I
form
a judgement, then I form
a true judgement
about what
1

perceive.

(k')

does not entail (1).

{k

.,

sta tes a necessary- but

sufficient condition for distinct
15
perception .

a

—l —
n

'

(k)

(-U

(k

not

I

distinctness

if it

.is

'

clearnes s

1

and

Kenny holds that a pain is clear
if and only
severe and distinct if and only if
judgements about
•

the pair, are true.

he thinks

S£ ga y.lg. d efinitions of

'--a..

He arrives at these definitions
because

per cep. ion is not a genuine, intermediary
between

the pain and judgement about the pain.

When we say we clearly

and distinctly perceive a pain we are
having, we are saying
something about our pain and something about
our judgement.
But what features of pains and judgements
could function as
defining characteristics of clarity and
distinctness? since
pains are severe or mild and judgements are
true or
false",

it seems natural to think that clarity
is a function of the
i

n;

On this point,

below

see the chapter on Frankfurt,
‘

'

p.

92

78

ty of the pain
and distinctness
a funct-i
i unction
of the truth
or falsity
fal5(f or
judgement.
..

.

Although

X

—
—

have argued th^r
=
hat rRenny
,

-

of
Ox. clearness
and

Ken , Y
y

a

,

,

i^icf ln °

tneSS iS

„

deflnitl °ns ° f

'

Cl

Kenny

^e

incing,

x

of his account

have not shown

and 'distinctness'
to be

'

defective.

def

3

have arrived at the
right definitions
° r Ule wron reasons.
y
it is difficult
Ju to assess Kenny's
definitions, however.
He ha«?
no-fhas not
given us a genera]
account
of clearness and
distinctness. At the
u.).e outset
outlet Kenny
K„
said he
would give an account of
qclearness
eso and distinctness
insofar
as these are properties
of "simple ideas such
36
,
.
Apparently he does not think
he is giving us an
account that
can be generalised to
cover complex ideas.
Yet in a later
chapter, Kenny treats his
definition of 'distinctness'
as if
rt is applicable to all
17
ideas.
Since Kenny thinks his
account of distinctness is
unrealizable, we can surmise that
h_ thinks it. is his
definition 01
of Vlsri
t
cianty
that cannot be
q e n erali 7.ed
stay

•

-

i

•

'

—
L.

j.

i

O

jlI

f\Gnny
•

app>lieS tD

r,

S£S®£alizin2
~

nrif
ot

° 1T,pleX ideas

4.

LzhiiYj_s

•

..

•

,

account, of

'clarity

cid±m chat his account cf
clarity
/'’«*)

-

-

-I

*>-,

_

he

i

,

«

claim to be giving us an

account of clearness and distinctness
that is applicable to
" imple ideas BUch as
sensations " Does ho mean that
he

,:

.

16

hce p. 63 above,
bee Section III be low

1

.
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thinks his account is
applicable to all simple ideas?
i think
not.
In whac sense cen we
say that a simple idea
of extension
is severe or mild?

Perhaps Kenny means he is
giving us an account of the
clearness and distinctness of
simple ideas of sensation.
Again
I think not.
Regarding visual sensations,
Kenny says, "There
neem to be two elements in
clarity; that the object of
perception be manifest and that
the perceiving faculty be
attentive.
In the case of sight, such
a distinction is possible;
in the

C3.se

of:

pain

it is

,

i

1

inormr
J °

»

Because such a distinction

cannot be made out in the
c nep of
Uie case
Pam, vKenny's account of what
it is to be a clear and
distinct idea of a pain does not make
use of such a distinction.
But in cases where such a distinction can be drawn, Kenny leaves open
the possibility that
anothec account of clearness and
distinctness could be given,
For ail
know Kenn Y ma Y intend his account of
clarity to
covgx not all simple ideas of sensation
but only those for
i

w

v/hicn the

'

>

distinction between a manifest object and an atten-

tive mind cannot be drawn.
In any event Kenny's definition of
Cxj-c uns or i bed

account.

j.s

.

At this point

mistaken; it is

I

'clarity* is highly

do not want to say that Kenny's

simply incomplete.

E. J. Ash-

worth's interpretation provides one way of completing Kenny's
“i

'

uec
p.

p

.

65 above.

80

account.

19

Completed in this way, the account
is easily
criticized, however.

Gg erallzlng Kansas account of
i

d istinc tness.

As

I noted
the last subsection, Kenny
does treat his account of dis0
tinctness as if it is applicable
to all ideas/
Although

m

gsi.e.alizable

,

this account leads in Kenny's
view to

difficulty for Descartes.

a

fata"'

If Kenny's account is right, Des-

cartes cannot without circularity
ascertain which of his ideas
are distinct.
As a result Kenny's account vindicates
Gassendi.

Although Kenny's account may in the long
run turn out
to be right, a charitable approach to
a reading of Descartes
requires that we tentatively reject Kenny's
account of distinctness and search for another that does not
produce difficulties
I

a ceil

f or

Descartes philosophy
'

ill.

KENNY

'

3

.01 S COS S I ON

OP

DE S CARTES METHOD
1

FOR ASCERTAINING WHICH OF OUR IDEAS
ARE CLEAR AND DISTINCT

At the end of his chapter "Reason and Intuition," Kenny

offers

a br.ee t

discussion of Descartes' general rule that

whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true (Kenny,
PP*

197"199)

genera

.

In this discussion Kenny argues that Descartes'

rule is inadequate.

J.

As Kenny says, "Apart from their

truth, there see ms to be no criterion by which genuinely
3

9 See

9

r\

Chapter IV below.

See the next section.
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clear and distinct
perception--’
1
P L °n° Can v
distinguished from apparently clear and distinct
perceptions" CKenny,
yci^eptions
-

p.

‘*

”*

«"

=

«

«...

tinctly perceives is true

On

i-h^
° *e

n

J9B)

o« .

»*«

h,

„„

o,.„ ly

other hand, he seems to
be
i

saving that he identifies
his
ni ° Cj
clearq
eai and distinct
perceptions by
ascertaining whether what-- he.
perceives j-ss true
pticei/es
+
(Kenny,
•

-

p. 198).
lo Re fair to Descartes,
Kenny considers what other

criteria Descartes might have
used in order to identify
his
co-ear and distinct, perceptions.
The possibilities Kenny considers are as follows:

£ clearly and distinctly perceives x if

(i)

(

s is

convinced

he clearly and distinctly
perceives x (Kenny, p. 198);
11 £ clearly and distinctly
perceives x if x has some
!

particular content C (Kenny,
(iii)

S

p.

198)

,

and

clearly and distinctly perceives x
if s's

perception of x is produced in accordance
with some
particular method M (Kenny, p. 198)
Let US GXamine Kenn y’

s

criticism of each of these possibilities.

.E£i^cism of

_(i)_.

Kenny says that clear

arid

distinct per cep cions "cannot be distinguished
by the degree
0jL conviction that they
carry with them; men have died
for

1

ne rake 01 ideas that they mistakenly believed
to be clear

and distinct
r~ 0

.

(K# iuny,

198)."

In the Fifth Gbjcactions

the name criticism. 22

3 s en d i r a i s 0 d

21.,.

p.

mpnds if
,

>

mine.

/

‘

2 HR

,

II, 152.

Descartes replied that

82

the example of men
willing to die
±e for rh
their beliefs "proves
nothing," for » +
n6Ver be pr ° ved th£t
they Clearly and
...
.
1Btln0tAy PerC6iVe what
th*y P e r tenaciously
affirm." 23 „ frp
Descartes is pointing
out that his position
is not the one
Gassendi's objection
ra. Q o
attark'~
CkS
Llke
‘

,

i

.

Gassendi, Descartes
thinks

’

wj

.

is false.
Q ^ n\7 s

Cl

Ti

-f"

1

pi

c rn

\

2£ lilL.

-

Turning to

(ii)

Kenny argues

,

as follows

01 be distin S"
uished by“thlir content!
for^houc^th^™
arc some tonics
so simple that no
doubt i~ -o-Ab16 *1
ab Ut them th we
seems to be none about
?
which no

476

m

>

'

II, 278) (Kenny, p.

x*

198

)

P osslb;ie

(Mt VII,

,

Let as locK at this
argument closely:

seems that, whatever
the content of our
perception,
we can be mistaken about
that content.

(1)

It.

We cannot identify our clear
c
'•- Co1
Y
an «^ distinct
perceptions
hy their contents.

(•i;

-

Plainly,
is

(I

(1)

What Kenny needs

s

)

:

(i'5

Whatever the content of our perception,
we can be
3 'tien abouc that content.

li.i.

Acco:r

a’)

is not the premise Kenny
wants.

1.

am a

to Kenny

,

is supposed to entail

Descartes holds
(2),

to be inconsistent with (ii)
2 3ti
un,

II,

214

.

,

(

1

‘

)

.

And since

which, in turn, is supposed

Kenny contends that we should

33

not attribute (ii) to
Descartes
hov.

ever

•

wpf.vrit.

lore abandoning (ii)

we need to be sure
that Kenn Y is right
when he claims
that Descartes held
1 ').
,

(

to show that Descartes
did subscribe to (.!),
Kenny
adopts the following
strategy.
First he attempts to identify
Plausible candidates for
perceptual contents about
which we
cannot be mistaken. These,
he thinks, are the
propositions
Descartes regards as indubitable.
Secondly, he tries to show
that Descartes believes
we can be mistaken regarding
even
th6Se
Jut if
’

—

<=an

be

rr

itanda, it would certainly
seem that we can be in error
rlardmg propositions we can doubt so that
we can be mistaken about

whatever proposition we perceive.
In SUpP °rt of his case

'

Kenny discusses

a

passage in the

Seventh Objections where Descartes
replies to Bourdin.
ing uhi.s passage, Kenny says:
tU8
?
f
7*
Z

though"?
as
a
WaaL *
° "What'”,'

Regard-

° f th

simplest truths of mathematics?
f
here
[the Third Meditation) oreu
“ aa the
Eame first-order indubitability
done cannot be undone," 24 in the
F^st Medi.

S

2 A

—

distinguished two types of indubitability
3JCCntJ "? rder
Although Kenny dr.es not draw
his d t
precisely, we can define first- and secondorder indubitability as follows:
u
der indubitable
"’tt
=jf it is impos
wh le attending
to
one
doubts
p,
that p
7
CD2) H. 1 ® second-order indubitabl
is
that while attending to n but not attending
to p, one
*

•

;

^

'

’

1

'•

;

(

douots
and
Kenny’s discussion of the disl Li
secona-orner doubt, see Kenny, pp. 183-184.
t

'

.

.

i

34

tation Dsscsrts'; ^cVc
6 ma go wron «>»never I add two and three?" 1 --'
9
“and^hi^
first-order doubt.
told the story „f a
a ° lee P heard the
Clock strike four ant said
,
"
has struck one o' clock
fct
"
times'
i
to.
s
cartes
said that
this example "shows tir^ a
together can be deceived."
47™
2 8)
Once again, the passages
•,
i
are record-:
fl We f^ember
°
? tl lf
tnat the impossibility of
7?
L tha
salT,e thing as
the impossibilitv o-' h-or aoubt
.

'

*'

*

'

t

S anSWer
may be wrong for all that
(Kenny, ? 86 k'
Kenny cites this passage to
show that Descartes subscribed
to (a ).
But the passage does not show
this much.
The exampies discussed are mathematical
propositions. These propositions can be false even though a
person cannot doubt them
when attending to them. On the other
hand, mathematical
propositions are not second-order indubitable
and are not the
best candidates lor being perceptual
contents about, which we
cannot be mistaken. Presumably the best
candidates would be
propositions that are both first- and second-order
indubitable,
nut are there any such propositions?

Kenny addresses this question when he asks
himself:
’’Are

there any propositions at all that are exempt
from second-

order doubt?”

(Kenny, p. 135).

as the paradigm of an

Typically the cogit o is regarded

i ndubitandum .

But Kenny maintains that

the ic?JltL 2 is n ^t second-order indubitable (Kenny,
p.
(

135)

,

On the other hand, there are propositions that are second-

order indubitable and are, as Kenny says,
que st ion in Descartes' sys tem
J

Bmp
pnasis
ha sis mine,

.

.

"

"(Kenny,

never called into
t>.

185)

.

85

—

These are the
propositions "ti
PreSS thC mind S
ious•,
ness of itS
own thoughts and
ideas.- Thus th
premise " Coglt
o"
"
a d the
Presence of the idea of
are not challenged
bv the
second- order dmiH+/v
ooubt
(Kenny,
'

'

'

...

,!

pp

183-186).

.

We have here Kenny's
acknowledgement of a class
of proportions that is both firstand second-order
indubitable
question th. remai
his :
Can «
iti
ing to this class be
false? Descartes'
reply to Bourdin in
the seventh Objections
does not provide an
answer, for the
proposition under discussion
there
«?
3 __ s „
is not
second-order indubitable.
On the UT
other
nei nand
v
hand Kenny
cites no
other passages in support
of his clcU
claim
m that
that. n
Descartes did noiconfuse the impossibility
of doubt with the
impossibility of
error, so that for all
we know, Descartes did
not subscribe
(1
and did subscribe to (ii)
.

—

—

1

”

/

-

}

~

Regarding (iii)

Kenny argues

,

as follows

for^cerfair bv^ he^oH^
'-V to
one's
one

-

^

aSj
=

° annot be distinguished

'

'

s

g- n
the
a the usand

^eas

”

u

possible

S
^iLsf^ifrLu^o

(AT

,

li:,

b0HKe^ny;

p?

a om matters

w
corporeal,
vo
th
TOSt WortSTt”
<
1

'

:

‘

$1^

Ce-tainly there are those who will
not clarify their ideas no
hov' many times they have
read the Meditations
.

this is entirely beside the point.

Al] Kenny's example

But

show,:-

86

that one can read
without profit
F
n
Descartes did not hold
(Ui)

Tt
rt doc
do ®s tot show that

'

.

Kenny

'

s

- Sl»

dGfsi'icjp

,-,.p

t-*

intgreretation.

After offering
particular criticisms
against
gainst (i), (11)
and (i.U)
Kennv arQues
in e,ense of his
own view that Descartes
distinguishes clear
dnd dlStlnc1 tco,!
obscure and confused perceptions
by ascertaining Whether they are
true.
Kenny says:
.

m

,

,

-

'

ime and. time acrain Dpcnsvi-oo
ldeas that ^em to
bear all the internal
'mark- nf
simply on the grounds tha^V clail by and distinctness
Conside r them to be
true.
But if 5 man cannot ttii
? Gl
1 Wn
uer hls ld ^as are genuinely clear and distbnrr
’wi th
true, then he cannot hope
61
to avoid^rr'^K^^b
— r j.o.i. by using the
method of restrict n-r
he clearl y and
distinctly perceives (Kenny?
j.

"

'

.

'

v-

-i

'

Kenny's point here can be
framed as a question:
If Descartes
really has a method M, which
functions in total independence
of questions of truth, why
does Descartes frequently
ascertain
hi., ideas are clear
and distinct or obscure and
contused by appealing to whether
they or some corresponding
proposition is true or false?
At this juncture, we are not
in a position to give a
dcjvinitive answer to Kenny's
question, but we can give a plansihle answer. M may involve a
complicated procedure. To
a vo i cl circul
As a

i

esu.lt

clear and

“J.
d.i

n

Using his general principle that
whatever

is cle arly a

cor res pondin'

Suppose, then.

07

that Descartes wants to
know whether his idea i
i s c lear and
distinct.
Descartes knows that if
is cleafand distinct,
thon En+1 13 trupBut suppose that Descartes
realizes that
,

'

t “ at llCt

Then Descartes knows by nodus
tollens
that
18
°
bscure
or confused
1
He does not need to employ
- in ° rder tC arriVe at the same result although
he could use
M if he chose to. Since M is
always available, Descartes does
not need to ascertain that
£^, is false in order to determine
that
confused.
Even though it is true that
b*X iS ° bScure
Descartes frequently ascertains that
his ideas are obscure or
confused because he considers some
corresponding proposition
to be false, it does not follow that
Descartes is guilty of
a circularity.

li

--n+l‘

V

-

Returning now to the main point of this
section, we can
see that Kenny's strategy has failed.
To prove that Descartes
was guilty of a circularity, Kenny attempted
to show that Descarc.es could not have consistently held
(i)
(ii)
,

While Kenny is right about
Descartes could
we Know

,

no-t

(i)

,

or (ill)

he has failed to show that

have held (il)

or (iii)

.

so that for all

Descartes did identify his clear and distinct loans

independently of considerations of truth.
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A

P T E R

III

frank, uri s discussion
of descart.es

w
xn
i

-

*

523

account

AM D DISTINCTNESS

C?Gar and Distinct
Perception
lon

~“’

'

Sto

5

t

i
a chapter
xn Demons
.

Har

^

Frankfurt’

" ffer " s ‘ ltisfact
°ry

''

s

main objective is

'to

interpretation of Descartes'
rule of
As formulated, this
Rale is aabi
jt is
f

eviaence.

^

Clear what it is that
Descartes thinks is true
as a result of
betng Clearly and distinctly
perceived. Frankfurt
argue
lha.t it is clearly
and distinctly perceived
propositions that.
<rUe
T ° supp ° rt his
be will distinguish
between
clearly and distinctly
conceiving and clearly and
distinct!.
perceiving that such and such
is the case, and he will
define
What ie * pans by *«•«*»
and distinctly conceiving

wm

-

’

an idea'

;

and

clearly and distinctly perceiving
that

>rdE

’

TO

Rl,jDUC rT0N

0F

'

Clip; At?

!

p.

’clear and distinct concept i on’

AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION THAT
-t

g..,iis

f

his discussion by attempting
to identi f

the coestj cuents of clear and
distinct perceptual acts.

He

notes that Descartes seems to
recognize two objects of clear
1

.

“ "

'
'

r -

«!« Madmen:
;

,'.

'
1

pp.

12 fa-145.

B 113

appear in rhe text.

c

Cle* r and
1st i.
The Defense of Reason in Descari-s''—
'

.

Bobb. Meri-m cSrapShy
retei ence s to Fj
.

^—

1

1970 ),

89

and distinct
perception
123,.

P-

-

But there are

idaas! and.
°'

,

is only
speakillg
1 a
IJeaK-ing loosely,
,
fn-

reaS ° nS t0
SUPPOSe

.

-

objects of Clear

we cannot ,i
-

w

PTOPOSiti °- <*™n
kfurt,

j

i -f

1

a
. ssa
at, is
,
factory

”

««

Descartes

r,

“

~s

that

ir^prnr
Q ^-,4.
lnter
“
pretation
of Descartes' rui*
rule
of evidence (Prankfnrf
,
,
-cuaiiit, pp. 128-130).
i->s
cartes [Rule cf.,j.
Q
atSS
that whatever we
clearly and
distinctly perceive
is true
If
„ nCepts
f C°
«*• among the sorts
of ...lngS that are
clearly and distinctly
^mctly perceived,
r
it follows
.
h L somo
concepts are tru®
a
Bui or ^marily
we think that it
ls Propositions
rather +-h=m
^
an concepts
thst
r* ^
--iai can
De said to be
1 1 U6 or fgl C£i
As a result Descartes
seems guilty of a
...
gurstic confusion
(Frankfurt, p. 123 ).
.

•

-

r

t"

,

-

.

'

'

'

*-

1

.

>>.

-

01

i

Arga, ng ir Descartes
-

’

defense, however
•

out

k

»

,

„ r vc..arr
Pr
ran^j.
points
A

DsFcaitpo° distinguishes
between wh-t he
- n
ne rcalls
mater'
and formal falsity.
i.hat.

'

'

iDte
can be found
in ideas
raate^il)
Is not a thing
there can be
things.

—

out that it is only j„
Called <
Y
formal
ly ls ““other kind
ol
kty
when they represent wi\-o'
a thin ?And
QO not appear to be
ideas of

f°
f*

f

T

f^y

"

"

•

•

•

.

.

According to Frankfurt, it
makes perfectly good
sense to
predicate Material truthof both concepts and
propositions.
proposition is: raateri" all
; r
uc 1£ -’-t represents
an existing
•

-

’-

-

-ate of ax tans

44,

''Prankfurt
11. 3-4.

,

,

.

J

and a concept materially
true if
o

.23

’ee

PH

I,

164; AT VII

,•

t re

i
-f
n..L

.

c
o
n r\
/O-

jU

a)
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sent, an existing
object (Frankfurt,
p. 129)
900- sense of
^cartes' ruie

—-

.

„

We
'

•

Allows:

whatever we cieariv
-l ear ly ana
d a
distinctly perceive
1e materially
m t
true fp
rar
^
Urankturt, p, 129 ).
'

.

,i

"

,
lr

We

DeSCartSS

.

Urt thinkS a new
ana

'

—

"*«

«*•

interpretation, however
serious problem arises.
I

quote Frankfurt:

the existence of
11 ! true
then
^"ob^c**^
a
2
rson
the fact that
has
a clear and distinct c?
Pf
1 ccnce Ption of
cartes would be saddled'
it.
Desf
aatuall y nis view,
wrth the grotesque
doctrine
the? vn* Uestlons of
ence can be decided by
existconceotirW
f^
1 activity
would be his belief i-L f ;
alone.
It
clear and distinct idea V * person need only formulate a
to be certain that
° bject ia order
an Sb^ct of tilt
°J
that
t
Pe
exists,
V
Accordina to
is committed to an aorior^n^f relation, then, Descartes
m ° re radical than St.
Anselm s (Frankfurt^
i

“er^w*

'

,

f

1

S).

In Frankfurt

view, the rule that
whatever is clearly and

distinctly perceived is
materially true entails a
"grotesque
a priori siii” which
Descartes rejects
*
IC J e ^tfa
„ u
his discussion
of
matter in Meditation H.
To be fair to Descartes,
therefore,
Ve Sh ° UJCi aVOid interpreting
his Rule as a guarantee

m

•

of the

h ‘“ Ul ' n

1

of

c

lear and distinct perceptions

-

Frankfurt thinks we can give a
satisfactory interpretatioi) ° lCe
reali
"having a clear and distinct
con-

^

JJek>Cai tss

}

c-ficM.r

f

(rranuiurt, p. 131).

an altogether non-propositional

Elaborating, Frankfurt says:

to have a clear and distinct concept
of someth ina P to
what characteristics necessarily belong'
to if
i-OcL tik. chaf. a clearly and distinctly
conceived
oo.ieep
is true means only that the concept
does actually
i

p*;,.cexve

i

.
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e

r

r,

rela !' ions perceived to be
.
tS t! e conce P t
necessarily has those propertie^rd^el
p
p rue “ ana relations (Frankfurt,
?
p. 131).-

i^licitly in

!r ;nfl%w

^

According to Frankfurt, clearly
and distinctly conceiving
X,
WhGre “ 15
concept, is a special case of
clearly and distinctly perceiving that
p
ri

:

c Ler r ly
-

--

-'

and distinctly conceives X

--

d.f

exemplifies X and

z_

(
'

v ) (•)
1

.'if
' ~ L

y.

is an essential property of
y,

then A clearly and distinctly
perceives that

characterizes

v

a

y)

As an example, consider the concept
Wax.

sence of wax is extension.

According to

distinctly conceive Wax if and only if

I

Assume that the es(Dl)

,

I

clearly and

clearly and distinctly

perceive that all wax is extended.
nut when

.

1

.

clearly and distinctly perceive that wax is

extended, Descartes' Rule does not entitle me to infer,
on
the basis of my clear and distinct perception, that
wax exists.

What my Rule guarantees is the formal rather than the
material
t

ruth of what

I

clearly and distinctly perceive.

that if there is any wax, it is extended.

It guarantees

Descartes' Rule

does not imply that whatever is clearly and distinctly per-

ceived is exemplified, and we do not have to saddle him with
this sort of apr iorism.
I'o

vindicate Descartes from the charge of apriorism,

Frank f urt c rec r s a reduction.
.

'

Fmphanis mine

He reduces the problem of

analyzing

m

'clear and distinct
nct Perception
nP
that'.
r
T+justified
all.
allOWS
US t0 aTOia

•ic
-LS

.

p>1
uXe uncharitably

I—
^

“1210

This
XX11S reduction

interpreting Descartes'

At the same 4time,
Frankfurt's reduction
•

.

IS consistent
with Descartes'

'

4-

.

—-

—

3re °bj

claim that
hot, concepts
-hat both
and

“““

Ctly

perceives conc'^it ^

in

distinct perception.

Which

«•

clearly and die

;

-/

mt.'

’

although at this st -top
"

fni

1

,•

Bu 4-

i-'t -

elucidated in

not ver Y helpful

'clear and distinct
conception

perception that*.

^

sense

;

in terms of

^

teanmg

'

.

(Dl)

(Dl)

defines

C le?u
u c“- and
ano. dice
distinct
-

-

expression is itself

vague.
OJT

What Frankfurt must
provide is a satisfactory
account
WhSt :t iS t0 PerCaiVe
and distinctly that such
and
'

sue] i is the case.

11

'

4’RANKFUKT S ANALYSIS OF
1

’

CLEAR AND

distinct perception that*
cuicturr says we clearly
and distinctly perceive that

E
(Tj

1

a.

Xi

Snd on -'y

v ’e

recognize that certain relations
hold between
dnd aD evidential basi “ tor
An evidential basis for
£.
p

G'lJO v

0.

o

fill

J- :c

^0clSOncilD

’

nTOlinrl
gro lncis

fozv doubting that p.
.p...

••

i

•

•

Comet lines
the evidential basis for
£ is -.another proposition o or some

experience.

Otherwise the evidential basis
for p is P i tse lf,
Xo

133 - 134

‘

ja ~ Q

to

1,e

self-evident (Frankfurt, pp,

)

i-t-.

n p

j.

s

not self-evident,

v/e

in virtue of which we recognize that

need some external basis

R

is indubitable.

In

93

turn the evident ai v
-oential basis must
baSiS 13 nea tiler
«*,
self-evident 1,0r
no," an
experience 11 must
verified by
be
u
-i yet
snnf
i
another evident-’
n basis. Rut
^entj-al
-nne this process
C °n”
ad infinitum.
At
‘
“
P ° lnt "* ” USt reach
an evidential
basis which
n suffj-ees
to establish
own
indubitabilitv
AAt y*
oelf-evid^n+laent propositions
'
and ex
Q
P e ^ences are
SQCh evidential
bases
when
When °ne understands
" » belj -evident
Proposition, one is
18 10
n “
positi °n to recognize
that «,
indubitable
When one has an
experience_ ' one
experience, for
experiences are n-t
h
ot t
the
sort of thinac
^
'
gs one
can doubt vrxcnKiurt,
(Frankfu-t pp.
133-139)
-i

,

«

-i

i

'

1

.

i

.

^

'

1

'

'

-

^^

.

"

.

*

a

Position to define
Frankfurt's notion

°- an evidential
basis:
(D2)

- 13 an evidential basis
for nE~df ® ew] udes all
reasonable ct
Una& f
9 cnr*
T'

(l)

QT

vl:

(

® is
o

\

or (iii)

self-evident,

“3

that E , and either

4

*

03 e

w

either self~evidp>r
aen-.- rw
or an experonce and e, excludes
all re
as-- -n-'-ubuiiaoic
grounds
boabrinq that e) na
fi-vn^urt,
J Frank
pp. 133—-1

•a.

°r doUbt

-s an experience.

~r

-

<-

r.

-

,

-•

('

..
*

u..a

t

1

cannot

->

p -- that l *' ir j r
"
P

„

.

18

° r E>

anrt

139)

while attend in a to
J t'° d pain

f

ara

1

My pain institutes
an evidentia
in a position to cl
" ea
a ~i
1V
v J
1 s1
“•

-'-

perceive that n
....
-iia

.

_

Vl

ranhf Ur

v

"~

t

rip

f
'

T

-3 rr

1J6)

1

-

_

p if and onlv
C;Ilow the

i

f

having, dout

1

•

n,,

•'

j

.

1 net!

<3

clearly perceive

P aj n is an evidential basis
-

possibility that p

rr

e

.

f

and

I

recognize it to be so
(Frankfurt, p. 136)
TO distinctly perceive
that , x must

E

not confuse

Wlth PrOPOSiti ° nS Wh °
Se indubitability
is not
eVldential baSiS
BUt

^

'

CO recognize that

'

southing

-

.

—

says,

establish
..xt

by

is possiblt

.

is certain

without understanding
exactly what it is that
is certain
." (Fran kfurt,
p. 13 „
1 mi9ht
f° r example
think Chat
£ is equivelant to
"I have a pain in my
leg," so that
*y evidential basis for
p
establishes the indubitability
of o as well. As a
result my
Clear perception becomes
confused.
a entails "I have a leg.'
a proposition I can
reasonably doubt even while
attending
u° my pain (Frankfurt,
p. 136)
.

'

.

'

c,

To avoid making myv clear
—Lear perception conrused,
I must
come to understand d fnii
t
-in
v
- tally understand
L --Uy.
when, for
all r, if
E entails r, I understand that
E entails r. Having
an exhaustive list of
E 's entailments, 1 know exactly what it
is that my experience of
pain
,

conclusively establishes.

^lo„,.

perception

V)

at £ is also distinct (Frankfurt,
p.

Accordingly, we can formulate
Frankfurt's definitions of
ness and distinctness as follows:
(Fi)

a.

clearly
^perceives

bssis for

p,

basis for £)
0>!)

=»+•
-*-h
-

nat:

—

a*

My

136 ).
c.lea.

t

E ~df
'£ is an evident u
and a recognizes that e is an
evidential
(Frankfurt, pp. 134 and 137)

a distinctly perceives that
p - fi£ a clearly perceives
"

1

-

y

:
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baS1S ° f
SI

then

understands that

tf and only if
p entails a
thSn - UndSrStands

«»t

p.

,

]

and

q

,

<*, (lf

e entails r)>]

(e

,

entailq

£ entails
(

Prankfurt

137)

111
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•

(D2)

-

(D4)

(D4)

contains a oenil
i sr
p -u.iar
Jsage of rhe term entails'
The Varlable
ranges over evidential
S.
bases.
These bases
are either propositions or
experiences.
One distinctly perceive.. that
£ only if he understands that p entails all
and
only what is entailed by
his evidential basis for
p.
If his
evidential basis is an experience,
he must understand that
p
entails all and only what is
entailed by his experience.
But
ls propositions, not experiences,
that have entailments.
J-hrs raif riculty is easily
resolved, however. Be need only
substitute for ’entails' the words
'excludes all reasonable
grounds for doubting'. This terminology
already appears in
Tj2 '"
and ifcs usage there would allow
us to say that experiences and propositions can exclude
all reasonable grounds
for doubting that p.
r-

1

u

•

'

On Frankfurt s analysis, both
’clearness' and
S

ness

are defined in terms of 'having a basis
for excluding

ali reasonable grounds for doubting
that p‘

says

mg
v,

'distinct-

,

.

As Frankfurt

"Clear and distinct perception is a matter of
recogniz-

that,

there are no reasonable grounds on which

an he doubled

(!

rankfurt, p. 135)

.

a

proposition

But what is involved

in recognizing that there are no reasonable grounds for

96

9 that

£

Something more than
the sublet
"
Lve °° nVlotlon
is needed if Descartes
scartes rs
is to
„
avord charges of
psychologism
Although Frankfurt does
not provjae
effect ve pro
cedure for ascertaining
when we have a basis it
that excludes all
reasonable grounds for
doubting that j>, his
discussion c , , P f
-dent Propositions suggests
a direction we
might Pursue
Frankfurt says, "Sven
the clear and distinct
perception of a
self-evident proposition
involves more
orc than
tnan apprehending the
proposition itself; it
requires recognizing that
no possible
state of affairs is
inconsistent with the
proposition" (Frankp. 134).
Frankfurt is speaking
loosely here. Propositions are inconsistent
with propositions and
states of affairs
incompatible with states of
affaire
o_ affairs.
In speaking loosely of
ai£a " rs however ' Frankfurt
seems to be acknowledging
that both experiences and
propositions can be grounds for
doubting that ;p.
-

-

'

•

•

.

^

.

_

-

,'

.

'

as far as propositions
are concerned, we can state

Frankfurt's view in the following
way:
O’j)

a is

reasonable ground for doubting
that p =
r
i- consistent, and the
conjunction of
p and o entails
a con trad i c t i on
a

Experiences can also be reasonable
grounds for doubting that
ctj L-houg.i she situation
is slightly more complicated:
CDS)

An experience F is a reasonable
ground for doubting
ihat.
j:

^2.’ *a

represents E, and the con junction

°f

E and 2 entail s

•

Having

CDS)

and (D6)

^ contradiction
)

5

we are
le ±n
in _a positi
on to define
vhat- it is for
,
a proposition or
~ an experience
to exclude~ ail
reasonable grounds for
doubting
n^t p.
y that
p
T ri the
i
case of
propositions, we can say:
,

c

-

(D7)

2 excludes

al l reasonable
yxu tines tor
crounds
fo - doubting
d
that.
13 C ° nSistent
a nd - (Er) I(
a and r) is con si,
•

~

"

df a

'

bUt

and

is inconsistent]

£•

in the case of
experiences, we can

s av;

An experience E
excludes
-,n reasonable
xciud.es all
grounds for
doubting that p =
/-p rf
*represents E, and - (Er)
df
!( 2 and r) is
consistent, but
and

(D 8 )

\

s

(

£

r)

is

inconsistent]

combiningj

(D
\ujy

and iD8)
ana
(

)

-

or a proposition

we can sav thatv
Ulat £
excludes all reasonable
,

—

an experience

grounds for doubt-

that E provided that
there is no state of
affairs or
proposition compatible
w-i + h v
‘
WlvJl
£' but incompatible with
p or the
state of affairs
g represents.
->nt

•

ouEak and distinct perception
that
Having set forth his definition
of
d„..rl,e._.

or

'clearness' and

'distinctness'

Frankfurt recognises that his
analysis

,

3

S

USCi the term
represents loosely. strip
picpobitions represent possible states
of a f
J
;lcc
' ut j:or every
~
experience
E,
*r
there
is a p r-~
A
\
A, having
j..
A s having E is a state of affairs
"and’ihere"
if? c 5 ace oi affairs corresponding to everv e-xpenence. In
sents E” means "there is a state’ of
affairs S
sue! x that r -Oj. responds to E,
and a represents S.
The same
•—
r
^
_
usage cf
e_.'i ereii i,s
appears in (D8) below.
!

spelt
p

-

-

'

4-

J

**

-

;

,

‘

'

-

r*

<“i

r. 4*

l
'

•

-

.

.

_

/

.A--.

.

-

_

•

problematic in part.

Prankfnrf
IUrt says Descartes
holds to the
vxe« that both clarity
and distinctne-s
-quietness are matte]rs
of degree
(Frankfurt nr, 13 9
n
«
140)
°" e can perceive
that p more or
es& Cj earl y, and
one can perceive \-h *
that p more or
less
distinctly. When we
loo at-" tpv
-ankrtirt s definitions,
however
we see that (D 4
allows for degrees
-- ee - oi
of di
,f
distinctness
but that
oes not allow for
degrees of clarity.
Speaking loosely, we
can say that (M)
impiies that
01s fcmctly Perceives
that E only if everything
entailed bv
bis evidential basj-Ss
,,
for £
is understood by him
to be entailed
by his evidential basis
for £’
10r
n
Whatever my evidential
basis
e for o, e entails an
infinite set of propositions
P - p
p
1 diStinCtly
E2
that E only if x understand
that e entails
E , that e entails E
that e entails p
and so on ad infinitum/
But as a finite being, X
v
ot understand this much (Frankfort n
p 1431
0n the other hand, there
are rim te s-nbcif^f-c~
m
° ome ot these subsets
•-*
will have p
as a member and of these
u
subsets
rs
n have
some will
more member:
than others.
if k lo
~ io the heL having just p and
p as members.,
cai. anQv-x stand that
e entails p and that e
entails 0.,,
when
,

\

.

-

'

-

7'

-

-

•

)

•

.

_

-

ww

.

,

.

,

2

-

-f

•

r>

,

'

..

,

understand chrs much,

1

I

perceive that p with

a

certain

degree of distinctness.
The degree to which
'

c‘

r^

'

hovevor

1

*

P more distinct if

wen

a/.

•£

and

p.,

.

can
I

'

I

distinctly perceive that

p_

can

tor example, make my perception
that

come to understand that c entails
P
“
L

As Frankfurt defines

‘

distinctness

•

,

as
2

we do
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perceive more or
less distinctly
sc that n ebCdJrte s
view that
distinctness is 3
md " tSr ° f d
^ree is preserved
When we turn to
Frankfurt's definition
of cle “i
however, we
encounter diffi culti
-^tnough Descartes
both Claritv
holds
~
ancl
and distinctness
d,
tn
a mutter nf
„
k a .ee we
cannot on (no\
perceive
3f
Ve fh
tilaL
P wore or l e « s
clearly.
The
evidential
ax Datj.T.S r
tor E
n eiuher
does or doe- rw311
reasonable grounds
for doubting that
„
‘

’

'

.

,

1

,

f

,

J

^

r

b^c

ffi.-i-L.-i_,-,

p
*

is perfectly clear
C r it

p-

is inconsistent

w

th De

^

-i

aJ:teS

.

-

„

As a result,

«

th3t

'

of claritv
To resolve this
difficulty
car es lloot
us'
the term
-P

.

(

D3 )

degrees

P r av ,v
--a-'Kturt
argues that De
-

'

.

"*

.

,

1

cl
-learn©:

r-

t

L
different
~
- a
isenses
eS
eluc rdates the first
sense
-- e
Tn the
-v,
In
second sense, a perse
clearly perceive « rn3 .t
2 Wten eVSrythi
en hailed by
p is kno ,
yJ
bv
ria.m
hin o oe entail aD u,.
i
y p * rankfurt , p. 141). But
as we
1,0 ’'° C db ° Ve ,
one can clearly
perceivee that
~ aar n although
£ vhe mav
iior understand
xi
— -id...
ly what p enta-i
1 a ~lo.
-as evidential basic
mav 'vn= t f-\
roving a proposition
he does not fully
understand. To fully
understand
Stand Eone must have what
Descart,
Cdj.j.3 a dequa te
knowledge
v

h-1

ii

( r\ *' \

fci

-i

J)

.

-

^

,

-

1

'

J

.

t

‘

...

tT

-

5

i

-

i

;

.

-

>

*

(D9}

§ Adequately knows that
,L
o
E
'

then
'

Ul

l

S

knows that

n

--

’

J

-

'

c

sense, a person's ppr^enfinn
-option

'^ ia

-

df
\

° 3)

See p.

94

above.

>

»

^ entails

a,

„

Frankfurt, pp. 14] -14

+..hac
v *

cioar depending on the
extent to which
r
wnich p
"
6

in) (ir
(a)

=-

p can be more or less
c

••

ent ailments are
+.

.100

known by him to be
entailed byv p
In th
this second sense,
E°
lty iS ' aS DeSOartes
ma tntains a matter
of degree.
-

"

,

V.

the minimal requirement
for clear
and distinct perception

HaVin9 ShOWn that b ° th
c ^ earness and
distinctness are
mattSrS ° f '
lrt acknowledges
another problem
-th his account. In the sense
in which clearness
is a matter
deSreP" °ne C;lear1 '’
that E only if everything
entailed by p is understood
by him to be entailed
by p.
Similarly one distinctlv
perceive
perceives -h-w
uhat p only if everything
-ntailed oy his evidential
basis for
E is understood by him
to be entailed by that
evidential basis.
both cases adequate knowledge
rs,,.
is rocrui
rpr!
J
acquired.
But adequate knowledge
is a
level of knowledge we cannot
attain (Fiankfurt, p. 143).
Human
beings always fall short of
perfect
riiecr clear and
P
-m* distinct
t
per ception and must settle for
something less. But how much
less?
What .is needed is a minimum
requirement for clear and
.

n

-

.

m

y

•

»

p-i caption.

We need to be able to ascertain
those

features of clear and distinct
perception that suffice to allow Descartes rule of evidence
to apply without error
(Frank•

furt, p.
-u-

mj

a., M,

144).
ly

According to Frankfurt, one's
perception
clear if and only if one recognizes

that his

evidential basis removes all reasonable
grounds for doubting
th.it £.
To have a minimally clear perception
that p, one
must clearly perceive that
£ in the sense in which clear
percept ion is not a matter of degree
(Frankfurt, p.

144)

101

istinctness is always
a matter of decree
v
'
*
'
hOWever '
in Frankfurt'ss
view we
.
cannot fix i-,,
tb nunrmal
requirement.
-

.

;

-

t
f u.i t
says:

*

J.he sensible
response
general solution; it is that tv.
problera admits of no
calls fL
each case. The
£«*'****
of judgement
appropriate
always be a function’
diStinctness
of the uLs to W ?
will
Je c LOn
1C 1 the Proposition
t:o be put
,
and
^
f
?
of
^
the
it that
“
seem likelv
be trou lesp confusions conce
1 to ho
144-145)
(

“

,

,

-

.

.

f.

'

.

.

Vi.

CRITICISM OF FRANKFURT

Criticism

1

S

ACCOUNT

1.

Frankfurt is right when
he claims that wc
clearly and distinctly
conceive only if we
clearly and disxnctly perceive ' hot
£ XOr Some E- A Close reading of
Descaries supports this
view, and
ana textual
textual support
<s,
seems to me to
be the best rlpfonco
en,,e ol an
interpretation. Although
no add.vtional defense is
needed Pranirftiv
Irankrur.1t makes use of an
argument
1
unconvincing.
<.

v, ->

’

/

-

•

'

Frankfurt

argument can be summarized
as follows.
If
».o do not define
‘clear and distinct conception'
in terms of
clear and distinct perception
that', we are forced to
interpret Descartes' Rule as a
rule that guarantees the
material
° E V V,t 13 Clearly and
distinctly perceived. But if
we
1

'

Di

'

ra:le

s ” CJh

an interpretation, we
saddle him with

an apriOXiCn he robabl
P
.Y did not hold.

To be fair to Descartes,

therefore, wc need an analysis of
clearness and distinctness
that IS consistent wlth the view that
Descartes' Rule guarantees the formal truth of what is
clearly and distinctly perceivecl.
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FranKfUrt

p

we

'

S

wnw

——

is unconvincing.

be

Acceding to

•

ted 10 hlm the View

«“t

a^

if we

his Rule guarantees
the

_

raat
oxxol truth Of what
is clearly and
distinctly perceived.
,t
XrS _ glanCe> FrankfUrt
S P ° int
obvious.
On Frankfurt “
view, an idea is, by
definition, materially
true if ancl c: ,
lf Xt 18 eXemPUfied
This ^finition of
'material truth' <
derived from a passage
cited earlier.’ Xn
this passage Des .
cartes does not define
'material truth'.
Father he states a
sufficient condition for
-ia Q
an 1Qecl
to be materially
false.
He
says that ideas are
materially false
arsu "when
when thn
tney represent what
is not a thing as if
it were a thing.
.»
'

'

“

’

‘

...

-

-

•

t

-

.>

.

.

Although Descartes does
not define 'material
falsity'
here, X will grant for
the sake of argument
that Descartes;

holds

(D 10

An idea ~
i is material!
_
L Xia L 1 v iaise
f a '- a “
i

10)

(1>

:

}

-

what is not
•Since it is

a

-

?

df

1

represents

thing as if it were a thing

natural to suppose that 'material
falsity' and

'material truth' are contradictories,
we can define a materially erne idea as follows
(0 11)

An idea i is materially true =

i
flf

is

not mater-

rally false
(D 11

)

CD 11a!

is ambiguous,

however.

:

See

vi.

89

above.

Frankfurt thinks it means

103
{D

lla)

An idea
i is materially true -~

11

1S 3 thlng as if

”

T

ii:

were

****

11

“*•

a

a

df

.

i represents what

thing

a

interpretation

-

What 15 cle a«y and
distinctly perceived
perceived, then his
Rule see
eems
to guarantee that
the. object of
clear andu ndistinct
-i-btinct percepti cn
exists
BUt VD 11} Can also
be interpreted as
(D ll.b; An idea
i is materially
true
=--

(D

lib)

r<a
i
represents
df ~
what

iS n0t a thing as
if it were not a thing

Both (D 11a) and (D
lib) have peculiarities.
On both interpretations, 'material truth'
and 'material falsity'
are nor
contradictories
t
T7C
We acce P t < D Ha), those
ideas that
represent what s not— a thing as
it were not a thing
are
not materially true, and
those ideas that represent
what is
a thing as if it were
not a thing are not
materially false.
ily ideas can
misrepresent
wi i-hr-if k
1 without
"
being materially false and
correctly represent Without
being materially true.

“
«-

,

i

,

,

n

i

On (D lib),
the material truth and
falsity of concepts i s not
analogous
to the loimai truth and
falsity of propositions. Since
every
concept representing what is
a thing is neither true
nor false,
of excluded middle does not
hold for concepts.

1

•-O

and
j

3

I

arn

nor.

mow

how to decide between

not claiming that

(D 11b)

that " raftkfur t has not shown

inn to

(D lib),

(D 11a)

is right.

(D lib)

and

(D lib)

My only point

to be false.

.Accord-

an idea is materially true just in
case it

,

satisfies two conditions:

XL
it nrn^t
must

represent what is not
a
and it must represent
PrC nt i + as
nonexistent
There j „
nothing in either ° +-u
f th6Se C ° nditi
°- that implies that the
ob
° f a ma terially
true idea exists
Tf
„
Ule guarantees the
material truth
a of clearly
,
and distinct]-./
perceived ideas, it does
not follow
" that
lhat ^scartes
u
is committed
to
an apriorism.
^ e
-

vhmg

.

/

.

h

.

.

~^

S

SB “

GaSSendl

es failed to provide
,
method
for ascertaining
when we are clear]y
perceiving. This problem
emerges again when we
look at Pran „_
s definitions
of clearness and
distinctness. To clearlv
and distinctly Dercpivp
perceive that p, we must
recognize that an
evidential basis for p eyrlnrioe _in
*- fcXtll d '- s a11 reasonable
grounds for
doubting that
But how can we be sure
E
£-.ria.i.
that
„h- wg ‘chunlc
wnat
WS re ° 0gniZe t0 be an
Evidential basis for
£ really exo]u(;£
311 reaSOnabla gr ° Unds
for doubting that p ? We
need a decision
procedure, but Frankfurt
does not provide one.

^

.

,

-t

.

*

.

Criticise

ike Gewirth, Frankfurt
thinks clearness
ana diotincjias are matters
of degree. The best we
car, have
if minimally clear and
distinct perception. But
3.

i,

on Frankfurf

interpretation, the minimal
requirement for distinctness
depends on what is appropriate
under the circumstances.
"it
calls for an exercise of
judgement in each case ." 8 For
Frankfurt, t he re

,J

Sce

is;

n,

no effective procedure for
deciding which per-

101

above

c

ceptions are minimally
distinct
ct.
,

.

ov.'over

wi tv,
Without
such a procedure
.

we can never be
sure that
at we
We ara Parceiving
with
,
dlstlnctness appropriate
to the circumstances,
result Frankfurt’s
interpretation makes
Descartes
vulnerable to Gassendi's
criticism.
,

.

^^

£ U. 2T

t 30

c;

-o

* +t0 g-1V0

a

*

1

distinctness that permits

^account

Of clearness and

charitable
it-at3.Lv.
interpretation of
But the net "result 1=
ls uncharitable.
Prank-

Descartes' Rule.

a

'

^
*

-

kD ci

VQ 3 D P ^ p 3

to Gassendi

'

s

”y**

4—

r?

/-»

f

.

01,1

charcTr><5
J

apI1 0risin by leaving
him vulnerable
'

*
A
Satlsfact °ry and charitable
account
,

.

or clearness and
distinctneso
n needs to be provided.
xnctness still
:
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CHAPTER

x

V

E. J. ASHWORTH'S
ACCOUNT Op CLEARNESS

AND DISTINCTNESS IN
DESCARTES
E. J.

Ashworth's article or -olsrit,,
lanty and distinctness
in Descartes is basically
critical.Ashworth thinks that
Descartes eouivocated on
the terms 'clear' ana
'aistincf and'
MS rUlC ° f SVidence
be adequately
,

,

'

.

.

1

^

m

defended.

Sections

through IV,

I

I

discuss

and.

criticize Ashworth's

arguments to show that
Descartes equivocated on the
term
'clear'.
In sections V through X,
I do the same thing
with
respect to Ashworth's discussion
of distinctness.
Finally
sections XI and XII, I consider
Ashworth's criticism of
Descartes rule of evidence.
*

TWO MEANINGS OF 'CLARITY'

I.

Ashworth thinks Descartes equivocates
on the terra 'clear
Descartes believe that every idea
is either clear or obscure,
The class of idea if not coextensive
with the
class of concep

however
(Ashwort

Any son
,

.

n

,

92

it

of consciousness is for Descartes
an

ii a result, both sensations and
concepts

are idea;ideas, and bo!
both, can be said to be clear or
obscure.
E
iH

,
ae*
8»

:

lr

The

Ashworth, "Descartes' Theory of clear and
Distinct
Cartesian Studies, ed e.
1>w York
,

?

iclo,

'

Ashworth”s
LLn ° article
i

v/ili

'

’

appear in the text.

™

.

fences to
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question is

^
When D6SCarteS
oe Predicates
'clarity' of both concepts and sensations, is he
using
‘if-o wolq
^ this
word .in
in the
th, same sense?"
In defining 'clearness'
Descartes draws an analogy
between
perception and eyesight (Ashworth,
p. 96)
Ashworth believes
that this analogy shows a
clear perception to be
"some hind of
immediate awareness about which
we cannot be mistaken"
*

"

•

(Ash-

worth, p. 96).

But if we view clear
perception in this way,
problems arise. Since we are
immediately aware of every concept
we refelct u P o n, a simple act
u
of- ref^ctirn
,^-iid enable
icr.L^CLj,on T7
wo
us
,

co perceive clearly any
concept whatever

(Ashworth, 0

2
.

97).

Although Descartes' analogy between
perception and eyesight seems to support the conclusion
that all ideas
are

clearly perceived, his discussion of
fictional ideas supports
the opposite conclusion.
Descartes believes that fictional
ideas can be clearly or obscurely
perceived depending on whethei

chey are understood or misunderstood.

If we understand

a fictional idea, we are able to
give a "full definition" of
a

term expressing that idea (Ashworth,
pp. 98-99).

\ fuj

1

definition is an enumeration of terms denoting
all and only
essencial properties of the object our concept
represents
(Ashworth pp. 9 8-99). Experience, shows us that
we are at

,

times unable to give full definitions.
v.-e

Since we have concepts

do nou understand, we can obscurely perceive some
ideas

we reflect upon.
2 ~,

Despite Descartes' analogy, we can avoid

For a more comprehensive treatment of the same point,
see the chapter on Gewirth, pp. 4-6 above.

10 8

saddling
y Descar-f-**
caites with the view
that
,n ideas are
r.nat all
clearly
perceived if we take
clarify
to
be
a
e
° bS a functio »
5
of understanding
A 3„
worth counters that
we are trading one
problem for
another,
x» defending
Oescartes from the charge
that all
arS Clearly PerCSiVea
We
'
«*» vulnerable to a
charge of
ecmivocation
Tiarif,,!
ariLy SeGras
have two different
senses.
There rs the clarity
of sensations and
the
e clarify of concepts
Ashworth thinks that Descarf-***
Cartes analogy between
clear perception and eyesight shows
clear perception of a
sense datum to
be a matter of immediate
awareness.
Since I am Mediately
aware of all my sensations,
I clearly perceive
every sense
datum I am having.

—

.

.

Clear perception of a
concept involves more than
immediate awareness, however
,
x
Analv^’e
analysis isc required.
I
analyze my idea into
constituents representing
*

.

.

must.

all and only

proper ae 0 of the objects of
my idea. But such
involve® more rhan immediate
awareness,
when predicated of concepts, ’clarity'
has one meaning; when predicated
C'l
sense dan a, it has another
(Ashworth,
pp.

II.

9

8-99}

.

DOBS DESCARTES' ANALOGY SUPPORT

ASHWORTH'S INTERPRETATION?
If the clear perception of a
sense datum were a matter

of immediate awareness, Descartes
would be guilty of using
'clarity' inconsistently.
But the analogy between clear

perception and eyesight allows for more
charitable interpret-

109

auions.

Descartes says:

attentive mind^L^h^same^rav 0 11 an<3 ap P ar6nt to an
objects clearly when, being
th
e see
SLen/to^h^r
^operate upon it with sJficient'strength^A&S?
'

M*

Ashworth is right when he
claims that we are
Mediately aware
sensations.

But in the above quotation
Descartes does
compare a clearly percLived
-in
perceived idea
t-i-'
with
a clearly perceived
sensation
Instead,, he comp
compa^e^
pi o a r
ares a clearly
perceived idea with
a clearly perceived
object
the sort of thing that is
presented to an eye but not to
a mind.
We are not tempted to think
that we clearly perceive
every object presented to our
regardr. c eye.
The object must "operate"
upon the eye with “sumcient strength."
*

.

i

•,

.

->

.

i

-

Jt 1S GaSy to

iraa 9'irie

cases where the object of percep-

tion does not operate with
sufficient strength upon the regardJ ny
e" e
If J aia drivin on a foggy
9
night and see something
in the road before me, an object
is present to my regarding
eye.
But, ordinarily, I would not be
inclined to assert that
1 see that object clearly.
j...
in i.aau,
if asKea, IT would fact ix
i
denv
that r see it clearly.
After all, I cannot even make out
enough features to tell whether what
I am observing
’

*

'

n

,

is a man,

J

1

^'-

c

f

or a lock.

Descartes' analogy does not sup-

port the conclusion that all ideas are
clearly perceived.

Moreover, his analogy does not support the
conclusion
that clear perception is

a

matter of immediate awareness.

D b s c u r u- perceptions can be made clear

i.i

the proper procedure

110

is followed

if I Slowly approach
the object in the road
and

.

turn on my parking lights,
see as

a

man.

First

1

may be

afale

to identify

^

T

notice
6 that
-Mat th,
the figure is human.
Then
1 observe other
features and 1t am
m P re Pa.red to assert
that what
1 866 13 3 man
My
tion depends on a process
of classification and inference.
More than immediate awareness
I

—

'

*

is

involved

Ashworth
uncharitable

.

'

interpretation of Descartes’ analogy
is
If „ e accept Ashworth's
interpretation,
s

we sad-

dle Descartes with an
inconsistency.

If clear perception is

3 matter ° f immad iate
awareness, then all ideas are
clearly

perceived

—

a view Descartes expressly
denies.

accept Ashworth's interpretation,
however.

We need not

The text admits

a plausible and more charitable
alternative, and in fairness

to Descartes, we should adopt
the most charitable interpretat ion available.

HI.

WHY ASHWORTH INTERPRETS DESCARTES'

ANALOGY UNCHARITABLY
I

Mh.in.iC

'

can offer a reasonable guess as to
why

Ashworth gives an uncharitable reading of
Descartes' analogy.
Strict y speaking Descartes never perceives
external
.

ob jects

,

of perception are always mental entities

J '""'

surrogates for external objects.
L(

-he.

-'

-Mink. that, the

—

As a result, one might be

object seen clearly when present to

regarding eye is an object of consciousness, an object of

m
which we are immediately
aware.

refemng

But the 00
object
iec. t n
Descartes
1”
'

to is an object
that .«b Fresent to
a regarding eve
'
a " a °' 3e ° tS ° f
C° nSCiousne
are not such objects
ob je -/
i consciousness
are ore-on
P
10 a re 9arding
mind, not to a

^
+-

-i

regarding

eye..

in the passage
cited above, 3
Descartes is speaking
oosely
ho is, alter all,
drawing an analogy.
Analogies
.

are

useful when they draw
on something familiar
to help one to
understand something
unfamiliar.
ue.
the an
=bovc
ie passage,
n
Descartes uses the f.--rot
>•<=+
person plural. He is
talking to his
reader and referring his
.
reader
er to
to „
d familiar
experience
the experience of
asserting that an object
is clearly seen.
ln reflective moments
Descartes himself
‘“ ielr has
ha- made
r **
such assetirons
and he reviews with his
reader the conditions under
SUCh cl&serl -LOns are
ordinarily made. There are
three
condi t i on s

m
-

•;

,

(1)

the eye is regarding;

("5

tne ob i ect is present to
the eye, and
the object operates upon
the eye with sufficient
strength

(3/

p..esu„,,ibly,

these three conditions are
analagous to the

three conditions Descartes
spells out in his definition
of
clarity:
the regarding eye is analagous
to the attentive mind,
the object being present
to the eye is analogous
to the

-Vi

See p. 110 above

112
o hn e c t of con ^ t
••-Ouontos osincT Present
g 'D2rG ? o,nh in the mind,
t

•

c

3SCt ° Perating UPOn
the

j_

and the

*ith sufficient

strength is , na
^ O \x S to tto ol'h
4-T
object of consciousness
being apparent to the
"1

mincK

/*;

•

In the example

gave of driving
Living on a foggy
fo
night, the
object cl i d Dot o° rhPer
o v» “ te
on **
with sufficient strength:
x could not
make out its identifying
features.
it had these
features all along, but
they did not appear
to me.
Using
Gewxrth
terminology, we could say
that the object was nor.
"open" to my inspection.
What I needed to do was
to get a
loo,. ... to scrutinize
the object more carefully.
I

—> j-

Analogously, ideas have
contents that are not always
open to the mind's immediate
inspection. Further scrutiny
or
dlYSj"S L “ ne aed
For an idea to be apparent
to the mind,
the mind may have to perform
operations that reveal the contents of the idea.
Immediate awareness is not enough.
Ashworth probably misinterpreted
Descartes' analogy
because he knew that Descartes
believed that, strictly speaking, we never perceive
physical objects. On the other
hand,
I do not think Ashworth
would so readily have overlooked
what
Descartes actually said if independent
considerations did sot
seem to him to support the view
that clear perception is a
matter of immediate .awareness
‘-

'

-CV.

14

-

ORE ARGUMENTS IN DEFENSE OF

ASHWORTH

Ashworth

r

s

'

S

INTERPRETATION

interpretation of Descartes’ analogy entails

.

113

that all ideas are clearly
perceived. Although I
think I
have argued convincingly
that Descartes- analogy
allows for
“ m0re Charitable
interpretation, Ashworth
thinks that his
view is supported by
additional evidence which
I have not,' as
yet, considered. Ashworth
says:

*-

he

cSoSf

s
'

?\

10r th l '>gs of
the sort when we consider'
then si t- ’ Tt ,°“
thoughts." He appeals to the
exm 111 '
e " ere nam to
show how a perception „ av
® ar wlthout being distinct
y
(Ashworth, p. sell
'

’

Ashworth refers to three separate
passages here.
s.ider each in turn.
•

worth's article.

There is a footnote error in Ash-

The reader is referred to page
forty- throe

of Haldane and Ross, volume II

(Ashworth, p. 96).

is no mention of a jaundiced man
on this page.
a

Let us con-

reference on the preceding page, however.

is the passage to which Ashworth
is

I

But there

There is svcr

.

assume this is

referring

The passage reads as follows:
s ihoeed clear that no one
possesses such per feet
J;
cercarnty
.in those cases where there
is the ve--y y --confusion
obscurity in our pe:
Lon;
wnatev ^ r sort it be, is sufficient to make uoouol here
In matters perceived by sense
]
clear Jy, certainty does not exist, because
we nave on-e^T
no tea that error can occur in sensation,
as in the instance
tJ;ie thirst of the dropsical
man , or when one who is
jaundiced sees snow as yellow; for he sees it thus with
no less clearness and distinctness than we see it
as white.
J.f
then, any certitude does exist, :,.t remains that it
.must be found only in the clear perceptions
of ho
Ifc

.

f

.

.

,

r

1

intellect

114

4
.

Although Descartes
"sneaks

" an

nr- +->
the 'jaundiced man
2£
who sees Bnow

'

S

PerCePtiOT iS

and distinct

—

.

Kathet^e

n_ Cc.se of the
jaundiced man to show
ow us
„ c that we
cannot
SenSeS>
” hat DeS
"
ying is that the jaundi
tcea man sees as clearly
and distinctly as
the normal person
n ° rmal PerSOn S
sense Perceptions are
obscure
and C ° nfUSed
AShW ° rth
mistaken
Descartes does no t
the jaundiced man
example to show that
sensation
y

- -

’

-

-

_

.

is a

model
contrary, his example
shows that sensation
is a model for obscure
and confused perception.

of clarity.

On

i-hp

-

,

.

Another consideration
shows Ashworth's view of
the
jaudiced man to be wrong.
it follows from Ashworth's
inter° - c tlon uhat Descartes is
1
implicitly denying his own
rule
cf evidence.
Asnworth's interpretation draws
heavily upon
Descartes' claim that the
jaundiced man sees with no less
-

Clearness and distinctness than
the normal person.
This claim
seems to imply that both the
jaundiced man and the normal
observer perceive clearly and
distinctly. But if we adopt
this interpretation of Descartes'
remarks, we face the following difficulty. Although
both the jaundiced man and the
normal observer perceive clearly
and distinctly, they hold
contrary Iwjrrefs that cannot both be
true.
But Descartes' Rule
as
:

4

HR, II,

42.

atev< r

1

nd distinctly

e

ceived

trUe

*

Theref °re, Descartes

*

Rule is false.

This difficulty is
avoided once we realise
that Descartes
1S n0t Sayln9 that
Sense perceptions are
clear and distinct
se.
Clearness and distinctness
are matters of degree
’’
he hSalthy PerS °n S
P^on has very little clearness
and
distinctness
i» other words, it
is very obscure and
confused,
^ t h 0 0 xs no ^ SaSOn
^
t0 SUp P° se ^at
Descartes' Rule should
apply to very obscure
and confused perceptions.
Clear and distinct
perceptions fall under Descartes'
When a minimum requirement
is met.
Only clear perceptions
of the intellect .meet
this requirement.
The jaundiced man
example does nor show us that
sense perception is for
Descartes
a model for clarity.
On the contrary, it is
a model for
perception that fails to meet
the minimal requirement.
.

'

.

c*

4-

M,

—&

5 MS££. k nowledge of pa in and color.

To

support: the view that clear
perception is a matter of immed-

iate awareness about which
we cannot be mistaken,
Ashworth
"COD'- paooege
a sentence from Principle
LXVIII
Of the Principles
"We have a clear and distinct
knowledge
°" paln ' cclour and ^her things
of the sort when we consider
tllem
J n ply
as sensations or thoughts"
(Ashworth,
;

'

:

'

-

p.

I

no

S6

)f

see how this passage supports
Ashworth's view. The
passage cites a sufficient condition
for having clear and
;

hot.

kn owledge .

It cites neither a necef

116

sufficient condition for
havin, clear and distinct
perception. 6
But even if we ignore
the distinction between
clear and
distinct knowledge and clear
and distinct perception,
the
passage does not entail any
of Ashworth's
claims.

Descartes'
point seems to be that our
sense perceptions are
clear and
distinct or obscure and
confused depnding on what
we "consider
By ltS6lf ' my sense
Perception is neither clear
nor obscure, distinct nor
confused
clan ty ana distinctness
entei the picture only when
we reflect upon our sensations
and
make judgements about them 8
Ashworth is mistaken. clarity
18 not just a matter of
immediate awareness.
.

.

Ashworth is also wrong when he
claims we cannot be mistaken about our sensations.
Principle LXVIII suggests we can.
Instead of making the informed
judgement that my pain is a
sensation or thought, I could judge
that my pain is in my foot.'
Tnere is nothing in my immediate
awareness of pain that forces
me to judge correctly about my
pain.

—

have thouc?ht Principle LXVIII supports

ll^LY.

.

Although the passage Ashworth cites does

support his interpretation, we can
speculate as to why
he thought it did.
I suspect Ashworth thinks
Descartes is
not.

C,

Sao my discussion, pp.
foee

8

6

8-71 above.

Gewirth on this point, pp. 7-8 above.

bee Frankfurt on this point, pp. 90-91 above.

Fee Principle LXXI

,

HR

1,

249-250.

1X7

Pi^idg US a WaTn
na
wcixuxiig
i

mn

the passage
nifpH
t
cited.
4-

i

I-,/-,

He is warning us
•

° confine our judgement
to what we are immediately
aware of.
Gxnce a pain in a
sensation or thought, we
are immediately
aware of a sensation or
10
thought whenever we are
in pain

““ “ *“* ”

“

“

•'

••»*».

immediately

„„„„» „„
«, „„ „

In -aome sente, clear
and distinct perception
appears to be a
matter of immediate awareness.
But in what sense?

Vne sense in which clarity
is now a matter of
immediate
IS not the sense Ashworth
wants, for clarity is now
a matter of confining
our judgement to contents of
which we
ere immediately aware.
Since we are not forced to
restrain
our judgement in this way, we
can have perceptions about
which
we an. mi.-, t-aken
if Descartes is warning us
to restrain our
judgement in Principle LXVIII his
warning does not support
Ashworth's account of clarity.
.

,

—

The last passage Ashworth cites
in

L®-

support of his interpretation comes from
Principle XLVI
De,j

s

•cz/s

,

hhen,

.

Here

for instance, a severe pain is felt,

the perception of this pain may be
very clear, and yet for all
mac nor. distinct.
Ashworth does not indicate why

U

'

;,

.

.

.

'O immediately aware of a
v
sensat ion or thought
y
g,oa„ recognizing
that it is a sensation or thought we are
rmried lately aware of.
,A'

4

,

(,

,

u.t.

'HR I,

2

37.
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he believes this
passage supports his
view bso°' once again,
we
are forced to
conjecture about Ashworth's
reasoning.
SlnCE PrinClple XLVI
rmmediately follows
Descartes'
definition of clearness
and distinctness
mcLness, rI suspect Ashworth
takes Descartes to be
elaborating on his
J s
analoav between claanalogy
rity and sensation.
It seems° llaturdl
nat-vir-u to
interpret this elaboration
the following wayW
When
n TL a,JVS a severe
pain, m
perception is clear; when
I have a mild
mi id pain,
m-Sn my
-

-

J

•

+.

m

-

1

.

w

perception

is obscure

vi

.

owedd ln
i n
tn,s~
i- v, i

Clarity Of sense perception
seems to be a function
of the inters
t,. oi
tensity
sensation, and
this intensity is part
of our immediate awareness
when we sense
--

i

{.r<

—ding interpretation of Principle
XLVI

is one

Ashworth accepts, it does not
go far enough.
Although we now
have a perfectly good sense
in which clarity can be
said to
be a matter of immediate
awareness, problems arise with
two
ether theses Ashworth holds.
These theses are (i) that we
cannot be mistaken about what
we clearly perceive
and (ii)

that all ideas are clear.

Descartes explicitly denies

(i)

in Principle XLVI itself.

He says we can make false
judgements about a clearly perceived
severe pain. Whether our pain is
severe or mild, we can make
Lh0
oi thinking our pain is -in our
foot.
Judgement
'

abou -

,.>na

s

sensation is independent of the intensity
of the

rioat.'on fc.lt

th„n

4

if intensity of sensation determines
clarity,

appears that clarity is a matter of
immediate awareness
about which we can be mistaken.
.it
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^^

Turning to Ashworth's
second
d°
unclear ide as
Sor
er Se PerCSptions
vary i„ intensity.
‘
Pajn c n ,be S6Vere
°r
If intensity U
ofL sensation
. en ,«ti
tority '
a
*
is having an
0
and ASh
iS

W

‘

“

,T ,

•

i

—™— — — - -

^

.

“ «- «« -

-

aVe triea t0 f ° rmUlate
an interpretation
of P rinciple
„ IVI
WO " ld
Plain "’ hy AShworth thi„
ks this principle
supP01ti “ 1S V1SW
In
the interpretation
presents
CrltiCiZing 3
"e
reasoning that is not
Ashworth
'
AShWOrth d ° es n0t tell
us why he thinks
Principle
hi, VI supports
his view, this i s the
best I can
"

“

-

^^

U

do.

V.

ASHWORTH

S

’

ACCOUNT OF 'DISTINCTNESS'

Ashworth thinks Descartes'
use of 'distinctnessis as
vague and inconsistent
as his use of 'clarity'
Ashworth p
U3Ually ' the predicate
distinct seems to suggest
two
things:
that the idea in question
is complete, and that
we
have ar, adequate basis for
making some sort of judgement,
though
° n1y th ® neC ° nd appUes
to i^oas of sensations"
(Ashworth, o.
(

"K

,

.

1

*

99>

’

:
:

’
’

’

“

dl Jtinctn
‘n ” ont‘iste!it

.

’•

to elucidat

But o

n

Oescartes

,

When predicated of sensations,

'distinctnessbus one meaning; when predicated
of concepts, it has another, i:

Eve.y distinctly perceived sensation
must satisfy two condi'xhrough.out his article Ashworth s
peats loosely about

120

tions:
.

it must be complete
"

uasis

'

-it
dnd Xt
must

.

- or

P^ido

an adequate

judgement.

a distinctly
distin-M,, perceived
concept must sat lsf Y only one of tiles**
cnnrli
s
conditions,
however:
it must be complete
,

-i

VI.

ASHWORTH'S JAUNDICED MAN
CRITICISM OP
DESCARTES' ACCOUNT OF
DISTINCTNESS
Ashworth claims that there
are other equivocations
besides the one that
appears in Descartes'
ordinary use of
'distinctness'. To ill
nQfr a +- Q his point,
illustrate
Ashworth refers us
to Descartes' jaundiced
man.
Ashworth thinks Descartes
is telling us that the jaundiced
man perceives distinctly.
But the
jaundiced mar. cannot be
perceiving distinctly
i

•

in the sense in

Which

distinct perception is one
that provides an adequate
basis for judgement, for the
jaundiced man judges falsely on
a

the basis of what he perceives.

In predicating 'distinctness'

o f the :iaundiced man s
perception, Descartes appears to be
'

departing from his ordinary usage.
distinctly
* in

the*

sense
en ° e
°

t-h-g-itlicU -

The jaundiced man perceives

he is able to dis tinguish the
.

snow from the people walking in it
(Ashworth, p. 99
S

1

sahnna ?ht°t° !ffi

and ^stinct perception.
u

.

O.JLU

^^

UJ-GciJ?

)

When it !
einci

Cl

'I

r

l

n r +*

of c
P ts or ideas as 'concepts
th.r^e^lcar^^-if-^ea
distinct
See Ashworth, p. 100. Ashworth’s
confn-ion Ihc-- f
ks V1BW that a11 objects of conscious”
n
® -rp
so
that
both sensations and concepts aie ideas
#
* inn a ? VQ
°
P
n
this ^alysis there are ideas as sen^°
htTsalons
andi ideas as concepts. But we can drop the cumbersome
Laea as
locution and speak simply of clear and distinct
f
sensations
and clear and distinct concepts i.f we keep in mind
mat botn. sensations and concepts have contents.
3

.

,

*

'

(

-

•
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‘iss cartes

"I

were

6 ’ diStinCtl

i

-

IS Uoing

n

—-™

t
fact claiming
that the jaundiced

have to concede that

'distinctness' equivocally.
Rut as l
pomteo out earlier, Descartes
is not making such
a claim 13
Wten Pr °Perly UnderSto
° d Descartes
point i s this
the
jaundiced man's sense
perceoti'm
perception is as confused
as the normal
person s
And t-h " 1 ^ lm
1S oe rtainly consistent
with what
Ashworth believes is Deqnvr Qr,i
“ ^-e_,
usual use of 'distinctness'.
1

'

:

‘

„

vil.

I.

•

i

ASHWORTH'S CRITICISM OF
DESCARTES'
account of completeness

Ashworth is giving

typical use

a

correct analysis of Descartes'

oj

distinctness’, we cannot
understand what Descartes moar.s by distinctness'
until we know what he means
by
'completeness'.
But Ashworth thinks Descartes'
treatment of
completeness is so confused that
Descartes does not even know
whether it is clear or distinct
ideas that are complete
(Ashworth, P. 100).

TO illustrate Descartes'
confusion,

Ashworth tries to show that
Descartes believes there are some
clear ideas that are complete.
Ashworth
argues as follows:

But other remarks suggest that
it. is clearness
rather th-n
ailS completeness for he [Descartes]
hat Wc can liave a cnsti.net
IT- ; r*
understanding of dvrroer a -ud number if we do not
* r~° 11
mingle with the^^
be
t0 the “"“Ption of
-ombb - complete idea, since it is of a
complete object
r
,trv'
wouIq have
to include the defining characteristics
of
o Lb stance (Ashworth
p..
100)
:

~

™„T

;

'

/

fc

sSstS^SL

'Tr

•

f

.

.13
>

-e

pp

„

114-116

a b o ve

.
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Ashworth's argument dope rio 63 n0t SUpp ° rt «"*
conclusion he wants.
T
*ns
C6SQ oil supposing
3 lln nnv*i— ^
the COnclusi °" that
some clear ideas are
complete, it supports
the corcjutm
Iusxon tha t some distinct
ideas
are incomplete.
+-

i

}

-i

'

.

Descartes does believe
there are complete clear
ideas
nowever
Every distinct idea is for
Descartes
so that
there are at least as many
complete clear ideas as
there are
distinct ideas. Because
both clear ideas and
distinct ideas
Can
C° rapiete ' AShW ° rth
tWnke Descartes is confused
about

<W«

.

W ‘‘

^
at “

iS tJ ‘ at iS COBp;,ete'-

3 ^t there is no
confusion in

thinking that two types of
ideas have a property in
common.
A difficulty would arise
if Descartes thought
completeness was the defining
characteristic of both clear ideas
and
distinct ideas, for then these
two types of ideas would be
indistinguishable. But there is
nothing ir, Descartes' admission that there are clear
complete ideas that suggests that
completeness is the defining feature,
or even a defining
£ e a t u re,-

of ales. r

Vt.i.u

i de a s

ANOTHER POSSIBLE EQUIVOCATION ON

Lb £ CARTES

'

USE OF 'DISTINCTNESS'

Although Ashworth has not succeeded in
showing Descartes
to be confused about completeness,
his argument resurrects the
criticism that Descartes is guilty of an
equivocation.
If
r-scai i.es ideas of duration, order, and
number can be both
'

HR

I,

237

distinct and .incomplete,
then Descartes
oscartes is
a
i <
deviating from what
SU?POSSd
bS
tyPlCal
Of 'distinctness..
But are
distinct ideas of duration,
order, and number
incomplete?
Asnworth argues as follows:

^

^

-

(1)

Someone, a, has a distinct
idea of
duration, order and
number.

(2)

A complete

id.-a

^

an

kJ

,•

q

™

Ass imp t on
.1

of a complete

object.

15

Premise'

An idea of duration,
order, or number
j® nCt an idea of Q complete

(3)

object.

(3

1

h's ideas of duration,
order, and number
" XG both
distinct and incomplete.

,

A-h^rtn develops tms argument
LV '’

111

PrinClple LV Descai'tes tens
us

{

\

(

J.

6

.^

that,

one can have

(3)

(1)

ie

seems to be anrJy-

So the only premise remaining
open to question

2)

MteEthls
oi

(1 j

or number so that

an assumption that can be
discharged.

ticaliy true. 18

Premise

on the strength of
Principle

a distinct idea of
duration, order,

is

-

2)

defense of U).

Ashworth argues in defense

in the following— way
1

15c- e
16
X/

J.

122 above.

p

Ibid.

HR
In

expression

1,.
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13)

,

*

'number* is synonymous with its usage
in the
of x s

a number

'

To have a complete ir!o=>
that idea all the
is to
delinino
^f^etxstics
q^stion, or onlv SosI cL°act
be denied of it
1CS
without contract'd
1
included, then the
object itself -;!'!,'
f° r
lrt
,

.

“

.

—
"

This ar
"'

“

h "'

“
*-

--

-

support

-

“elude within

of the object

whi <'h cannot

these are all
9
J4K

(2)

Ashworth is defini ;;-

.

13 t0 be a C ° mplete
idea ° f

-

But What Ashwort
needs is a definition
of what it iss to
-° b~ *
a complete idea.
Ashworth seems to give
us the
cue defir,-;^-*
definition we need in a
passage that refers
erS +-r> +v,«
Lhe one 3ust cited.
He says:
These
[on clarity] are
reminiscent of the account
he (Dei
cartes] has already
given of a complete idea
as containing all
and presumably only,
defining characteristics
„
l

98>

We have a di -repancy hare.
In the first passage the'
term defined was 'being
a complete idea of an
object'.
In the
second passage the term defined e u
aeimcci is being a complete
idea'.
^et the second passage
qnnnncp^ to review
-„
supposed
ror us what is
19
-aid in the first passage.'
P-

-

•

-i

*

->

can resolve -his discrepancy
in one of two ways:

either Ashworth is saying
precisely what he intends to say
in
the second passage or he is
speaking elliptically. If we
adopt
the second alternative, then
the second passage reiterates
h-.hwoi.tn s definition of 'being
a complete idea
of an object'

nnd we have
19 m

a

definition that is not germane to a
defense of

pys.

nre actually two discrepancies in
the passages
qualifies Ashworth's original
d
m acu
y
count or completeness.

1

'

h-

t

L ° nd P assa 9®

(2)
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«. -op,

»,

„

“*

i

"—

r;.r~-of r'completeness
oOiinition
(D)

•

*

« «.

:

a complete idea

x contains all and
only

defining features of
what x represent,
<D! aOS * n ° l
SUPP ° rt (2) > however
consistent with the
possibility that there are
complete ideas that are
not complete
ideas of objects
-

Our ideas of duration,
order, and number are
such ideas.
Although complete, they are
not complete ideas of
objects
We knOW that the
Properties of substance
extension
and thought
are not part of the
essence of duration, order
or number.
If we include Extension
and Thought in our concepts
of these attributes we
render our concepts incomplete.
But
if we exclude Extension
and Thought and include all
and only
essential features of duration,
order, and number, our ideas
are complete.
Yet these complete ideas are
ideas of attributes
rather than complete ideas
of objects,
if (D) is the

-““1

-

-

,

tion Ashworth means to give
us, then
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'

-

an °th

-

ense ' but

him to do so.

m

J

•

(2)

is false.

" hap
’

d ° not think it would

wort

could

jiop

1

conjunction with his definition of 'distinct-

ent:ai s that there are no
distinct ideas of proi-

perties.

To be distinct

,

an idea must be complete.

But

(2)

that all ideas of
properties are incomplete
so that
no ideas of properties
are distinct.
Vet Ashworth's own discussion of the ideas of
duration, order, and
number shows UE
th»t there are distinct
ideas of properties.
So either
Ashworth's definition of
disti
nctneco is wrong or
uistinctness
(2) is
'

'

c\X

S0

*

i)inCG

(

2

j

rlrioc

overall interpretation
V
IX.

i-

"

'

rn
U)

v_ n

paay
1 -’

j

a cr hcial

role in Ashworth’s

the claxm he should
abandon.

-t-n-

i

•

ASHWORTH'S CRITICISM OF DESCARTES'

CRITERIA FOR GOOD GROUNDS
FOR JUDGEMENT

Ashworth thinks Descartes is
confused about the conUnder lvh L ^ h an idea provides
good grounds for judgemen
Descartes is alleged to shift his
criteria for good grounds
depending on wbetner the idea in
question is a sensation
-

or

concept

Although a sensation provides an
adequate basis
for judgement only if it is
clear and distinct, 20 Ashworth
argues that the clearness and
distinctness of a concept is
neither necessary nor sufficient for
providing such a basis.
He says:
.

* oon ept is a complete idea we already
G
hi-J
e good pounds for judgement;
whereas if a distinct
.idea can be incomplete, we will
not have sufficient
grounds (Ashworth, p. 100)
.

,

vve

have two arguments here

—

one to show that clearness

Ashworth, p. .100.
It is clear from what follows that
Asnwcrth intends clearness and distinctness to be a
necessary
ana sufficient condition tor providing adequate grounds
for
uagement
!
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anu distinctness is not
necessary, the other to
necessarv
show that
clearness an* distinctness
is not sufficient,
tor provide
adequate grounds for
judgement. Before criticizing
these
arguments I will try to cHve
a
e a fa±r Presentation
*
J
of each;
ar gume nt I
,

U) If

t.neie are clear complete
concepts,

then there

are ideas that are not
clear and distinct but that
do provide good grounds
for judgement.

C) There are clear complete
concepts.
(3)

There are ideas that are net
clear and distinct
but .-hat do provide good
grounds for judgement.

.u not the conditional Ashworth
wants.

,r)

u- a matter o,

is

(1)

false if,

tact,

there are clear complete ideas
and every
such idea is distinct. What
Ashworth wants is
(l')

(!')

:

If there are concepts that
are clear and complete but
confused, then there are ideas
that are not clear and

distinct but that do provide good
grounds for judgement
11 Ve Saosc:it ” te

We need to amend
)

.

Now

v

(*

)

(2)

tor (1), however. Argument
to (2’) where
'“‘tii,
v

>

('?

'

\

1.0

I

is invalid.

tue antecedent of

follows.

(3)

ARGUMEN T II
(4)

If there are distinct incomplete ideas, then
there
cii

e clea.i

and distinct ideas that do not provide

good grounds for judgement.

.12 8

(5)

(6)

.There are distinct
incomplete ideas.

There

fi
ar Q na
~ p
ear

a.t'©

j

r,

.

•

distinct ideas that
do nor
provide good grounds
for judgement.
(4) is not the
premise Ashworth wan^s
«
" nrs
But since
Descartes
holds every distinctCt ilded to De clear,
we can let (4)
pass
*

j

.

U-3TH

IlOV/

"t*

O n

c*

1 +- >

problematic premises are
follow from DcscsyfAe
- ej

A
cis
ro Of
Arguments
r~

(2')

and

(

5

I

and li„

The

B °th are supposed
to

)

-

^
dlSCUSElon
° f the ideas of
duration, order, and number.
r
A^hwArfit
Ashworth thinks Descartes'
discussion shows
on the one hand that
there ar P
c
In complete ideas and
on
the other hand that
there are le°i complete
ideas that are confused.
But as I argued in the
last section, Ashworth
has not.
presented a convincing case.
And lacking such a case,
he. has
not. shown us that
Arguments I and II are sound.
For all we know,
Descartes does not deviate from
the view that all and only
clear
ano distinct ideas provide
adequate grounds for judgement.
•

•

,

.

,

i.

™

X>

m

•

4

.

CRITICISM OF ASHWORTH'S ACCOUNT OF
DESCARTES'
USUAL USAGE OF 'DISTINCTNESS'

After presenting his account of
Descartes* usual usage
t.^i.n.uasi,

,

Ashworth, argues that this account
creates

problems for Descartes.

In Sections VI through IX, I
argued

if correct, Ashworth's account
does not produce the
problems ne ihinrs ft does. Now I want
to consider Ashworth's
thar.,

account itself.
'

nis account is problematic.

Ashworth maintains that
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Descartes is

cruilfi/
7
"

eq" 1V ° Cati on-

311

'

When predicated
of
‘distinctness' h- s nno
meaning; when
predicated
nf
ot concepts it
has another.
'
Concent.
e Pt- are
,
distinct if and
on ly it they are
lie
comniofn sensations
y
complete;
,
»*
S if ar
dnd
only
if thev arp
complete and P
provide
adnrm6 ^equate
grounds for judgement.
sens
sensations,

'-

+-

Ashworth gives
,

.

.

distinctness.
ti.ict

He

i->q

H fp C

partlal defen
tW ° eXamP les

4- T

sensation to ba an

of his account of

,

ide=th-i
63 Chtlt

'

.

-

,

deigned

to show a ai ,..

Prides

adequate grounds
but he civenn d ±snss
J
whatever of his claim
a da sum cm, concept
need only be complete.

ior judgement

,

'

in

J-ater

passage suggests that

fact<>

a

a

distinct concept has to
be complete and Provide adequate
grounds for judgement.
Defining
a clear and distinct
idea, Ashworth says:
clear and distinct
any ref i°ctina mi na

A.

ripn

musu be both aooarent to
S
d
If contra
-Acting mind,
1
on?y^hat
is°
essentlal *>* this understanding and hence
of judgements about'tif
" Bklns
i

.

*

,

*

s

*

it™?

•

ide^ttehSfpf^oS?!

Presumably the grounds contained
are good grounds.
And the
good grounds are provided by
the completeness of the
idea.
Since completeness is the
defining feature of distinct
concepts
it follows that every
distinct concept provides
adequate
grounds for judgement.
Asnworth. could reply that
providing adequate grounds for
judgement is a necessary condition
for, but not a defining

characteristic of, the distinctness
of concepts.

So the
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distinction between di
n,-+- ^
distinct:
concepts and distinct
sensations
lemams. Such a reply
seems 1perfectlv revn
reasonable, but the
same reply can be made
to Ashworth's claim
that providing
adequate grounds for
judgement is a defining
feature of diet j.nct sensations.
i

cl
G*
t p
ni
ue
rends
his
claim
as follows:

*1X^0 J7 tl"I

£-*

"f

t'i

•

c;

1

0.TS& j& r„rs:
I-™;.
h

^

“lor*

b’—:

sations? Againf^evere^aT^i^
not distinctly because
learly b-Jt
?
1
" of the
pain with my judgement h^fusethe^eib®!
nalUTi e 1
e. I tend to
think that the pain h a ~ about~its
1 t
a
a P h y sical cause,
although this may
i not be jjistif
i°biwusr.itiable
(Ashworth, p,
'

•

i

99)

Ashworth's remarks here do not
support the claim that providing adequate grounds for
judgement is a defining
characteristic
of distinct sensations.
What Ashworth says is consistent
with
an interpretation that holds
completeness to be the defining
feature of distinct ideas.
On this interpretation, every
distinct idea is, by definition,
complete. And every complete
idea provides adequate grounds
for judgement.
Consequently,
every distinct sensation provides
adequate grounds for judgemeri ' ex?en though Providing
such grounds is not a defining
cii ar a c t e r i s tic of dis
t i n c t ne s s
In criticizing Ashworth,

I

am not arguing that Descartes

ovoiaed equivocating on his ordinary usage
of 'distinctness'.
aL

‘

P° ini.ing out 'chat Ashworth has not demonstrated that

Descartes did equivocate.

To prove that Descartes is guilty

01 an equivocation, Ashworth needed to
substantiate the
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following two claims:

Providing adequate grounds
for judgement is
feature of distinct
sensations.

!i)

(ii)

a

Providing adequate grounds
for judgement is
defining feature of
distinct

defininq

not:

a

.

concepts.

Ashworth substantiates
neither of these claims,
however.
?or
all we know, Descartes
is not guilty of the
equivocation of
which Ashworth accuses him.
XX.

ASHWORTH'S CRITICISM OP DESCARTES'
RULE
To utilize Descartes' Rule,
we need to be able to dentlfy ° Ur ClSar 803 distinct
ideas.
Ashworth thinks Descartes
oepaiated tns clear and distinct
from his obscure and confused
ideas by ascertaining whether
he was deceived by judgements
based on these ideas.
If one is deceived, then
one's idea
rs not clear and distinct
(Ashworth, pp. 101-102)
Like
Kenny, Ashworth thinks this
approach is illegitimate.
:i

.

If

Descartes is identifying his clear
and distinct ideas by ascertaining whether judgements based on
them are true, then

Descartes is arguing in a circle.

To know by his rule whether

judgement based on an idea is true, one
must ascertain whether t-nat idea is clear and distinct.
But to know whether an
J.ooa is
l_l.

clear and distinct, one must ascertain
whether

udg'ement based on that idea is true

Dtiscartas would not

.be

the.

(Ashworth, pp. 101-102). 21

guilty of the circularity of which

he is accused if his criterion for identifying his
clear and
2l See also

ray

discussion of Kenny, pp. 80-81 and 86.
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—

——

diStir Ct ldeSS iS n0t
'

s

:°

avoidear the

witeri °» »-b-or th and
Kenny clain

-

says

..

Descartes
nxtfall of introducing
yet further criteria
which
would distinguish clear
and distinct ideas
from those seemln9ly 50
•" (Ashworth,
p. 101)
A=hwort appears to be
mating two claims hero:
(i, Descartes did
not introduce
tl er CritCria
(ii)
had introduced further
criteria,
he would have
confronted a pitfall.
'

,

•

.

.

“

'

'

Ashworth's first claim
seems to contradict what
Descarte
says in his reply to
Gassendi.
Descartes said that in the
Meditations he provided an
adequate method for identifying
his
clear and distinct ideas. 22
Ashworth does not try to
refute
claim by arguing that no
such method appears
in the

instead

he tells us that Descartes
would face
a Pitfall if he introduced
further criteria
without, however, telling us just what
pitfall he has in mind.
1 imagine Ashworth
thinks Descartes would be
guilty of
an infinite regress if he
identified his clear and distinct
ideas by ascertaining whether
they have some property
£, for
then Descartes would have to
introduce yet another criterion
to identify those ideas
that are £.
if a regress is the pittail Ashworth has in mind, Ashworth
might be right. But at
thm, juncture we are not in a
position to tell. First we
,

-

22

HR II, 214
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ou, whether .Descartes
did in tl
3 meth ° d f °r identif
* in * **» clear and distinct'
ideas
If ho did, we can
then

decide whether his
method leads him
vicious regress.

into a

Mr.

CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
AND INDUB IT ABILITY
Bef ° Ie reje ° ting DeScartes
n»le altogether, Ashworth
examines what he claims is
Descartes’ best defense
of his
rule of evidence. This
defense can be put as
follows:
(1) Whatever is clearly
and distinctly perceived
is
indubitable
'

.

Whatever is clearly and
distinctly perceived is true

(2)

(Ashworth

,

p.

102 ).

Ashworth announces that Descartes
asserted 1
(Ashworth, p
102), but Ashworth does not
support his claim with references
to text.
Without references to guide us,
we can only speculate
as to why Ashworth thought
Descartes held
(

!

(1}

— SSSSSSt

in defense of

OK

the following considerations
in mind.

Ashworth may have had
In Meditations III,

De s carte s wr i te s

know what is requisite to render
ftath? Certainly in this first
knowledge
there
u J ln g tnat assures me of its
truth, excepting
!
i-stinct
tion
\ not inde
Wulucl
ed
suffice
to assure me that what l
/
.^
° •'
ever happen that a thing which
1
so clearly and distinctly could be false;
and
according.! v it seems to mo that already
I can establish
as a general rule that all things -which I
perceive very
clearly and distinctly are true
i-'-kev/ise

./if

't

/

,

k'

'-'

#

1

1

/;3

HR

I,

15 8.
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The point of

t-hic;

13 nQt Sayln he
?

sage is not what
it night seem.

^s

Descartes
'

established his rule of
evidence.
•

-

He
ar.iveu at a point
in his meditations
wherec he
ne bas
has uncovered
“is mdubitandum
CUm
0bs «v lng that this
proposition is one he
° earlY
distinct] y Perceives,
he oayb
savs mat.
thar » It
it seems
to him"
>e can establish
his Rule on the
ba-is
a ° ls ot
rf this
w
clear and distinct perception alone.
But
UL he re-i=e
resists d °rng what
merely "seems
Ulm t0 be legitimate.
Instead he turns
uinb to
L°
or
d
b examination
° f C° UntereXampleS
that
b e raised against
his Rule.
D e begins his
_
npyf paragraph
-s next
as
.

.

-

-

^

•

.

.

.

,

-

follows:
At the same time r h^ro,
e
3
things to be certain
3dmitted ®nv
and manffes-^wh®^
,,lch 1 yet afterwards
recognized as being dubious'
blous "‘w-v
J
What f.
th en were these things? 24
f fiis , glance
Descartes
rotrivi
v
rte 0
remarks
here
seem to be off the
point,
his Rule states that
whatever is clearly and
distinctly
perceived is true; it does
not state that whatever
is very
certain and manifest is
indubitable.

^

-

•(

-

Descartes’ examples

1

° L irrelevant,

however.
it is
not enough that Descartes'
Rule be true; Descartes
must be
certain of its truth. To
acquire the assurances he wants,
Descartes must canvass all those
perceptions that could possibly be construed as
clear and distinct. Perceptions
of
WImt SeSmS Very certain and
manifest would surely be among
,c,c.

regarding such perceptions,
Descartes must perform two
tasks;
he must ascertain whether the
perceptions in question
are really clear and distinct,
and he must ascertain whether
-

24

HR

I,

158.

JL.

what is perceived is really
false.
TO perform the first
task, Descartes
needs adecuate
ciiteria by which to
identify his clear and
distinct perceptions.
At this juncture we
are
e not
not- in a
position to say whether he has such
criteria
Tr, perform
the second task, Descartes cannot make use
of his rule of
evidence, for it is this
rule he is trying to
establish. To ascertain
whether what
he perceives is false,
Descartes must utilize his
method of
doubt
the only other method
available to him at this
point
the Mentations.
But this method involves
withholding
belief from any proposition
open to rational doubt.
Por this
-a»on, Descartes' defense
of his Rule involves
his showina
that „e cannot rationally
doubt propositions we clearly
and
distinctly perceive. But a
proposition that is not open to
rational doubt is indubitable
so that Descartes will
defend
r.i..e of evidence by
showing that whatever is clearly

m

-

m

and

distinctly perceived is indubitable.

Ashworth is right.

Descartes did hold the thesis that

whatever is clearly and distinctly
perceived is indubitable,
ana he did use this thesis to
justify his rule of evidence.

criticism of Descartes

:lh.'.s

Ashworth and
evidence
(i)

v.i

th

1

.

defen se of his rule.

that Descartes defended his rule of

following argument:

f.ne

Whatever

'

j.

clearly and distinctly perceive is indubit-

able.

(2)

Whatever

I

clear

i.v

and distinct! v perceive is true.
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But is this argument
good?

Ashworth thinks it is
not.
Ashworth begins his
criticism by pointing
out that 1
18 VagUS
The PrSdiCate
indubitable admits of
three different senses
a logical, a
psychological, and an ethical
sense..
But regardless of the
sense we give 'indubitable',
Descartes'
defense of 2 is
problematic.
,

)

'

'

’

(

)

Lcoical Ind gbitability
.

"

E is logically indubitable"

means "It is logically
impossible to doubt that p"
(Ashworth,
P- 102).
Ashworth will use 'logical
impossibility'
in a
wide sense.
It- -is logically
innicnii
impossible to doubt that, n provided that not-* either
entails a contradiction or is
'selfdefeating (Ashworth, p. 102).
By 'self-defeating', he
means
a proposition which is
falsified whenever it is affirmed.
"I do not exist" is
such a proposition. 25

If we define

indubitability' in terms of 'logical
indub tab i 1 i ty
then we have a straightforward
logical criterion for ascertaining whether
a proposition
£ is indubitable.
We simply determine whether
not- E entails a contradiction or
” S “ >CJ f
footing
-But is this logical
criterion also a
sufficient condition for ascertaining
whether p is true?
'

.i

,

.

Ashworth answers as follows:

"We cannot use a logical

criterion to pick out the paradigm case
of certain truth that
Descartes was searching for" (Ashworth,,
p. 103).
The eternal
25

,.,

}or more detailed accounts of self-defeating
proposi"Dreaming and Skepticism" and A. J
3 Thlnk / Therefore I Am'*," in
Descai
;
/
tJ-txcal Essays
(ed.
Willis Doney (Garden City, New
jfork:
Anchor Books, 196 7), pp 5 8-61 and 80-87.
.

tions, see Norman Mal.com,

,

'

,

)

.
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truths are propositions
that should be
picked out as true
an adequate
criterion for identifying
v
t
trUG
-uo Propositions.
^
te na truths are
«*«“*•»*
'

-

the

:
;:;n °"'

,

^

;
"

-

.

G o,. 8

.m

so th?,

trl0tly SPeaki “
3 ' analytic (Ashworth,
pp. 102Th6y d °
logical criterion for
irdub
* and
to be true if the
logics
orrterron is the only
criterion available.
Somethin* other
l,,at a purely
looical
a...
cr
tf'rim xs required.
criterion

^

-

^

•

'

X

Ps chqloaical
indubitabilit;i_*
v

—

.

»

P0

,

-

c

chc

ogicall’

indubitable" means "it is
psychologically possible
to
th.c p" (Ashworth,
p. 103).
Ashworth notes that
Descartes coo
lf hS bSlieVeS he is
in -Pable of doubting
what he
cLtr 1 v
u di
nof
Tv?
J
^is’Linctly perceives
Paraphrasing two passages
x°
Descartes, Ashworth says:

d^

^

"

*

i:',

^

1

i

O

pos 3 ID If

i.

for

*“ r~\

vn

r r-I 4-V.l

i

n

clearly understood, he
01 ” What
"
writls^V^
l,e
frarn from accenting our(Descartes)*
cannot
”
r;*„i custinot
cleer and
ideas as true
or bring ourselves
m
“n
athematical
^
truths
worth, o. j 03)
(Ash;

f

1

Jfsoari.es has psychological
indubitability in mind,
/-.snwort.b or fers three arcrwmrm he
,1
JU
nhs to show
that Descartes defense
U) tS U " SOUnd * ° ne of theSR arguments
is convincing,
it
runs as follows.
since the atheist can be
skeptical
11.

^

.

‘

about wbd
clearly and distinctly perceives,
clear and distinct pereeption is nor. a sufficient
condition for psychological
indubL,.t*.ji. .j
l

d.i

® bOUt

-

<+ck

t_y

.

tne

belief

m

ieq,j....ied

God's veracity is needed.

But since

faith, one can be in genuine doubt

the truth of what he Perceives clearly
and distinctly.

"

iS a rUle ° f
PSyC

(1>

^
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iCal indubitability
,

own remsrKs about
ut thp
the at ^eist falsify
(i).
,

•

hearts*.

t

BUttlttfetefeUte.

"£ is ethie.il, indubi
table"
E ought not to be doubted"
(Ashworth, p. 104)
and
,
ought not to be doubted"
means that "n contains
H o
within jtself
no grounds for dmihf
_
3
"
anQ one has adequate
evidence for p"
,
hwortn, p,
Hut Ashworth thinks
KS <-har
nat for
Descartes
the n ° tl0n ° f a<3eqUate
eviden =® collapses into
the notion of:
containing no grounds for
doubt"
aoubt
(Ashworth p. 104)
on this
view,
1
is equivelant to
"Whatever 15
i=> clearly
clear!., and distinctly
perceived contains no
grounds for doubt."
•

'

'

*

'-

•

fS

.

(

.

)

.

,

'S£2SSS£

aaaj-ngt;

eth ical indub jtab i.lity 26

proposition containing no
grounds for doubt
uuw - is "self
+ „
~r
self-supporting
(Ashworth, n ini'!
r
Aa „self-supporting
judgement is an analytic
truth.
It is a judgement whose
subject concept is a complete
Idea.
An idea is complete
provided that the person having
that
idea understands what it
is that belongs to the
essence of the
object of that idea. When
one formulates such a
'

•

self-supoov-Hn.

Judgement, the subject concept
r;U!K "'

-

a

complete idea

-

is before

ancl “ c

knows by analysis alone that
the predicate
concept represents part of the
essence of the subject. There
is nothing in the judgement
itself that could give this person
auy reason to doubt his judgement.
As Ashworth says, "Any

grounds for attacking a judgement
about the [complete] idea
™.st then be external to it
.

'

\

.

(Ashworth, p. 104)..

£

Ashworth offers a second criticism of ethical indubitability that I will not discuss. See Ashworth, p 105
..

.
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there are PXfprnal
external grounds for
doubting a self _
supporting Judgement
p, then E seems to be
a proposition
we
t0 dOUbt
iE
self-supporting, it is not
e
ic ally indubitable
f

T

^

-

^Plying, Ashworth points
to
Descartes
a

letters
tters to Regius.
-f

self-supporting- Jjudgement
gement is

S ° nS

P-

101).

n ° Str ° nger

a

passage from one of

•

Here -e—
^
Deqrsrfuo
cartes indicates
that
•

.

supported by such strorm
r »afound to attack it"
,o

—-

.

(I,-,

r

on Ashworth's
interpretation of this passage.
thlnXS that a self-supporting

judgement ought nor
to be doubted because
it cannot be justHfiablv
ua
x x d iy b,.M
aouDte d
To
justifiably doubt that d, one
t
must
lJot balance
-nri one's
h
reasons fir,end ag ams c p and fr na
xv.,,-.
nd fthat
h -if the
evidence against p outweighs
the evidence for it,
l.

..

.

-

,

-

-

Ashworth distinguishes two
types of evidence
interna
-.roc,.,... one external
evidence.
Internal evidence for or
against £ is gained by analyzing
E 's contents. If p is
self-supporting,
£ is analytically true, and the internal
evidence for E is vary strong. Any
evidence one has against
P must be external. The evil genius hypothesis
would be such
evidence-.
Cut whatever the external evidence
against p,

-

'

'-°

suggests that the internal evidenc

for p will outweigh the external
evidence against it.
If Ashworth, is correctly
interpreting what Descartes
Sciys

to he gius

,

(

1)

boils down to the view that whatever we

clearly and distinctly perceive is supported
by such strong

14 0

reasons that no stronger
can ever- be found
to attaok lt
,
interpretation of ( 1 is
inconsistent with what
Descartes says
9 ° Ut tha atheiSt
hOWeVer - The at heist
'
clearly ana distinctly
perceives mathematical
truths.
These truths are
self-supportit the atheist
has an external reason
strong enough to
1 ustify his doubting
his self-supporting
belief. The atheist
rli dn<3 dlotlnCfelY
Perceives what is ethically
dubi table
Once again, Descartes'
remarks about the atheist
falsify 1
^essment of Ashworth's crdtimm
Ac.u
gue.
Ashworth
argues that
Descartes cannot defendJ hi
hlsq Kule b Y appealing to
the indubitability of what is clear] v thH
_
and distinctly
"perceived.
0 is
indubitable" is vague.
Ashworth considers three
interpretations,
but each interpretation
is problematic.
So Ashworth concludes
that (I) is problematic.

m

.

)

(

)

—

.

i

my

If Descartes meant by

Ashworth discusses,
clusion.

But

available.

I

I

j

(1)

+.

,

j

any of the interpretations

would not quarrel with Ashworth's
con-

think a fourth interpretation
of

(

1

)

is

±n j;js discussion of logical
indubitability,

Ashworth points out that Descartes
believes God to have the
power ho make eternal truths false
(Ashworth, pp.

102-103).

But Descartes does not think that
God's power provides a
reason tor doubting those propositions
whose denial is selfdefeating. .jvuwuxtn
...
f-n-p-iih nv.- is_
Ashworth f-n...i,Ks
h n ir
tnat
there
something about the
logic of
first person assertions like "I exist" that
makes
them immune to doubt (Ashworth, p. 102)
Whenever I doubt
i

<q

r

.

that

I

exist,

I

am forced to admit that

I

do exist, for

I
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procedure

^

ln

fc

f

—

^

r Pr ° Ving

hG

GXiStenCe

-

But

Cartes-

own

--

not consist simply
^eeing whether he can
successfully deny his
existence.
Xn te=d, Descartes
examines the evil genius
hypothesis, and he
asks himself whether
he rnnia
^
could k
be deceived
into believeing that
ae exists when
° m.,n
d ° eS not
concludes that the e vU
genius hypothesis does
not prcv'de
P
a
- at,.ona.L ground
for doubtIng one's own existence =
na
d tner ° are “> other
good reasons
one could adduce.
"I exist- is
rationally indubitable.
'Rational instabilitymay be what Descartes
means
y rndubitcbj Irty
£ is rationally indubitable provided that
canno - conceive a world
in which
false.
p_ is
Once again
the eternal truths seem
problematic.
X clearly and
distinctly
perceive sncn truths, yet it
appears there is a possible
world
they are raise
the world in which God
wills to
deceive me.

L

-

'

“ n

-

.

but is the world in which
God deceives me a possible
world? When Descartes
questioned his existence, he did
not
simpiy conjure up the evil
genius hypothesis and coalesce
in
concxu„j.„.i chat,

i

exist" is false.

Instead he tested the

evil genius hypothesis by
seeing whether there is a possible
world in which Descartes does not
exist but in which the evil
genius deceives Descartes into
believing that he does. DecCarte., concludes that there is
no such possible world and that,

his own existence cannot be doubted.'"2 7
27

Rational indub.itabi.lity is not identical
with ethical

142

lowing
Dg s c ? rf o p
b ^scartes

*

procedure for aJbCe i
taming the
rational indubi lability
of »i » xist
we can ascertain
whether
,
r
Cod s omnipotence
-- nrnvi
-/ides a good
reason for doubting
the
eternal truths or any
truths clearly and
distinc*
Hbtinctly Perceived
We need to consider
whether" th
orthere
is a possible world
in which
thp ° UOWlng COnditi
° nS obtain
a person A clearly
and
distinctly perceives
that E and believes u
true, but A is
deceived because God
has willed D false
jf th
be
„
11
Lhese
conditions
Obtain, it is also
true in this world that
God has
nds deceived
de
A
SO that God is a
deceiver
But
u
i
1£>
he world
which God is
a deceiver a possible
world? If
no- ' „
J
not
»y reason for doubting
clearly and distinctly
perceived propositions is
idle.
And
f there aie no .oetter
reasons that can be
produced, then there
are no good reasons for
doubting Descartes' Rule,
and his Rule
is rationally indubitable.
'

'

,

.

,

T ,

•

,„

.

:

"

•

1-

m

'

On my view Descartes
defended his rule of evidence
by
shoung tficij aie no good reasons
for doubting his Rule.
Descartes own words support
my interpretation.
a lengthy
paragraph in the Third Meditation,
Descartes outlines his
strategy for proving that what
he clearly and distinctly
perceives is true.
I quote this paragraph
in its entirety:
.

m

‘

;aaa

~

indubi tabi 1 ity
Descartes does not decide that "I exist" in
1C b6CaUSe thS evil ?eni US
hypothesis
ng enough to outweigh the evidence has merit but
I.;
"I exist" pre’ ln J
On the contrary, the evil gCn
"1 own behalf
i'"'
gen'^ us
hypothesis has no merit at all!
.

^^
.

.

ere

-a

other things of the

“^

would not have been
doUbted this
so for am, nt?
a n than «.at it
came into my mind
that
m f°
me with such a nature perhaol a
ht have endowed
that I
been
concerning things which
en
every tine this' preconcefseemea
manifest.
But
v^ op^
ion “2^
P
1 the sovereian
povjer of a God ureseni-s
- ^'
ny
thought,
strained to confess that
1 am conit != Jo
it, to cause me tl
S3 wishes
err
ln
hich 1 believe
myself to have the best even
hnd, on V
the other hand,
always when I direct mv evidence
go- -C
thlngs which 1 believe
myself to perceive very
T
S ° parsuaded of their
truth that" I let myself c/ar"break' out*°
5 such as
these:
Let who will deceive me
never
be nothing while I
me to
think tha*- -'// or
/ some daycause
to be true to sav <-t y- r ,
cause it
now to say that I am or this " ever bee "' ib bain ? true
ar
three make more or
less than five or
, b.'.°
ch 1 see a manifest
contradiction/ And? ceZiinl/^s--\
s ' ce 1
have
no reason to
believe that there"'-,
rv,a’ /
have not as yet satisfied
m^ZZZthat
f

L

'

^ **"

'

M

'

.

'

'

ZV

'

Whi

!

,

‘

th^r?'

Spends on thL pinion

f

alone^is
Ut in crder to~be*able
altogethe^to remov/it"*!
?
muo
~
iflcjuii g wnether thcro
c
r'r-sA
Presents rtself,
,

.

i

-a

‘SSYfVfS
r.A..bt

t.

v/o

tha^

Su^s

decsi

r

r:

f<;;

t.

with -

rrui.ns i? co not see that
28

can ever be certain of anything.
,

V3

In this passage Descartes
is saying he will remove a
metaphys-

ical doubt from propositions that
are apparently logically,
psychologically, and ethically indubitable.
Among the propositions subject to a metaphysical
doubt are logically indubitable judgements. These are truths
whose denial Descartes
sees to be "a manifest contradiction".
These logically

indubitable truths are also psychologically
indubitable.
23

1/

158-159.

Emphasis mine.

14 4

Descartes cannot seriously
ouot them
y doubt
SS Pr0P0Sltl ° ns Whlle
Pertaining
,

—

t0d d0eS n0t have the
_

y,

the propositions

m

he thinks of

his metaphysical
doubt ag-

-ch

truths to be false

.

question are ethically
indubit-

—

able.

nu
Whenever

.

The metaphysical doubt
Descartes entertains is
"slight"
BUt " Sllght d° Ubt C ° Uld
»>e strong enough
to outweigh’
the interna! reasons
favoring logical truths..
Yet Descartes
feels that he cannot be ppri-ain
"
1 in 0j anything
until he removes
even this slight doubt.

^

...

.

-

But how does Des cartes
remove this doubt? He shows
that
the world in which God
deceives Descartes about what
Descartes
\ cmd distinctly
perceives is not a possible world.
The
Descait.es pio/as no exist is
one "who possesses all those
supreme perfections of which our
mind may indeed have some
.... Who is liable to no errors or defect
[and who has
none of all those marks which
denote imperfection ]." 29
‘

Continuing, Descartes says that it
follows from God's perfection
"that He cannot be a deceiver, since
the light of nature
t Gacn.es us

The wor I ci

that fraud and deception proceed from
some defect ." 30

m

which God is a deceiver is impossible,
and God's
omnipotence does not provide a rational ground
for doubting
clear. iy and distinctly perceived
propositions.
'

9

30

HR

I,

Ibid.

171.

.1

45

Ashworth argued that
we give to
is either false or
inconsistent with other
ci
holds.
But if we takp (1)
U) tC
t
“ ean that whatever
is clearly
" bt LnCtly
perceived ls rationally
-M
(1)
/

•

.

(!)

•

'

indubitable, Ashworth's

?,

objections to

^

the

(1)

disappear.

° f thS athelSt

God 's power
pu/vtia. is
is unproblematic
un-.-v r
-ineffectual.

What the atheist
clearly and distinctly perceives
is rationally
indubitable
a though the atheist
is not in a portion
po—tinn to show that met
aPhysical doubts brought
against
st d»sri,J
clearl y and. distinctly
perceived
propositions are not good
reasons for doubting.
j.

+-
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CHAPTER

V

STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES
This thesis aims at
answering two questions:
(QD What did Descartes mean
by 'clearness' and
'distinctness ?
1

(Q2)

How does Descartes
ascertain whether ideas
are clear
and distinct or obscure
and
-

confused?

111

thG flrSt

f ° Ur

Chapters

answers to mese questions.

commentator

'

s

1

examined other commentators'
have argued that each

i

answers are
^^ ; ar
arc un
^satisfactory.
+-

-

.

Now I want to
orrer m > own answers to
these question
u qucsrionsc
But before
suggesting answers, I think it
is best
tbl thcit
th*t we ™
m *P out a plan of atA
ght orward approach suggests
itself.
Find the
places where Descartes
addresses (Ql) and (Q2) and
explicate
what he says. Let us see
whether this straightforward
approach
can succeed.
r

.

'

i.

I.

DESCARTES' DEFINITIONS OF 'CLEARNESS'

AND
Descartes

'

DI STINCTNESS

explicit definitions of 'clearness'
and

'distinctness' appear in Principle XLV. 1

In this Principle

are told that the distinct "contains
within itself nothing
but what is clear" and that the clear
is that "which is present
and apparent to an attentive mind.
But what do the predicates
-we

'

1

HR

I,

237.

14

'being present to

mind'

7

mbein
9 apparent', and 'being
atLsntive mean'5
‘ere we encounter
serious difficulties.
Drearies never defines
these key term.
r , nt
Lacking
such definitions
al
0rCed t0
mean i-d bv examining
18 US_ ° f thS terniS
qUestion
Unfortunately, these term.
not part of Ms
ordinary vocabulary.
They rarely appear
^
" lltlng
neVGr ****«
a way that illumine..
Jescartes meaning in
his definition of
'clearness' and
distinctness
'

-

•

'

•

—-

V

:

a

“

—

.

'

‘

-

'

‘

'

'

r°
.'

P-LOd.cn.

.

ClarlfY DeSCarteS

—

iug, we could try
another apin Principle XLV Deqca-hpc
nuescartes draws
an
'

analogy between

clear perception and eves-i ah+eyesighu.
to see whether

w r can examine
We
this analooy

Cdn he]p us "J-arify
Descartes' definition.
Wh6n WC eXamine Desc «t
es analogy, however,
we flnd
it is not helpful.
Kenny and Ashworth criticize
Descar to.
-!

t-

-

-

analogy because it makes
use of distinctions that
make sense
2
for sight but not for
pains.
Although X have argued against
this line of criticism, 3
J
agree that Descartes' analogy
is
n0t h lpfUl
interpreted straightforwardly,
it makes Descartes
vulnerable to the criticism Gewirth
raised1-cu.oca,
->ii
an
1.0025 seem
4
to be clear..
'

-

3ee p.

'6'4

and pp. 107-112

i

~’Cv-.

pp »

Sec pp

.

o

3~ 7 ± and 10 8—110 above.

4-6 above.

We can avoid
Gewirth's criticism
m 11* we d ° not
define
9 PrSSent
bSi
and '-in 9 attentive'
in
t
GeWlrth,S CritiCiSB
reqUireS
BUt h ° W
knew
what
whltTf
definitions are correct?
corro,^? Since
c
^
uescartes does
not heln
us to define his
termsS ' T1 +-m
thlnk
be natural to do
just what Gewirth
did.
Fir-t xrr,
rrr.t,
we look at how
Descartes actuy uses the tern, 'clarity'
elsewhere in his writing,
and
then we try to
locate a definition of 'clarity
on this ba*
Once we have arrived
at this definition,
we can go hack to
Descartes' explicit
definition of 'clearnc—
clearness and
a 'ad.istinctne;
and juggle the meanings
of the predicates he
uses.
In this
way we can make Descartes'
explicit definition equivalent
to
the definition we
formulated on the basis of
Descartes' actual
usage
'

.

,

'

'

-

-

‘

i

•

*_

^

i

'

If we adopt this, approach,
however, we are abandoning

the strategy with which
we began

-

namely, that of using

Principle XLV to elucidate
Descartes' definitions of
'clarity'
and. ’distinctness
Descartes' explicit definitions
are hopelessly vacuo and his analogy
is not helpful.
So instead of
using his analogy to elucidate
his meaning of 'clarity', we
define ...la,-, v on the basis
of its usage and then use
,

the

definition arrived at to clarify
Descartes' analogy.
11

•

i.,in

DESCARTES' REPLY TO GASSENDI
no

to the second question we have
raised:

does Descartes ascertain which
of his ideas are clear and

"How

149

distinct?"

To answer

(Q2)

„ e want to ex Plore
-1
'

..

involves a search
.

-Fnv

'

-n

!?

assa 9 e

m

a

strategy that

which Descartes
expressely
’

,

UP !Q2K

TUe

locaces and di
c
discusses.

Posing

passage is one Gewirth

i
re
ls Descartes'

reply to Gassendi
Gewirth translates this
reply as follows:
And as tor what you then ar)r]
concer n must be
not so much with the
’V°
truth of -m-J 1Uie
as
with a method
to discern whether
h
c~ rn< \
0 °S V
that we clearly perceive
^some thing
G
do
° '"T
not (?en Y this;
but 1 contend that this v^rv
hJ 9 Vhas1T been
set forth by me in itaccurately
£lrs
*
^^arded'
prejudices i and then Inwlrated
all
aM1 J,
che Principal ideas
and distinouisherthnseTn- w
Were clear
the
obscure and confused? 1
'

-

—

-’•

,

T

of Descartes' reply.

£

mentary is short

A

^

Gewirth 's com-

raises more questions than it
explains
He says, "Descartes is here
referring, of course, to the
procedure followed in the first
three Meditat ions." 6 Gewirth's
comment is perplexing.
It implies that there is
one and only
one procedure followed in the
first three Meditations and that
Descartes is referring to it. Yet
Gewirth knows full well
chat there is more than one
procedure followed within the first
three Meditations.
Descartes uses the method of doubt in
Meditat lc
and -he method of difference in
Meditation II ^
j.

i

make sense of Gewirth*

J-c

~

and.

Gewirth

6

,

p.

251.

oid

.

Emphasis mine.

HP I, 144-149.
8

HB. I,

150-157.

comment, we need to interpret

Emphasis mine

.

b

s

him diffSrently

When ha

that Descartes is in
his rep3v
referring "to the procedure
followed in: the first
three Medltat-ions
Gewirth means Descartes
is referring to the
procedure followed throughout,
not within, the first
three ,ted ltations. But the method
of difference is not
this procedure
meth ° d ° f
not used anywhere in Medit"I
at.ion I.
The only procedure that
adl can
c^i qualify
r n n uf
as a procedure
used throughout the first
three Meditations is a
composite of
several processes Descartes
mentions to Gassendi
the discarding Of all prejudices, the
enumerating of all the principal
ideali
"
th <
ritity nc o
t hose
-

“““

-

-

-

'

‘

tl

in^retation

Mill

narrows the sco^e of our

If we have interpreted him
correctly, Gewirth thinks

Descartes is referring Gassendi
to the process of discarding
ail prejudices, enumerating
the chief ideas, and identifying
those that are clear and distinct.
But this process is not
the procedure for which we are
looking.
We want the method
Descartes used "to discern whether or not
we are deceived when
we think we clearly perceive something."
Although Gewirth has
not given us this method, he has narrowed
the scope of our
inquiry.
Descartes tells as that the method we want
is to be
iouno at The place where he carries out the
process that
Cev/irth says occurs throughout Meditations
I
irillil

in'terp r otation

of:

Gassendi

1

s

r.o

III,

objection.

151

****•

“*•“*

««•— »•«»..

PreSentS GaSSendi S
critici
'

^

...

—u

„

«™. c„-„,

in the following
way:

l
endi writeS! "Why
so many Mi^s vari6™
are th
|ninio
that he pcvrceivefc^arly
***
e thLks
and'dShe defends, And lest
th ® ?P inion which
partisan or pretending,yoi sav that
e *ther being
I want von
i'f®
no
?.ie those who even
-ice
that there.
l"
face flpafv, .c'
Which they hold, even“h^hh
° f th
?
t£y sS
see others
the sake of the opposite
r facing
£
it for
ooininn'
noe' Gassendi con
eludes, Descartes'- mui,
,2®,
Sconce™
have beer to
pound a method which should
rodfr» l
we are deceived and
US
when
when not deceived in
clearly and distinctly
that Wa
perceive something"- 18
Since we know that Gewirth
thinks Gassendi is "in a
general
sense" accusing Descartes
of having a merely
psychological
criterion for ascertaining
what is true, we can construct
a

^

™

^

>

•

^

reasonable interpretation
of how Gewirth reads Gassendi's
criticism.

111

GeWlrth thinks Ga ssendi*s
objection contains two parts.
thS ril" St Part Gassendi
P° ints out that people are willing
foi.

-vhui.

they think they clearly and
distinctly per-

Tneir willingness to die shows
they are subjectively
convinced they are clearly and
distinctly perceiving. But
people have been known to die
for false beliefs.
To ascertain
Wheth
P®^Ption S are clear and

^
method

distinct

that coes not rely on subjective
conviction,

it is

this method Gassendi thinks Descartes
failed to provide.

Having charged Descartes with failing to provide
an
1

‘

J

Gev/i x th ,

pp

.

25 0-251.
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adequate method for
ascertain^ g olearaess
and distinctness
„-assendi
moves on to the second
u
pert of h-'.
P
iJ-°
objection.
Here
be concludes" flat
that Descartes' main
concern should have
been
Lo P ro P°und [such]
a method.
T*
Gewirth is right
Gassendi is asking
Descartes to answer
'

.

•

,J

•

‘

-

..

..

(

- E£2ki
" ePly

^

.

Q 2)

interpretatio n of Desc artes'

GeWlit " d ° eS not seem
to entertain the
possibility
that his interpretation
of Gassendi's objection
might differ
from Descartes'. Gewirth
thinks- that
L.uai r-,e
Gassendi asked (Q2) and
that Descartes gave
Gassendi what he asked for.
‘

Gewirth

u

right, the strategy we
have adopted for
answering (Q2) succeeds in
the sense that it leads
us to the
method of difference. This
method does seem to qualify
as a
„oi

u.,ce...

raining clearness and
distinctness.

On the

other hand, if the m^thnc
etiloa n-r
of difference if Descartes'
answer
to
his
f
answer raises new problems.
In Chapter I, I
pointed out that the method of
difference does not allow us
tQ aSCertaiU WhiGh ° f our
sirnP le
are clear and distinct, 11
oo if rhe method of difference
is the method by which Descartes ascertains clearness and
distinctness, Descartes
has

nCt P rov LQea tu

adequate method Gassendi requested,
and
Gassendi’s criticism stands up.
-

'-‘

^iieUier interpr e t at ion of Descart es

adopt Gewirth'

]

1 bee
c

pp

s

’

reply.

If we

interpretation’ of Descartes' reply, Descartes
54-56 above.

153

answers

(Q 2 )

but his answer is°
*
not satisfactory.
Another
interpretation of Descartes'
reply
,
uilable,
^ ls
however.
....
On
interpretation Descartes'
reply to Gassendi
seems to follow the structure
Gewirth finds in Gassendi's
objection.
Initially, Descartes
replies to the j-x^sr
first part
p rt of r
Gassendi's
criticism.
H0
' u aL nGassen «i S point about
people willo face death for their
9
beliefs "proves nothing"
"because
it can never be proved
that they clearly and
distinctly perceive what they pertinaciously
12
affirm "
y auuni.
n==
Descartes then
proceeds to the second
part of his reply. He
,

,

'

+-

4-

-

says:

W t
viz
that it is not
so^much^a^question of f aMno~~ Sa
of the rule, as of
th truth
finding a method’
f
^oiamg
we err or not when we
whether
think that wf perceive
something
clearly
But I contp'nrUhaftJthls has been cai
attended 0 in its
where 1 fir£5t laid aside
all prejudices
a^l fLrn
in ^ ishin ^ thec 1 e a y f
confusedt^^

p

-

.

,

t-

It is plain that Descartes
is not replying to one
criticism

having two parts, as Gewirth
supposes.
What we have here are
two separate replies t.o what
“u u
D°s
cartnVoe to oe tv;o
-scartes
takes
separate
criticisms.
Let us look at each reply in
turn.
'

£t-i£i£iS2!
" ly
tnc.

° G

n

SM

uggests th

lines.

<=><5

Descartes

1-

’

j

repl y

.

Descartes'

not read

:

Gassendi pointed out that people are
willing to
die for beliefs they think they
clearly and distinctly perceive.
12

hR II, 214

.

1

JO

Ibid.

Emphasis mine.
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We can all agree that whsf c-what Gassendi says
is true, but what
Uoion are we to draw
from his comment?
Descartes took
him to be suggesting
that sincere persona.!
conviction in one ,
bellef 13 SVidenCe that
° ne is perceiving
clearly and distinct
-Pi - precisely to the criticism he thought
Gassendi was
making Descartes simoly
denied tintueniec
r
}
that "no
pertinacious affirmation'
is a criterion for
clear and distinct
perception.
,

•

.

,

+-

Gassendi may have actually
meant more than Descartes
realised.
Gewirth thinks Gassendi was
pointing out that we
must fall back on subjective
conviction unless Descartes
gives
US adequate criteria for
axcertaining clearness and

distinct

But in fairness to Descartes,
Gassendi does not say explicitly
what Gewirth interprets him
to mean.

Record crit icism and Descartes

'

r epl y.

if

j

ar)

right, Descartes did not interpret
Gassendi's objection as
Gewirth does. Gewirth thinks
Gassendi's objection has two
paits.
the urs-c part charges Descartes
with psychologism,
and trie second part is a
"conclusion" telling Descartes what
no must do to avoid the criticism
raised in the first part,
roi Descartes, however, the second
part of Gassendi's objection is not merely a continuation of
the first part,
it is.

rathe

j.

,

a

different criticism and requires a separate
reply.

But what is the second criticism Descartes
thinks

Gassendi is raising?

Gassendi asked for a method "to discern

whether or not we are deceived when we think that
we clearly

perceive somethino.
9

"

J

4

Gas? .„,.,
Gassendi

and can be read in
two ways.

Casssndi

'

s obieot-irin
ejection

objection is ambiguous

To cxmbi
exhibitL its
it
ambiguity,

I

put

as a question:

How can a person be
sure'

(Q3)

.

s

'

,^+.
" lsQ not
mistaken when he
-i

thinks he is clearly
and distinctly perceiving?
The first reading of
|Q3|.
The first reading Qf
(Q3)
13 the reading Gewirth
J
h ° sclibes to Descartes.
If, as Gawirth
argues, Descartes is
referring Gassendi to the
method of difference, then we can
surmise that Descartes
took Gassendi to
be wondering whether a
person who believes he is
clearly
and distinctly perceiving
can support his belief
with something
more than his own subjective
conviction.
Descartes' reply is
straightforward: such a person
can use the method of difference
*.

—
1 “”

"

j ading

-

J'

'

of (Q3 )_.

if we adopt the second
read-

Uassen<2i is not suggesting
that Descartes’ method

for ascertaining clearness
and distinctness falls back on
subjective conviction. Granting
that Descartes has a method
that does not rely on subjective
conviction, Gassendi is

wondering how Descartes can be sure he
is not deceived when
he uses whatever method he does have.
After all, the evil
genius can deceive him.
He can make Descartes believe
an
inadequate method to be adequate.
Descartes gave Gassendi's objection the
second reading of

(Q3)

it would make no sense for Descartes to refer

Gassendi to the method
off diffo,
dlff ^rence since this
method is
itself vulnerable to
Gassendi's criticism
luc ism. if,
to
as Qewirth
supposes, the method of
difference i*
n *« cartes'
lo DG&
method for
ascertaining clearness and
distinctness
- ctneso
rae
^
Gassendi
could on
the second reading of
(03, put the foliowing
guestion to Descartes: How can you be
sure you are not deceived
when you
believe the method of
difference to be adequate?"
,

•

.

,

Assuming Descartes did give
Gassendi's objection the
second reading, we can
make sense of Descartes'

reply only

i,

suppose that Descartes is
referring Gassendi not to
the
method of difference but to
some other method.
But what is
this other method to which
Descartes referred Gassendi?
TO answer this question,
let us return, once again,
to
Descartes' reply. He says:
do not question what you next
sav v-i ?
h
Ue °- i
ak±ng pains *-° establish the'
truth
of the rule
of ft i
I

•

.

«

Sea^^rle^

ontend
at this has been carefully
i^'
attended
in J to P r °per place where
I ’first laid a
dp
r
eS
an
afterwards
enumerated
all
^
the
chief
idea? ^d?^i? ngU1Shln3 thS Clear
from the obscure and confusS:^
9

,

^

f,.°

-

^

<- i

,

'

i

Descart.es agrees that he must answer
(Q3)

.

His answer consi:

in his referring Gassendi to a
method found at a place in

—

the place where Descartes "first
laid aside

prejudices, and afterwards enumerated all
the chief ideas,
distinguishing the. clear from. the obscure, and
confused,"

th<
a.

15 7

Descartes mentions three
distinct operations here.
Does he
mean, as Gewirth supposes,
that the method Gassendi
requires
18 tD be fOUnd at the
place "here ail three
operations are
performed? Or does he mean
that the method Gassendi
reeuires
IS to be found where
Descartes "first laid doide
all prejudices ?
if the second interpret
-muexpreratior)
at inn is- correct,
the operations of enumerating the
chief ideas and distinguishing
i

-

the

clear from the obscure and
confused came after; Descartes
laid
out the method for which
we are looking.
To find this method,
we must look at the place
where Descartes discarded his
prej

ud ices.

— Ei—

Descartes discarded his rejudice
p
s.

When Descartes says he enumerated
all the principal ideas and
distinguished those which are clear
from the obscure or conri’ooo,

(itwirch thinks Descartes means
he set forth the real

definitions of 'Cod’, 'mind', and 'matter',
and distinguished
these real definitions from those
that are merely nominal. 16
Descartes distinction between real and
nominal definitions
of 'God' occurs in Meditation III, 17
and his distinction between real and nominal definitions of
'mind'

appears in Meditation II. 18
16
3

7

and 'matter'

since Gewirth acknowledges that

Gewirth, p. 273

HR

I,

165-171.

18,

5 ~15 4
These distinctions are discussed after
ueai r.acion III as well, but we are here concerned
with just
tnose discussions that occur in the first three Meditations,
1

•

15 0

Descartes discards his
prejudices
s ^ e fore he
^
enumerates the
chief ideas and distinguishes
the clear from the
obscure or
confused, Gewirth has helped
to narrow our search
for the
Place where Descartes discards
his prejudices. We need
to look
at Meditation I and that
portion of Meditation II
that precedes Descartes’ discus'?!
nnq r\
discussions
of +-u„
the nature of mind and
matter.
In the relevant portions
of Meditation II, Descartes
simply reviews the skeptical
arguments he has raised in Meditation I. Apparently, Meditation
I is the place where
Descartes
first discarded his prejudices,
and it is to Meditation I
that
Descartes referred Gassendi. At
the outset of Meditation I,
'

-

-f

‘

eocart_.,

shall at last seriously and freely
address
myself to the general upheaval of
all my former opinions." 19
x.i th.. same .'em, he
says, "I was convinced that I must
once
tor all seriously undertake to rid
myself of all the opinions
which I had formerly accepted." 20 Among
Descartes' former
opinions are his prejudices
those opinions he held without
...ays,

I

—

rauxuj/ed

justification. 21

•

If Descartes rids himself of all

his former opinions in Meditation

I

,

then he rids himself of

all his prejudices as well.
in Gewirth

'

s

view Descartes' discussion of matter is his
see Gewirth, pp, 270-271.

cuss:. on of wax.
1

?

9

nr

dis-

14 4.

0

'bid
I leave open the possibility that Descartes' prejudices
are coextensive with hi s former opinions.

DeSCarteS

'

Syr'° psi3 ° f

.

1S thG firSt Meditation

—

tion

X

also suggasts that

Which we are looking.
synopses appears in the
Synopsis Of The Six

This

blowing Hedit
atrons, which precedes
the six Meditations
themselves. The
Synopsis is divided into
six paits,
narfc,
«
each part summarizing
one
° f thG
Meditati0nS In Sho
Descartes is telling us
in
EeCtiCn ° f his Scepsis
what he has done in the
cc
rcsponamg Meditation. The
entirety of Descartes'
synopsis
on Meditation I is as
follows;
..

,

^

‘

we raay/genlrall^spenkdn **1

f

,°

rth the reasOTS for which

^

abSuth^eX^th"

especially
at least as we have no
~
'
other foundations for fiio s
than tho3e which we
have hitherto “ss^ssed
IS®"???
a Doubt which is so
genhafdols ,
‘
=ppee./, i t
is at the same time
verv emit
,
r ® at
lnasm
ucn as 'V
it delivers
?
us from ever-, Hn
of prejudice, and sets out
for
a
verv

VI^

"

-

r

f

s"

’

the senses ; and finally
iXmSes ?fimpossi
th ° be thlngS w hich' „e
hav^once^di

scovered

Here Descartes says he will
"doubt about all things" and that
such a doubt is useful because
"it delivers us from every kinc
of prejudice
Apparently, Descartes plans in
Meditation I
.

”°
b..

'"

-

p£ '* jf

" 1S

5lnod of aoubt to ail his former
opinions, and,

ra '

doing, to rid himself of all his
prejudices.

second reading of

(Q3)

,

Meditation

I

On the

seems to be the place to

which Descartes referred Gassendi.

~~

f ound at
.

the place

-w here

D escartes discarded

160

^ejUdi —

13

Wh6n We rSView the fir
^t Meditation, we
find
that Descartes never
makes use of the method
of difference
there.
The method of difference
is first used in
Meditation
In Meditation 1,
Descartes uses one and only
one method
the method of doubt. J
'

The method of doubt and
the
the second reading of
(Q3)

second

reading of

(03J

.

On

Gassendi is WOI

ng how D
can oe sure ha is not
deceived when he thinks
that his method
for ascertaining clearness
and distinctness is
adequate.
Descartes' answer is straightforward:
"Use the method doubt." 24
But the method of doubt is
not the method for which
we are
looking.
We want Descartes' method
for ascertaining which of
nrs ideas are clear ana distinct.
If the second reading
is
right Descartes did not give
us this method.
Instead, he gave
us a method for discerning
whether we can be deceived when we
a.,e his method for
ascertaining clearness and distinctness,
whatever that method might be,.
,

,

Ms^ssment of the strai ghtforward
---- -

s trategy

for answer ing

have Pursued a strategy that had us
search for a
Passage in which Descartes takes up (Q2). 25
The only passage
that seems promising is Descartes' reply
to Gassendi. This
'

HR
2

I.

.145-149.

4.

Presumably Descartes would argue that we would have
to
God as a deceiver if the method He has given us is
inadequate. But we cannot rationally doubt God's veracity.
Gee my discussion, p. 142 above.
2.5

See pp

.

147 - 1 5 0 above
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reply has two equally
plausible interpretations,
interprets
however.
On
one reading Descartes
is refe-rinrr
re±e,rmg Gassendi to the
method of
_
-f ference on the
second reading,
+
readina to the method
of doubt.
If the method of
difference turned Ut +t0
be an adequate
°
method
.
or ascertaining
clearness and distinctness,
we would have good
reason to accept Gewirth's
interpretation. But the
method of
difference fails for simple
re we are
aeas
t e ideas
ito avoid the conelusion that Descar^P'?
cai.es did nnf
not \have an adequate
method for
ascertaining clearness and
distinctness, we need to
reject
the first reading and
adopt the second.
But the second reading leads us to the method
of doubt, and this method
is not
the one Descartes uses
in Meditations II and
III when he
distinguishes the clear principal
ideas from those that are
obscure or confused. As a resnU-oUJ.t rhe strategy we
adopted leads
to a dead end.
To find out what method Descartes
uses to
ascertain clearness and distinctness,
we will have to develop
a different strategy.

m

,

-

i

....

t

’

-*

HI*
S ince

ness

'

•

strategy we will adopt

'l'IIE

Descartes

1

definition of 'clearness' and 'distinct-

is vague and since his reply
to Gassendi does not expli-

citly identify Descartes' method
for ascertaining clearness
“ nCI ca

-="-

Lnc '-nass,

I

think the best approach available to
us

IS to delve into the corpus of
Descartes' work and to see how

he actually uses the terms

'clear

'

and 'distinct

'

and how he

actually goes about distinguishing his clear and
distinct

,„ „

p
a
;
ci /ides ideas into
two types.
g “ ch t
type in turn, we
can try to identify
the features of the
..
'
cieai
clea- and distinct
and
obscure and confused ideac:
f^n-i
Luea ® .tallinq
t-fJ under i-nat
type
At the
same time we can trv
+.^
try to identify the
method or methods by
„ hlch
;

,

-

+.

.

-scau.es ascertains
whether his ideas are
clear and distinct.

16 3

C H A P T E R

V

I

ANALYTICALLY CLEAR AMD
DISTINCT IDEAS
objective in
n r -n
ln Mthe
following throe chapters
g-ive an interpretation
of Descari-***
artes account of
claritv
..
-Btinctncss and to exhibit
his method

™

'

1Geas are clear and
distinct
U,
'

two different aspects of
xhe.se asp oto
f;j

a

-

T
1

,

v;iU argue that
there ar-

oi-.rH-,, an< .
^

distinctness,

1;

-

l

,

i

cal

i

lcal clarity and
distinctness'

U

,

j.

md

tor
1 d
a C02 t a i n mg wh
i cl

sentational clarity and
distinctness'
oioev is mine, the
distinction to which
relieve

,

.

.

:

•t

t

I

.

am pointing ia

,

j

n Descar t e s

in this Chapter I
will try to elucidate the
notion of
analytical', clarity and
distinctness and to set

forth beecteie
me mod lor ascertaining
which ideas are analyticallv
c ’ea- -m,
StinCt
T ° 8Chle
I wild give
considerable
attention to what Descartes
says about the composite
ideas,
for his remarks on these
ideas provide what 1 regard
as the
best .basis for formulating
an account of analytical
clarity
and distinctness.
In section II, I attempt
to elucidate what
DeSCE
'fictional id a \
Section

^

- «*"

-

'

'

-•

.

u

because there is an important
connection between an idea’s
being fictional and its being
analytically obscure or confused

I

v.i.i.i

J. .

T'iE

pursue

«.

COMPOSITE IDEAS
strategy like one Descartes undent

s

16 4

in the Meditations.

This
qtrat-om, seems
- strategy
to me to be characteristically cartesian. At
the outset of the
First Meditation,
Descartes says he will doubt
all his former opinions. 1
But
be recognises that he
cannot doubt each and every
opinion he
formerly held, for there
are so many that he
could never
2
apply his method of doubt
to each.
Instead, he groups judgements into types. There are
particular sense beliefs, 3 beliefs
P-rtaining co "corporeal nature
in general," 4 and
mathematical
* repositions.
Against each of these types,
Descartes raises
at least one metaphysical
doubt.
By raising these doubts,
hop_, to show that all his
former opinions falling under
toe enumerated types are
dubi table.

To find out which ideas are
clear and distinct and which
o
uj.o and contused, I
want to try to adapt Descartes'
method
for telling which of his former
opinions are dubi table. Since
Descartes cannot assess each of his
former beliefs
separately,

ne groups them

ar.d

considers them as a class.

Similarly, al-

though we cannot survey every idea
separately, we can survey
types of ideas to see whether they
have clarity and distinct1

UR I, 144.

>

“ihid, p.
5

Ibid.

,

145.

pp.

345-146

!.

Ibid-,,

pp.

146-14 7.

\

Ibid., p. 147.

1G5

n^ss or obscurity and
confusion as generic features.
I thiniDescartes Mmself adopted
such a procedure. This
much is clear
at any rate.
He does give us a
classification of ideas into
types and subtypes.
Using Descartes' classification,
„e can
proceed systematically from one
type to another.
If Descartes
also proceeded systematically
in this way, we can expect
to
Hiir. reeling us,
for each type of idea, whether
ideas
falling under that type are clear
and distinct

Descartes divides all ideas into
simple ideas and complex or composite ideas. He thinks
composite ideas are composites oi simple ideas. u The
composite idea of an inscribed
triangle contains the ideas of being
inscribed and being a
triangle. The .idea of a triangle is
itself a composite idea,
for it is analyzable into the idea
of being a three-sided

figure.

Alghough the idea of being three-sided may
in turn
be anaiysaoie, the idea Figure is not
analyzable in
.

the same

sense.

It is a simple idea, and all composite
ideas have

such simples as their atomic elements
Des cartes
s

!

V

distinction between the simple and compos i te

rai ses two questions

IQ1)
(Q2)

1

that is a
/>

1

\ii

fi

*

Vi

iiCl

t
!

-j

s imp 1 e

idea?

the containment relation that hc-lds between

compos ite idea and the simple elements it contains?

"ibid.

,

p.

7

'Ibid.,,

pp.

40 and pp.

41-44.

43-44.
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1-

lake up

(Q2)

first.

— i~

AlthOUgh Descartes

net expressly clarify
the part-whole relation
holding bet W een a content
and the idea
containing it, he frequently
.peaks about the contents of
ideas.
In a typical passage he
floes

says:

“
ccrtiLL^tvLT^ire
idea of a
'~ L *

S

^“e

then
triangfe ,
w
oiiciix truly af f j rm of f hp
v —
^
aacfle
and
arJ y
^ rm
shall1 aJ
af xlr
m of Isthe square whatever T find n simij
^
•

f

n

-L

4»

*

I

^

-

'

‘- j

i

i

-i

%

«
.

;

.

tLlequaUty

’

vTtatTA?

,. r

*-i

‘

^

.

8
•

-

..

+- v,

.ljnu, yet 1 cannot aenv that
of it
hv an Y cle- ar
xt b
and distinct mental operation attribute
V
°t
/
Mhen
1
'
"*
self
ri g»tly
understand what I .ay! §
,•

Descartes* view seems plain.

,

The contents of the idea Triangle

are those concepts that represent
necessary features of triangles.
We can say that an idea’s contents are
its entailments.
An idea Y is contained in an idea X
provided that X entails Y. 10
2ii

A2iL*

Descartes is,

I

believe, confused about simple

.ideas.

Sometimes he talks as if simple ideas have no
parts.
He writes:
2 s
evident that we are .in error if we judge that anv
of
_nese simple ideas is not completely known by us.
For
otherwise it could not be said to be simple /but must
complex -- a compound, of that which is present in our be
perception of it. and that of which we think we are ignor--

II

Descartes means "equal to two right angles."
r)

HP II, 20.
1

r^

In what follows
entails' will be an undefined term
meaning something other than 'strictly implie
For an
eyp 1 an at i on see footnote 13.
!

f

!

.

,

16 7

ant 11

Here Descartes seems to be
5
saving
ay mg that we cannot
sensibly
speak of simple ideas as having
parts.

yet in the paragraph immediately
following the above
quotation he says:
,

g

“

tEL!\r^r

m0t n
Decease it is impossible to duration
conceive
a
i
n ° 6Xtensi0
of
a motion
hL^oiSation!^of
of

^

th^

His remarks here imply that the
idea Figure entails the idea
Extension and that the idea Motion
entails the idea Duration,
yet. figure and Motion are
for Descartes simple ideas.
And
since the parts of an idea are its
entailments, it follows
from views Descartes holds that simple
ideas do have parts. 13

Descartes appears guilty of an inconsistency.

On the one hand,

he thinks that simple ideas have no
parts; on the other hand,
it follows from the view he holds that
they do have parts.

Although Descartes sometimes lapses into language
that
L1

12
.

KR

I,

42

Ibid

1.

Descartes need not recognize in simple ideas all the
parts wo might think them to contain. The simple
idea Figure
entai.is tne o.isjunctive idea of being a figure
or being red,
hut Descartes can consistently deny the latter idea to
be
contained in i:he former. For Descartes, the ent ailment relatioj
is i.Qv
ual of strict implication.
His method for recognizing
necessary connections is what he ;alls 'intuition*,
"i
tel
us,
.is the uncioubtmg conception of an unclouded
and
attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone."
See HP. r, 7,
X do not propose to elucidate what Descartes
mean s by intuition’
What 1 do want to point out is that
Descartes could on the basis of intuition deny that the idea
figure entails the idea of being a figure or being red.
•

t

>.t.

.i.

1

.
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suggests he believes simple ideas
to be unanalysable
his con,
s idcred opinion is,
I believe, plain.
In his explicit definition of a simple idea, Descartes
says:

»

Here we shall treat of things
only in our understanding

FFF -

annot be analyzed into others
more distinctly known. 14 "
Descartes does not say that a simple
idea cannot be analysed.
Instead, he suggests that such an
idea can be analyzed but
not in a way that will make it
more clearly and distinctly
known than it already is.

Giving us an example of such an analysis,
he says one
could define 'figure’ as ’the limit of
extension'
The person
of rering such a definition thinks the
idea Figure has an analysis and contains among its parts the ideas
Limit and Extension
Descartes responds that the idea Limit is less
clearly and
.

ois*-iiic*...ly

known than the idea it is meant to clarify.

de-s not say that Figure has no analysis and no
parts.

explicit definition of 'simple idea

1

1^

He

His

and his elucidation of

it are consistent with his view that the idea Figure
contains

the idea Extension as one of its contents.

Although Descartes sometimes speaks as if he thinks
simple ideas are unanalyzable,
1

j

iru

i.nciuj. i t_aniy

opinion.

Or.

the.

think we would be interpreting

I

if we accepted this view as his considered

.interpretation

1

will adopt, both the complex

and the simple ideas have parts in the sense that they both
“
i

.>

'HR I,

40-41.

II

'ibid., p„

16

41.

.Ibid

.15

69

Have entailments

There is in Descartes'
view a signifi gant
dirference between these two
types of idea, however.
„ e believes we cannot profitably
define the predicates
expressing
simple ideas
Satisfactory definitions are
,

.

an aid to under-

standing because they define
what is less understood in
terms
of what is more understood.
But in the case of simple ideas,
Descartes thinks that among the
defining expressions will be
terms that are no better
understood than the predicates they
a-e meant <_o clarify.
We can, on the other hand,
profitably
define terms expressing complex
ideas.
Complex ideas have part
simple Ideas among them
which are better understood

—

t-ht.i

than

complex ideas containing them.^'
ideas

and (Q2)

.

Having answered

(01)

we are in a position to classify
composite, ideas.
1 con centrate on the composite
ideas here because Descartes
discussions of them give us the best material
for developing
,

5

account of analytical clarity and distinctness
and it is
,
chis account that I want to develop first.

ci.n

Descartes divides ideas into three types for us.
Ideas
falling under a certain type can be combined with
other ideas
falling under that type or with ideas falling under
some other
type.

Once combined in this way, these composites can be
17-rj.n

.

.

another sense, however, we can,
believe, legitimately say that simple ideas can be better understood than
they are. The person who knows that Figure entails Extension
seems to me to understand the idea Figure better than the
person vaio does not recognize this ent ailment to hold.

i

j
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further combined so
that the 1possib'e
S1 °‘ e combinations
are endless
all „
K
these
syntheses win be reducible
to a few basic
combi,,
s, however.
In turn these
combinations will be
reducible
°
e oirn pic ideas
of which
U) thpv
ne Y ,
composed

™

-

,

"

'

‘-

5

"

7

*1

** * m»i.

*

c*t^r.tbute

r

lae *

um.

a.

* <» »•*=•«- -

or a substance

mv-,.;,,

h

« . „«,

<«.

c
second
wa Y of classifying
•

fe

ideas is misleading,
however.
oescar
Descartes
n recognizes
ues act,,
actually
ideas of individual
modes and types of
mode, of individual
attributes and types of
attribute, of individual
substances,
types of substance, and
18
of substance itse’f
j.Lsc...t.
rv
For
our purpose,
uooevar, we can refer to
ideas of individual modes
and idea*
Of types Of mode as
ideas of modes, to ideas
of individual
attributes and ideas of
types of attribute as ideas
of attricUuSS and to ideac;
^
j.
mCiXv lQU 3.1 ouuoLdnces,
Ub S t r n HP O
types^ of substance
and substance itself as
.
ideasb ur
>,<,f=
of c U P
n
T
seance
In blurring these
important distinctions, I do
not think we are raising
f

“

-i

r.

-\

r

,

3

£\

r-

-, c>

->

,

,

.

unneces-

sary difficulties for the
analysis

other hand

.

f~h

is

a l v<?i c
an wlysis

these distinctions as
13

I

; r.

1J=

I

want to give 19
.

0 n the

,,
greatly
simplified if we blur
i

.

suggest 20
,

See HR I, 239-246

19

X

7: attribute°of
matter

My idea ° f

Z

"
\

It

- -

E
'i

\

iaea Of

^

£
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Descartes is a
conceptualist
ptaalist.
ds

mmd

n
Uni versa Is do not
exist
•

independent entities
titles 21

vr
We
can have universal
ideas
a°
however
Our
Lx xoeas oxsubstance and of types
of ailh , t
would be such idea^
,
«
j-ccas
Really
ejp'stinn
"
ng °—,~v
ub s lances are
indii
2
vidual tinners, ~ 'Pbncp
i--fc.se tilings
have modesS
h Tl1odi e
A
is a pro24
1
8nd there arS tW °
tYpes of them
attributes and mod
^'.
,
pi oper
An attribute
c
G X ° a necess ar
Y feature of a substance, 2 5
..'ode proper,
a contingent
j
feature
lecture.
r0
Being
red headed is a
contingent
fea^-nm
J
ieu..ure of a_ human
if in.j .
beina*
lt
i*
mode proper.
But being rational
...
i
na rs necessary feature
an attribute. 26
When we combine our
ideas of modes, attributes,
and
substance xn various ways,
we get various types
of synthesis.
The ° e 1 ,1 tUrn fail int °
three ? eneral Classifications.
Borrow.

-

.

,

,

.

•

_

*

.

-

.

•;

«-

*

,

c<

d

..

-

..

a.

0

idea lnd ?t s con?ents°arrnecess **? * aCh idea Aether that”
need to show is that De-cartf « f r i,ly connected. What we
findin * out is an
effective oroc^durf appficabfe t?'
Kln< of comPosite idea
Using Descartes* classification^^*
?
3 " int ° three
can show that his method
*YP«, we
appUes fo
re«. sorts of composite
idea and, bv extension
-Auji.oion, to aj.l composite
ideas.
21 HR
I, 242,

?
^

-

22 _
'ibid./ pp.
r

)

242-243.

i

'HP II,

101.

24
|

Hr

I

2

,

41

„

23
'

26

.

PP-

240-242.

r

allows I will use the term ‘mode* to
mean
Although Descartes recognises that he uses
u. vocally, he admits that he
is not always c reful
ai
about his usage.
See HR I, 245. We will be careful
however
oi.
*®
u we contuse the two senses of 'mode'
if
wilier
we
lot
be.
,
aole i.o distinguish modal syntheses
from svnthe«es of reason.
See HR I, 244*245.
j1>

,

_

-l

n

*ode proper t.

t.

f

‘

,
'

.

;

i
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in, from Descartesterminology,

!

will refer to various

Of synthesis as modal
syntheses, syntheses of
reason, ana ...
syntheses. These types of
i?
S>nuhGSls can
turn be subdivided.
I discuss each
type and subtype
separately.

^

M^al syntheses are
syntheses that
mode with an idea of the
substance

_

combine an idea of a

of

whlch it is

mode or with an id^aa 0
°-f
0
same substance."
There are three
iree
a

arntw
°ther
d!i

t-vnoc
-yP efc of

property of the

.
r
modal
synthesis:
-

substance-mode syntheses
"--eo, mode-mode syntheses,
y
and attribute
-mode syntheses.
,

U!

^t^e-mode

S

syntheses combine an idea of
a substance with an idea of a mode
of that substance 38
Typical
of such combinations are the
ideas of a moving body, a recollecting mind, and a hungry lion.
Bodies, minds, and lions are
substances, and moving, recollecting,
and being hungry are,
respectively, modes of them.
-

.

(2)

^ ^l£]l§ses combine ideas of different modes
cf the same substance 29 My ideas
of running swiftly
.

recollecting clearly are such ideas.

and

Running and being swift

are modes of an antelope; recollecting
and being clear, of
Inxncu

VJhen 1

-

7

,
-f

> p
C v>

p

T

combine ideas of modes of the same substance.
244

.

Ibid

29

M y i - sa of a reel, object will be a composite
idea of
mar;;on falling under the mode-attribute subtype.
See below
(

;

P.

!6
176
!

.

a
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I

get a mode-mode synthesis, 30
<3>

by Descartes

a^theses are not explicitly
discuss^
,

but we can suppose he
would have acknowledged

such a synthetic-

-r

-p„

for, n

an attribute-mode
synthesis when I

add to my idea of an
attribute an idea representing
a contingent feature of that
attribute. Although thinking
is the
essence of spiritual substance,
how I think is a contingent
matter.
I can think
logically or illegally so
that being
logical is a mode of an
attribute, and the idea Thinking
Logic«_lly is an attribute-mode
composite.

—

theses.

Descartes recognises three types
of real
synthesis:
substance-substance syntheses, mode
of substance -substance syntheses,
and mode of substance-mode
l
2
of
subs tance^ syntheses
(1)

Substance- sxfcsfcance

.syn t he ses

combine ideas of two or

more substances to form ideas of
things like a winged horse
or an embodied thinker/" Since
'winged' and 'embodied' are
adjectives, it may not be clear how the
substance-substance
syntnesis differs from a substance-mode
synthesis such as the
idea of a brown horse.
Since we take adjectives to denote
I

,

24 4-245.

Descartes says, ’The real is properly
ween wool- more substances," I imagine he means found betwo or more
non-idemp,oa: substances. But if this is his view,
then we
need a y/pe of composite idea that joins together
ideas of the
same substance.
Some of the joined together ideas will
essarily connected; others not. I could take my idea of be neca
centaur and join it to my idea of a creature that is
.

.
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properties , we would be
inclined to think that
the tents
'winged
eddied', and 'brown' express
ideas Qf
escartes does not group
composite ideas according
to *„ e
linguistic function of
the terms expressing M
them or the logical
function of the idea
itself
H ~ dldssifles
composites according to the ontological
status of the objects
of the ideas
icmed together to form the
composite. To form his
idea of a
winged horse, Descartes
takes his i dp c
Wln 9 s and joins it to
18 1063 ° f 3 hGrSe
Since v;in
can exist independently
o'
tf ngS tHat are
W±nged win 3 s ar =
Descartes

^

^

.

-,

.

.

.

^

*

'

substances..

j the
and
idea they exemplify

™

is an

->-b

t

idea rorc a substance.

Mode of Substan^^- substance
2

syntheses

Idea of a mode of one
substance with the idea of
another substance!' I have such a
composite idea when 1 conceive
of myself having the shape of
a beer barrel.
The shape of a beer
barrel iS a mcde ° f a SUbSt
I think of myself
having
such a shape, I think of
myself
one substance - as having
the mode of another substance
a beer barrel.

—

«

-

—

3)
___

of substance

_^

n
a

t!

j'c

v

h ° rSe
!

si-v-e

'
,

h

^

J

° r°

L

-

ar ld

.

,

half man and half horse.

h “ lf

-^clucie these explicitly,
J2.
II

id

f

PP
Pi

244-245

s ynth eses

join

hs a result 1 get the idea
of a ere-

aur

ttsS*
'

^

.

however.

~
But
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an idea of a mode
of one substance with
an idea of a

another substance as
when
an apple

I

form

thc;

^

Qf

idea of a frnit

shape and a pear’s
color,
Although Descartes does
not mention
nor
nentinr ocher
^
categories of
real synthesis, he chn-ma
" ld lllcluae at
least two more types:
0

^

n

-

of substance,-Riih«f an «
r
1

“

° f an attribUtS ° f

,

s ynthe ses
,

combine

substance with an idefof
ano-

tner substance not having
that attribute.
if rationality is
part of man's essence,
then the idea of a
rational doo is
an attribute of
substance^substance, composite.

—

~~ 21

{5)

gubgtancei -attribute of substance,
SV n'
j0
ideas ° f attributes belonging
to different substances
With this tvpe cf
only one attribute
represented by the ioined
0 ldecib Can De a
necessary feature of
both substance, and substance^
The idea of a rational
omnipotent man is such a composite,
for it combines the
-d_a cl „n essential feature
of man with the idea of an
essential feature of God.

“

.

,

-^.L'lcd^o

of reason

:

Descartes recognizes two syntheses

substance-attribute syntheses and attribute
-attri-

D uts syntheses
'

.

To these

I

add a third

-

the mode- attribute

synthesi
V1 *

syntheses combine an idea of

176

substance with ar

„
1

,

‘

ea ° ^f an " ttribut
« Of that substance.
of an enduring
body is S uch an
idea

»^
.

,

!!Sasa

mole attributes of
35
the same subst-rc
substance.

U .„ „

3*

two 0 ,

She idea of endurino

:::::«13

bCCaUSe dUratl ° n and
extension are both
necessary
features of matter.
id)

“

^-attribute Smtheses
°f

^

SttribUte

-

coniine an idea of a
mode with
'
mode
My idea of somothing
.

is ied and non-black
qualifies
-xu.eo a 0 suen an idea
i
if we
regard being non-black
o
tlack as a necessary
feature of the contingent
proper ty be ing red
t,hcit

-

->

-

,

fictional versus nonpigtional
ideas
Having sketched Descartes'
c3 assifi
-Li.

-ab,iucdUon
cati rm

-r composite
ui
ideas into types and
subtypes, we want to
ascertain whether
there are any types that
have clarity and distinctness
as
generic features. As a first
step toward this end, we
want
to distinguish between
fictional and nonfictional ideas,
and
We Want tQ fiRd ° Ut whether
are any types of composite
ideas that are nonfictional.

i'll 0 !-'

ideas
Composite ideas result from the synthesis
of other ideas. Minds
hav„ the t.o i.ity to produce
such syntheses themselves. A
j.

Ibi d.
3 c:
'j.

Ibid.

,

p.

245

1

FI.

:

.

177

person can take any two
ideas and combine them
m lnto
into
° ne f ° rmS SUOh a "
ia

“

'

»-n

a

composite

he takes the ideas
of

bexng inscribed and
being a triangle and
puts them together
to make the idea of
an inscribed triangle.
When one puts ideas
together rn this way, the
synthesis that results is
what
Descartes calls a fictional
idea.
I imagine that
Descartes
calls such composites
fictional because the
synthesising capubrlity of the understanding
is the source of what
„e would
ordinarily call imagination.
Using our ability
to combine,

can create all sorts of
composite ideas.
Will be ideas of mythical
things

-

sacyrs

Some of these

winged horses, centaurs,

and the like.

Others will be ideas of really
existing
things -- embodied thinkers,
tall people, etc. The term
'fictional idea’ can be misleading.
Fictional composites need
not be f active : they can be
exemplified.
,

Besides these fictional ideas,
Descartes thinks people
have composite ideas their minds
did not themselves create such
t.n..

a oi

I

a

triangle.

These ideas have an external source,

perhaps God.

produced

Whatever the source, these ideas are not
mindThey come into the mind already
synthesized.
Deo-

.

cartes re era to them as ideas of true
and immutable natures.
3

meth od for asce rtai ning which ideas are
are i'^eag of true and immutable natures.
In the First Reply, Descartes tells us
that fictional ideas
can, but that, ideas of true and immutable
natures cannot, be
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analyzed by "a clear
and distinct mental
operation" 36
says

Ke

;

5
to

;s**

a mental synthesis

r

S

-

“
?*»
a

1:ictl clous one due

7

not merely by" abstraction
anai y^d,
for resect
1 if®
f"?
n of
but by a clear and
the
thought)
be clear that those distinct mental
° ri: henc0 ifc will
thine* Vic’i
80 analyse have not
^standing cannot
been Tut^tncVk
“y
wnen 1 think of a winged
tVor maniple,
n aetuall y
existing, or of a trianaleho^e 'or of
understand that I can on theinscribed \ti sc™ R re, I easily
ntraiy think of a horse
without wines, of a lion
Xis ng and of «
apart from a scuare ? r 6 so
triangle
't
things have
**??«
.

•

4

13

2

.

^iV^iTTt--'
af&^Srs^a^S^i

sver^I
triangle, as tha* its
shall

nS<3

-ta^i;

ln the idea qf' the

^IriL^-al^^fltf

Ping
i cannot deny that
yCt
'attribute ol
cfear
distinct mental operation, i, e. t bv
when fmvse?? rightlv
g ltiy
understand what I say
Besides if '

:i

'

^r^V^T
^

--infto

'

'

ascribe^to

ST

91-

t0 the trian 9 le al ^.e or to
assign
the
"9
Properties of the scuare but
for the orroose
o
C
ara nlng that whioh
arises from
Jh s colifA‘c??on
"‘ J
lon 0j
of'‘h
l nature
uhe two
the
be not .Less true and immutable h r of that composite
nan that: of the
square or triangle alone.
3&

h

'

"

-

,

.

*'

.

.

.

The clear and distinct operation
Descartes has in mind is hi
method for ascertaining what he calls
a real distinction. 35
this method allows us to find out
whether cert
ertain parts of a
composite, idea are necessarily7 connected 40

.

Taking a composite

36 KR II, 20.

See footnote
38

8

HK II, 20-21

ke
40

below, pp. 190-192

Throughout

I

will speak loosely.

I

will say that two
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idea, we see whether
we can conceive of
a possible state
of
affairs in which features
represented by certain
parts of our
idea can exist in
separation from each other.
If we can
or such a state of
affairs, the concepts

representing
these features are
contingently connected.
They could by the
will of God be made to
really exist separately 41
If , on the
other hand, we cannot
conceive of such a state of
affairs, the
represented parts are
necessarily connected.
.

~f

'fiP-MoaSi idea’.

Commenting on the passage Cited above, Gewirth
distinguishes the fictional ideas
from the ideas of true
and immutable natures in
a way that
suggests there are no ideas
that are fictional and
contain a
true and immutable nature /' 2
Although Descartes does not explicitly say that the fictional
ideas and the ideas of true
and immutable natures are
mutually exclusive, I will with
some
-

^

“"if

SSS* other or
entail~each Ither ^anfonly
dna °my it j.t is necessary,
+
„
for an Y £*
7
that
z
is an instance nf y lj dllu
onl Y if * is an instance'of
-V
T
.4n
•

t-

.

;

'

.

,

,

-

t

that
t

is an instance o* y on iw if

z

:

„

aiy

'

J

°J

an Y £»

;This way of ducida^i.ng'the'notion^f
"'^necessary ^con
'

between concepts is somewhat
t
sav o"t
ld
necessarily
connected
- y *Y°
on l
1
necessarily connected with Y
Y
n
d
1
2Y oid ? his formulation because ii^ does
no L tteJ.
e 1 u
u.,
q in
i n which
“f
direction the ent ailment goes, and fo>
our purposes direction is almost
always important.
11

'

•

'

.

•

,

j”

41

•

HR

I,

190.

42

Gewirth, p. 270

'
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reservation adopt what
Descartes. remarks.

X

take to he Sewirth'a

Speaking looS ei
Y

notional idea is one that

!

..

readinq „ f

will. say that

is not fictional,

non-

a

and

I will take
nonfictional idea' and
'idea or
of a true
tree anda -immutable
nature* to be coextensive.

the terms

'

•

Looking back

at.

the passage cited,
nowever, we can see

that the interpretation

cartes seems to

I

^

aor®-vi,C
L

needs qualification.

-On tiirsu ic t iLncr ii-uifac...La.„
y hnnsGl_f
,

Des-

.

r

7V+At
the beginning
i

of the passage, he says;
(i)

When

1

1

think °of a^

•

triangle inscribed in a
square, I easilv understand
14
t can
stand ^i-n“
hdt
I
on the contrary
mink ... of a triangle apart
from a square,
*

*

•

-

and that hence these
things have [this thing has]
ho
true and immutable nature."
But at the end of the same
passage, he seems to contradict
He s ay s
!ii>

"

If

(i)

think of « triangle inscribed
in a square
for the purpose only of examining
that which arises
1

.

j/t

1

1

t le -on junction
‘

of:

the two, the nature of that

composite will be not less true and
immutable than
that of the square or triangle
alone. ..."
LC

saying tuct some ideas ao and do not

contain true and immutable natures.

^°° e

exam ^ na ticn of Descartes’ remarks
reveals that

he is not contradicting himself.

He is using the terms

1

f ic-

.

.131

tional idea’ and 'id
ea of a true
t
ana immutable
nature’ eouivocally.
1 do not know
wheth
Descart
aj u-'s
-s «•,. aware
that he
was equivocalk,,+. u
i nrr
^
DUt
his wnrric
//or as at the
beginning of the passage
arS diSCUSSing d
°
**
-t the possibility that he
5 aUare
StartS
*
a discussion of
’’those
"I
ideas which do not
contain a
a Uub a,,Q
immutable nature, but
onxy a ficticious one
due to a mental
synthesis.” He leaves
open the possibility
that there isSc
a Pr
a oer.se
rn which an idea
can contain a true and Tnn .,f ,?
-t-m-teoie nature and be
fictional,
although he is not discussing
J such dn
an ic.ea
id-v, cil
this stage.
fstei he does discus ^ onnj- such an idea, however
his idea of a
triangle inscribed in a
square.
This idea is fictional
in
the sense that the ideas
Joined together to form it
are not
necessarily connected with
each other.
X call ideas that
are
fictional in this sense
fictional,/.
Ideas can be fictional
in another sense, however;
they can be fictional,.
Descartes’
idea of a triangle inscribed
in a square is both
’fictional
and nonrelational^ it
contains a true and immutable
nature^
t:he second sense..
.

-

•

-.

,t.

.

,

,

"

^ *“»*

"

’

—

.

.

i

,

.

.

—

•

-

;

.c

’j

help make the dist
! r-c*one
uj.oiinccj.ons
•?

r
I

.
__
Wane
to draw,
* T

-

.

l

vili

aitfarentiate between three types
of conceptual contents. When
join two ideas together to form
a composite idea, the ideas
joined together are conceptual
contents of the composite
foriu,

"...

i

‘'ill

ths composite.
in a square

,

call these contents

*

the primary contents’

of

In my composite idea of a triangle
inscribed

the primary contents are the ideas of
being

182

inscribed

m

a square and

being a triangle.

The composite idea
formed as a re
resultsuit of joining the
primary contents tocrethe-r
together h->o
has a content it entails.
1 call
thx.s content the
secondary content. My
ldea of a triangle
inscribed in a square
contains in its secondary
content all
the concepts entailed
by the primary contents
and more.
Since
the concept of having
angles equal to two right
represents
•

,

eCeSSary Mature of triangles
and, therefore, of
triangles
inscribed in squares, this
concept is part of the secondary
content of my idea.
But this content also contains
ideas not
contained in the primary
contents themselves. The
geometer
uncovers the secondary content
when he demonstrates what is
true of triangles inscribed
in squares
Although what, is
necessarily true of triangles and
necessarily true of things
inscribed
squares is also necessarily true of
triangles
Ar^uibvJu in unis way, what is necessarily
true of these
“

r

'

.

m

-inscribed triangles may be untrue
of uninscribed triangles and

figures inscribed in squares generally.

Strictly speaking,

is the secondary content that is
the content of a composite
idea.
besides the primary and secondary contents,
there is
-it

What
mind

1

cal1 a ‘tertiary content*.

dependent entities.

ldeas ot a thinker.

believes
cern us

..in

idea

For Descartes, ideas are

There are no ideas that are not

The tertiary content is what the thinker
to entail.

This content may include con-

that are not part of the secondary content.

The thinker

may believe the secondary content of his idea to contain

183

concepts it really
does not contain
-oncepts representing
contingent or neces^ari -- e-,-i
false Properties of
the object of
" 1S idea
If 1 think that my
idea of1 a tr„r gle
i
trian
inscribed in
a square contains
the concent
v
Cep " S ° f beln ted
or having angles
9
equal to 190 dear«^<=
n ule tertlar
Y content of my idea con
+
C ° nCeptS n0t
the secondary content.
1

— ^

1

'

•

'

.

“

-

In composite fictional
ideas, the primary
contents ar „

not necessarily
connected with each other.
The difficulty
WlUl SU ° h idGaS 15 that
the P ers °n having them
may not realize
that their contents
represent particulars that
are really
-

ai.j-i.ng

to realize that the
represented particulars

are not necessarily
connected, he may make the
mistake
thinking that what xs true
of the one particular is
true of
the other.
He may, for example,
ascribe to the square what
Je ^“ g0 V ° tr ^gles aIonc?
and to triangles what
belongs to
squares alone, 4 3 Speaking
in a characteristically
Cartesian
v;e can say that
composite fictional
irip-r
Lor)c 1 laecis-^
provide mater-

.*

‘

ia1

fo r
y

error**

1CLlCn

'

?

i

4

*

m

ide^is

the second sense also provide
material

° nly °? e ° f the ideas
joined to°form the^omp!^
5
° be con tmgently connected
with the ovher
n°
" cxv e to .^ e contingently
connected
with each ott^r~i-hr
U
C ase or my ldeas of an
inscribed trianqi« ard
••mv /uhorse nowever, the
primary contents happen
to
-dn-"nci n??L
eCte<^ Wlth
oth ~'
either "on
cept%nt^ils^the' other?
r

,

•<

.

.

,

'

44..

h® Fourth Re P ly Descartes says,
"Certain ideas are
6
accordi ng to my interpretation, that
Ro Judgement with material for
error." hr ii
wh ra esc frtes uses the term
'material
?
falsity
f
|:

*

t

°
J

ra -/lC''

.

;:;.r

’

i

‘-c^tnctively, however.

’

5

See HR I, 16 4,

for error.

An idea X will be
fiction-!
notional

incons istGrit

v

-

n

•

if and only if x
—
•

’

n

contingently connected
with some idea
belonging to
s tertiary content.
Descartes- fictional
idea,
or an inscribed
triangle is nonfictions^
because this idea
entails all the ter
! sru
tertiary
contents it Viliams
* Te
contain
Necessarily
connected with, its t-prHam
tertrary content,
Descartes' idea can be
aaid to be an idea of
a true and immutable
nature.
Not everyone's idea of
an inscribed triangle
is an
Adea ° f 3 trU ° and
irmutable "«ture in the
second sense, however.
In Principle LIV
Descartes tells
LJij us
i-h-t we can put
Uo that
fictional content into our
idea of God. 45 We aake
our ldsa
fictional when we include
in this idea contents
which do not
pertain "to the nature of an
absolutely perfect Being. ,,46
There seems to be no reason
why we cannot in the very
same way
put neuronal content into any
idea we have regardless of

,

1-

,

.

,

•

whether that idea is fictional
or nonfictional in the first
Whether our xaea is fictional,
or nonfictional, we
make our idea fictional., when
we include among its tertiary
contents ideas it does not entail.
if ray jdea of an inscribed
triangle contains in its tertiary
contents ideas representing
contingent features of inscribed triangles,
then
,

my idea is

fioLrouc.i^.

sat if this same, idea contains in
its tertiarv
U.

con ten

i.

only necessary features of inscribed
triangles, then

my idea is nonfictional^

,

and it is an idea of a true and

immutable nature in the second sense.
45

HR I, 241

46

Ibid
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Looking back at the
passage cited above 7
/ we can see
that Descartes is
misleading us. Speaking
first of his idea
Of an inscribed
triangle, he tells
18 us ^,
4
lU
that
this
idea does not
contain a true and immutable
nature.
Speaking next of his
° f 3 triangle
suggests that this idea
does contain
such a nature. Juxtaposing
his remarks in this way,
Descartes
gives the impression that
he is contrasting these
'

.

.

.

^

'

two ideas

cl lid

that h.0

f fl

O' p r» r
°

*£*a\v

«

US to

, ,

•«.

the term "true and immutable

nature" univocally to both.
Ihe impression Descartes
conveys is,

PreSSi ° n

AlthOUgh Descar tes

*

'

I

think, a misim-

remarks suggest that his idea

Of an inscribed triangle
is fictional, and that
his idea of
a t ri angle is nonf'.ict
h i. s for filer,
•

idea is fi

non f .ictional-

Wh at

.

fol low! ng two clai ms

CO There

a re

:

f i.c
'2

12

)

The re are non
:

'1

De scare es

'

ide a of a

example of. .an idea that is both fictional
-

L

and nonfictional
2

Although its primary contents are not
necessarily connected
V/1U1

aeon other, its tertiary contents
include only concepts

lep ..esc. iud ng j>ecessarv reatures of
triangles inscribed in
47

See pp

.

15 9 *-160 above.
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squares 48

—
~~

highlights some
difficulties° Vvluh
v f-h
n
Descartes'
view
ideas
1 am not sure
whether
s «**.
hj
oa
a triangie
has
or „ hethor hs
thinks ‘triangle’ is
-.=«!<=»
* name
lo a
expressing the idea of
a threesided figure so that
the iflcac
,*
at 0i bein?
three-sided and being
« lmi
„
figured constitute the
"
primary content of his
idea.
I am inclined
to adopt, the latter
view because I thin),
that he would want
to say that n
< .
,
h -->
de of, an inscribed
±a.ed
r i an q 1 e was
pin10nal
SVen lf he renamed it,
say, a 'scril
triangle
But
e r
“terpreting Descartes correctly,
we
can easily give an
example to show
now that (2 is true.
t
Although
Descartes -iapn or atriangle is nonfict.ional
it i
his idea of a triangle
contains as its primary
contents the
rdcas of being figured
and being three-sided.
But we can
easily conceive of figure*
-3 r^-. th
tx.cil. are not
three-sided so that
f he primary contents nf y
^
-uu.o oi Descartes
y
comnn^ifo
ouinpooi u8 idea are nor
necessarily connected with each
other. 49 Like Descartes'
0
a winged horse and
an inscribed triangle,
Descartes'
idea of a triangle is fictional
(2)

_

'

;::°7
;

-

•

,

'

-

./

..

-

*-

•

'

„

“

•;

•

.

»

.

...

.

,

m
>

'

.

+.

•

*.

r-

,

1

1

. .

.

1

Po c a rt e s

’

- 131—

•

me
1
for a scertaining the two
l^.ui9d.
types of
:Et is important
to realize that

Descartes

is using the- same method
to ascertain whether ideas are
4S
+

.

rr .x,.

„
....

49

_c-

,

as unK
f

:

7

that Descartes, the geometer,
includes in ttm
oi his idea, only concepts his
idea entails.

7'd. though the idea of being
three-sided entails the id^
t-emg figured, the ent ailment does not
run the other way.

.

.
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fictional

j

nr

n the
nt fir-f
°t and second sense
a^ube.

wh-nwnat changes are
ideas to whi ch Oescart.es
iipcipari-o^
apples his method. when
he
applies hj.s method to the
primary contents
tenus 01
ot a composite
idea,
lie finds out
^ whetherwne t*ier tms composite
fi
f sue i**
is national
or an idea
of a true and immutable
nature in the xrrs-L
first sense
„
* find
To
out
whether this same idea is
fictinmi
tional
or nontictional
•

mrr

.

he

2

applies the same method to
see
" whe^h^-r
h--„ idea
„
eLner h±s
is not necessarily connected with any
of its tertiary contents.

^

•

Regardless of whether Descartes
is trying to ascertain
if a composite idea i s ti r,+ onn
1 totronalp or r->
fictional
his fundamental task is the same
he must ascertain whether
certain
i<3ea " dLe nece
a ^-ly or contingently
connected.
The method
Descartes uses to reveal such
connections is his method for
ascertaining what he calls real
distinctions. This method
dees double duty therefore-, it
identifies both fictional
composites^ and fictional composites
-i'

1

,

:

^

'

—

SiarilZ and distinctness and the fic tional and
•

Descartes

'

nonf.i c-

remarks in Principle LIV suggest that

We would be mistaken if we adopted
the view that a composite
idea is clear and distinct if and only
if it is nonfictional
He says
e

C

^ ar

and distinct idea of an

T *.?.
^dependent
thinking substance, that

1

is to say,

of God,

we do not suppose that this idea represents
to us ail that is exhibited in God, and
that we do not
mingle anything fictitious with it, but simply attend
to
vviu.t io evidently contained in the
notion, and which we
are aware pertains to the nature of an absolutely
perfect

188

Being. bu
-scarce*,

language here is cumbersome,
and it raises two
difficulties for our
understanding when it is
that a composite
idea is clear and
distinct.

r-o

The first difficulty
arises because Descartes
may seem
be stating at least
a sufficient condition
for having a
a-Lo-Li.net

idea.

But on closer inspection,
it is
plain that ha is not
giving- us* this
un
much
mucn
T n~+i
Instead,
-

he is stat-

•

ing a sufficient: and
perhaps a necessary condition
for being
haVS 3 Clear and distinct
idea.
Descartes' remarks'
do not rule out the
possibility that we can have
nonfictional
loeas that are obscure or rnr-fncori
lilusea,
oince the method of
difference can show us only
o 11r iceas are
XY that our
nonfictional,
this method may
on a- much
ul acccrnrhi
acv-crupiish
y not
as we might hope.
For
a.j-1 we know,
it cannot by itself tel'
_ r
-- - nrp
Uo w
which
of
our composite
ideas are clear and distinct

—-

i

.

1

J

i-,

;

i,

The second difficulty with the
above quotation arises
because we have no way of telling
whether ideas which have
fictitious content mingled with them
are fictional.,
,

fictional^

ACtionai^ or fictional^, or both fictional.,
and fictional
This difficulty is not serious,
however.
2
In what
follows, it wiJl become evident that we can drop
the distinci..itnei.

i.

.

tion

v. ....

n

c.'r.as

that are fictional^ and fictional
2

.

Then

we will be able to say that an idea is
clear and distinct only

I,

241.

Emphasis mine.

189

this distinction and
say that an idea which
is either fictional,
° r flctlonsl
2 Prides material for error.

toalytical c l e a rness and

^inctnegs.

a contains no material
for error.
i.^

A nonfictional

It is nonfictional
only

if

necessarily
„
ui i u each
eccea Wlth
* conner'r<=a
idea contained in
its tertiary content and
only if its primary contents
are
necessarily connected with each
,

-

other.

.

..

In some ideas the

requisite necessary connections
will hold, in others not.
The determining factors are
the analysis of the idea
and the
analysis we give it
the primary, secondary, and
tertiary
contents.
If the primary contents
are not necessarily connecbl
ted with each other
or if the tertiary content is
not a subset of the secondary content,
then the .-idea is fictional and
obscure or confused.

—

0311 this mods of obscurity or
confusion 'analytical
obscurity or confusion'. This name seems
appropriate because
1

'

it is the analysis of the idea

we
iaeu
*

11 eve it to have

;

an a.:.ytic ally obscure

.is

—

—

the parts it has and the

that determines whether the

03:

analytically clear and distinct

confused or what

I

call

1

.

xt is not clear whether simple ideas
have primary concartes does not tell us how simple ideas orig
in oil' mur-ds
On my interpretation simple ideas have
ouu it does not fol.lov; that these ideas are produced parts,
as a result
01. a mi/Jci joining other ideas
together. For" the purpose of
mis paper I will adopt the view that simple ideas have no
primary contents. Lacking such contents, they cannot be
rot: onalp , and J will stipulate them all to be nonfictional
•

1

>

.

,

l-h

i

52 Analytically

clear and distinct .ideas need not be clear

190

HI.

ANALYTICAL CLEARNESS
AND DISTINCTNESS
1'N

COMPOSITE IDEAS

Following oho stiatogy
wo have outlined, we
will now

“ ““
thou.,

aie

“

- «*

types o, oo.po.lt.

fictional and analytically
clear and distinct
SinCS ° Ur Strate9y
° 0nf °- S
one Descartes himself
adopts
we can follow his
discussion of the various
types of composite
iaoa as he applies his
method
° a tor
tofor ascertaining
a real distinction to each.
jin nrHor T
i.o russ rhe real,
composites, the
modal composites, and the
composites of reason.
nor,

^

•

r

S££ 6rt
--

^

•

V..

SSSSSfl °£ analysis when applied to real

’

comoosx_tes.

When Descartes applies his
method of analysis to
a real composite, he
finds that the ideas joined
together are.
as he says, really distinct.
Two ideas are really distinct
if we can conceive of the
objects of these ideas existing
separately. b
We can think of objects
existing separately that
arc not separated in fact,
however.
But Descartes tells us
that such objects are really
distinct because whatever we
can conceive to exist separately,
God can really separate. 54
Descartes' method for showing ideas to
be really distinct
is not to be confused with the
method for forming what
j

'

Descarte,

call.s

'an

intellectual abstraction".

a ii d d i s t i n o t
b 3

54

,

h ow e ve r

HR

I,

24 3-

HR

1,

190

.

He says:
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A real distinction 'cannot
,,
be inferr^a
ie thing is conceived
apart
annfhov by means Vnat
from another
°J
of the
°f
.

id^a^ joined together in a
real composite are intellectually abstracted when one
diverts his attention away from on
ne
of the ideas and concentrates
it on the other,
By so doing,
one can intellectually abstract
ideas that are not really diotinct.
If he confuses his ability
to abstract ideas with his
abalrty to make real distinctions,
he is liable to think that
what ha can conceive separately is
actually separable. He

might think that figures can actually
exist apart from the
substances of which they are figures. But
he would be mi .stakes
One avoids such mistakes if he uses
Descartes' method
of analysis correctly. Used correctly, this
method shows him
..hat

his substance-substance idea of a winged horse
is really

distinct because he can think of winged objects
that are not
horses and of horses that are not winqed. ‘Mode of
substance
1

-substance

ideas and mode of substance -mode of substance
1

2

ideas are also shown by Descartes’ method of analysis to be

really disrinct.

I

can conceive of myself to be shaped

differently from a beer barrel, and
shaped things that are not me.
-

shaped

>'i 'ce

I

can think of beer barrel

Similarly,

I

can think of things

apples that are not pear colored and of pear colored

'NR II,

•

97

See also UR II

.

22

19 2

thlngS that arS n0t
Sh

^

lik *

-PPU-

APPlying the 8ame
attribute of substance
-sub s tance syntheses
1
and
2
f-o attribute
of substance -attribute
of substance
oUDouancc compos i tes
L
1 can show that
these
do-,~ also
6 lde<1S
l° ln ^g^her ideas that
are
really distinct.
-

:

•

•

Using the method for
ascertaining
--taming a real distinction,
we show that every subtype
of the real composite
ideas is
fictional^
Depending on the analysis
we give of the ideas
rn question, these ideas
may
e notional
fiction -,1
1 be
as well.
But they
need not be.
'

.

~~
When

show

X

-

.yjai

a teal

tiomposite ide a is fictional

can conceive of the
objects of ideas as existing
separately, I have provided
what we can call a minimal
proof
Of a real distinction. The
minimal proof is not the best
proof, however.
As Descartes tells us,
"There is no better
pro or of the distinctness of
the two things than if, when
we
study each separately, we find
nothing in the one that does
not differ from what we find
in the other. 56 Examples
Descarte
uses suggest that he is giving the
term 'in' here a technical
I

sense
s

'

'-

ec! li)lca

l

-

I

Descartes says:
OJ

sense appears in Principle LVI
But when we consider su

:

1

1
1

'

<

,

Here

1

'

•

:

,

1

named _as

of such and such a kind, we shall use
5
Lae word
gualities [to designate the different modes which
cause it co ne so termed]; and finally when
we more oe.nor axly consider that these modes or
qualities are in

‘

5C

HR II, 102

.

substances we term them
att ribut es 57
.

Ordinarily, we say that
properties belonging to
an object are
° bjeCt
BUt ln thS
quotation, Descartes uses
tne tern 'in' more
restrictively. Continent
'•(-iK.ingent. properties
modes and qualities
are not in the substance
they modify.
Since Descartes reserves
the term 'in' in this
sense for attributes
necessary features of the
object modified
we
can take Descartes to
be using 'in' to mean
"in the nature or
essence of."

^

‘

-

-

-

If Descartes means by

'in'

"

in the nature or e£sence
Qf „

when he discusses the best
proof of a real distinction,
then
is t'-ilmg us that there
is no better proof of the
distinctness of two things than
if, when we study each
separately, we
find nothing in the essence
of the one that does not
differ
from what we find in the
essence of the
other.

—

Sfisessite idea of an em bodied t hinker

Descartes
uses the best proof possible to
show that his ideas of mind
ana body are really distinct. He
.

says:

x

understanci. in a complete manner
what body is [that .is
6
f
aS a
mpl te lhin * ] ' merel
bv

4

Y
S°
ana by denying of it everything
which beloncrs ro b, P
C ° nv
sel Y also 1 understand that mind"
f
Co^kU. which
h- doubts,
knows, wishes, etc., although
^ ~cono?et
an Y thjgg belongs to it which is
contained in
tV
'•lit’
j.o.ea

thin^-nrthat it

et.c,

-

-

,

o

l

Doo.y

Here Descartes gives the best proof
possible that mind and
57
r
.3

HR I, 241-242.
,

o

O

"HR II,

22-23.

E mp basis mine.

“
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-ody are really
distinct.
n0t bel ° ng t0 the

—

4

Whatever belongs to
the essence of

-

^

and Vice versa,
composite idea formed
u
-a-i.
ov
joining together realjv
distinct ideas is
fictional,, Descartes' i fl
*
x ^ oa
1
an embodied
t. inker is
fictional, as well.
s the

v

.

.

.

,

Recognizing that this
idea is -hic-Liona.i.^
fictions!
n
Descartes
is
in a position to
avoid
° of judgement
he might otherwise
have made. He will
not~ attr-'bir
-^ +to
~ the
v
lbUue
™-nd what he believes
,

-

1

"

Paln
n.

“

"

° f th

°^ ht

r*
n his bodv
qn
-ecause,
Y bp

mind.

Ho can. how^v^T*
W ',er
'

he will not judge the
pain to

'

~
as
a mode of thought,
,,

‘

it is in his

a£,crlbe essential features
of mind
•

i

ana essential features
of body to a r'Oison
Mr ,, n
a union of mind
and body. A person is
extended and does think,
-*

—-—-2

Cl

iJPlEOSite ideas with analytic al
claritv
"
Although all real composite
ideas

— ^MnetiSH.

’are

fictional^ we can perceive them
clearly and distinctly if

Wft

are cautious.

We must use Descartes' method
for ascertaining
a real distinction and
adjust the tertiary content of cur
xctea until our idea is
nonfictions^
Using the content of
our nonf ictional idea.,, we can
restrict our judgement in such
a way that wo cannot err.
If I a m a geometer whose idea
of
an inscribed triangle is nonf
ictional.,, then I include
.

in the

-..rt.U.ry
1
'

content of my idea only concepts
representing necaj.e.j.

I

appropriately restrict my judgement when

P c.:vl'.cat e these features of inscribed
triangles.

X

fail tc

restrict my judgement if

I

predicate of triangles Qr

,

f

rbed figures necessary
features of inscribed triangles
or if
1 PrCdiCatC 01 inSCrlbed
tri -^.es features not
represented
by a concept contained in
the tertiary content of
my nonfictional
ro-ea
Descartes would say that we
2
must train our win
oarfaculty of affirmation and
denial
to act in accordance with
our understanding.

-

,

-

J

n this chapter we are
reviewing what Descartes says

about the composite ideas in the
hope that his remarks will
shed light on that aspect of
clarity and distinctness that I

Can
.uiea

ana ly 1Cal clarit and distinctness.
Y
'

'"

So far

we.

have exam™

L he

real composite ideas,, and we have
learned this much.
Although ail real composite ideas are
fictional.^, we can adjust
then r tertiary contents so as to
make them nonfictional

^cartes' Method

—

E££ites.

o.'uice

ideas

ideas.

of analysis when a pplied to modal

Having completed my discussion of the real
comp,

1

proceed to an examination of modal composite

Here our analysis must become more complicated.

Des-

cartes was able to use one method to show that all
his real

composite ideas were fictional.

composites

,

however, he modifies his method to fit the subtype

under consideration.

Descartes
n
l

1

£ d l: compos iter-:.

asc-rj.rt.ai

When he considers the modal

Let us examine each subtype separately.

method oc ana lysis when applied to substance-

Although Descartes thinks his method for

nu ng a real

distinction does not show sub stance -mode

composites to be fictional

,

he thinks a modification of this

196

^®4-hoci

achieves

thic:

“ can cal1 this

modified method.

Descartes

procedure for ascertaining
a quasi-real
distinction
A composite idea is
q uasi-reali y distinct provided
that one
of its primary contents
is neceqnrP«
e-essarily connected with
che
other but not vice vpr?a
p„i.
x
ei ° a
Substance-mode composites are
x
quas ~rea 1 ly distinct
at
j-Vi
u
ilLn
ough
i cannot conceive
of a mode
existing apart from its
substance, I can conceive of
the substance existing without its
59
mode.
My ideas of a substance
and its modes are contingently
connected, and like all such
ideas are fictional
'

r-

,

-

‘

’

-

1

JL

applied to Mode-mode composites

Since Descartes does not
explicitly recognize the attribute
“•mode composite
we will have to speculate about
what account
he rould gxve or such an idea.
I imagine he would
think modes
of attributes cannot be conceived
as existing apart from the
attributes they modify. He would, no
doubt, think I was
,

tal.,..,..ig

111

uvRben.",e if I saici,

Vvhxch

logically,

"T am conceiving a state of affairs

exists apart from a thinker who is thinking
On the other hand.

‘

I

can think of a state of

affairs where thinking goes on that is not
logical.

Although

attribute- mode composites are not really
distinct, they are
quas i •—re a 1 Xy distinct. Like the other two
types of modal
synuruisrs f the attribute-mode, composite is
fictional**i
-

59 .

HR

1,

'

244.
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GS

~~"

~

to

opposite

i deas

of

reason.

Although both the real and
modal composites are
rictional,, Descartes think,
the ideas of reason
are nonficticnal
We
were
able to show the real and
1
modal composites
to be fictional^ because
we could in each case
show that ideas
joined together to form, the
composite were contingently
connected. With ideas of
reason, however, Descartes
thinks the
primary contents are always
necessarily connected with
each
other.
they are neither really
nor quasi-really distinct.
.

As Descartes says

iaCUOn ° f raasoni is rnde manifest
from the
that we cannot have a clear
and
°
a substance if we exclude
Sacn
from it sueb'a- o.t.
f^
tym
l
Lj.
_.t
ate
or
we cannot have a rioa^
a
oleaj idtja of the one of the
two attH~
bnteo
f ..1
r
t
h
es
S
e
^°
which do^s not ceasTto
exis whe^
1
fact
act

?w

[

5

.

,

'

;

•;

-

^

1

SsLnL

SHHa a muu
.

thought and from each other in a
common object. 60
net us apply Descartes' remarks
here to each type of idea of
reason

Descartes’ method w he n applied to su bstan
ce- attribute.

Descartes tells us that we cannot conceive
of a
possible state of affairs in which an attribute
and
^HlEpsj^tes.

its sub-

stance exisr in separation.

Like any property, an attribute

cannon ror Descartes exist apart from the
substance it modrfies.

In turn the substance modified cannot exist
without

the attribute modifying it.

Since attributes are necessary

'

19 8

features of the substances they
modify, these substances
cease
to exist as the substances
they are, when any attribute
of
thera is removed.
In Descartes' view substances
and their
attributes are not separable by
either a real or a quasi-real
distinction

Descartes' method when applied to
a t tribu te -attr ihu

SH^osites.

Descartes thinks that two attributes
A, and ft,
of a substance S cannot be
separated by a real or a quasi-real
distinction. Although A., and
can be conceived to he
attributes of different substances that
exist apart, a of S
and
of S cannot.
To think of A, of s as existing apart
from A of S, I must thlink of A as modifying
something other
2
than S. But, then i t is not A of
£ I conceive as existing
2
apart from
of S'.

^

,

.

Descartes' analysis here can be questioned.

thinking of my extension and my duration,

I

If

am

I

can certainly

think of myself having my extension and a different duration
ana vice versa.
inodes

o.L

me

,

Perhaps these individual properties are

nowever

.

But as a material body,

do have the

I

attributes of being extended and having duration.

Yet

easily conceive of myself as unextended and enduring
soul that thinks

,

Initially, the substance modified was

Now the substance modified is

body.

stance

.

—

can

I

a

But Descartes could reply that the at tribute

or having duration is not an attribute of the self

be me.

-Just

I

I

I

took to

as a material

as an immaterial sub-

If Descartes

argument is sound,
attribute-attribute
composites have primary
contents that are
necessarily connec'-tu each other,
tike the substance-attribute
composite
they are nonfictional
'

.

bhascartes; method when

allied

If being non-black
is

color red

,

then the idpo
Jca r°,-pf

a

to mode- attribute com

necas-rv reature
necessary
„
of the

rea non-blaok thing
is a mode-at
tribute-- composite
The primary contents of
such composites
cannot be separated by a
real or quasi-real
distinction.
if
I think of a red
thing which is not non-black,
then it is a
brack rather tha.11 a red thincr t
i
in mg I am tninkmg
of.
I-ike the
substance-attribute and the
—
attribute-att-iWo
uLi.r id u lg s vnt-ho S 0
the mode-attribute syntheses
are nonfictional
a

.

a

•

i
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.

go nflctiona lx composite ideas.
son are epistemically
preferential.

Composite ideas of rea-

Because real and modal

composites have contingently
connected primary contents,
these composites are fictiona^
and provide material for error.
When judging about the objects
of these

ideas, we must,

Descartes believes, be especially
careful,
.ideas of reason,

with composite

we can be less cautious, however.

Since the

primary contents of these ideas arc
necessarily connected,
these ideas are nonfiction^.
Descartes thinks their primary
contents do not give us material for error.
comp osite ideas

.

Although Descartes be-

lieves the primary contents of ideas of reason
to provide
no material for error, composites of reason
can contain other
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contents that provide
such material.

We can include ficticConcepts in the tertiary
content of our ideas, i»
this
respect composite ideas
of reason are no better
than real and
modal composites. There
is only one way to
assure ourselves
that our composite ideas
are nonfiction^.
Wo must painstak _.
mgly apply Descartes' methods
for ascertaining real and
quasi-real distinctions to each
idea contained in the tertiary
content. Whenever we find
our idea to be contingently

-us

conned

ted with any of its tertiary
contents, we must remove these.
Carrying out the process of
reduction Gewirth mentions, we end
up With a composite idea that
is necessarily connected
with
each idea included in its
tertiary content..

When the idea reduced in this
way is a composite of
reason, the idea is analytically
clear and
distinct.

^

c' or,W-din

within itself

materia..]

for error

.

if

i

It does

restrict

my judgements about the object of my
composite idea and prodcate of this object only properties
represented in the tertiary content, of my idea, I will never
make a mistake, for the
represented properties are necessary features
i.

of this object,

lli'l

the distinction

bcdy.ycen

fictiona l^ a

Although Descartes thinks the composites of
reason are epistemically preferential,

T.

think he is mistaken.

He thinks real and modal composites provide
material for error
that c °^POsites of reason cannot provide. Because
the primary
contents of real and modal composites are contingently connected, wc

are.

in danger of predicating of the object of one
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primary content what is true
of the object of another.
But
this danger is eliminated
if we take exactly the
steps required
to avoid misjudgements
about the objects of composite
ideas
of reason.

First we reduce these ideas
-t-v,-.
as so tint
that they
are necessarily
connected with every concent inn thm* v>
tneir tertiary content. Reduced
ln

r' hl "

Way? our ideas become nonf ictional,^

.

Since we can

carry out the same reduction for
real and modal composites,
v/e can make these
nonfictiona^ as well. Secondly, we must
restrain our judgement by predicating
of the object cf oncomposite idea only features represented
by concepts contained
the adjusted tertiary contents.
But we can exercise the
same restraint when we judge about real
and modal composites.
Restraining our judgement in this way we
automatically avoid
the errors Descartes traces to fictional
ideas

m

,

.

These ideas are dangerous because the unwary
ch inker will
attribute to an object represented by one primary content
what
is true or an object represented by another.

But if we

restrict our judgement by predicating of the object of our

composite idea only features represented by concepts contained
in the adjusted tertiary content, we cannot make such a
mistake.

The judgement we form will always have our composite idea as
its subject concept and a concept beloncring to the t.ertiarv

content as its predicate concept.

Since the subject concept

is necessarily connected with all its tertiary contents,
is necessarily connected with the predicate concept,

it

and the

:02

entire judgement is necessarily
* true
to neutralize

The
c
me same steps
required
+-

•

material for error in fictional
ideas,
neutralizes the material for
error in fictional ideas
Since we safegurad ourselves
from the errors Descartes
traces to fictional ideas^^ when
we protect ourselves against
mistakes arising from ideas that
are fictional^, there seems
to be little point in retaining
the distinction between these
two type* of fictional idea.
Dropping this distinction, I
will say that an idea is fictional
just in case it is fictions.
In this sense all types of
composite idea are on an equal
footing.
Depending on whether we add fictitious
material into
o,.r tertiary contents, our
ideas will or will not represent
true and immutable natures. Those
that represent such natures
313 nonfictional; those that do not are
fictional.
the.

/

IV.

DEFINITIONS RELATING TO ANALYTICAL

CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
We examined the various kinds of composite idea in
the

hope that we would find a type or subtype that is
nonfictional
c,nd

analytically clear and distinct.

Although we failed in

tnis respect, we found out how we can reduce fictional
ideas
i

so as to make them nonfictional.

New we can bdc.in the task

of defining our terms.
vDi)

An idea
tfc

.X

is necessarily connected with an idea Y

is necessary,

of X only if

v.

for any

z

,,

that

is an instance of Y

z

is an instance
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(D2)

An idea X is contingently connected
with an idea Y
Qf

consistent, and X is not necessarily
con-

ti

nected with Y
(D3)

Two ideas X and Y are really distinct =

X is not
df —

necessarily connected with Y, and Y is not
necessarily
connected with X
(L'4)

Two ideas X and Y are quasi-really disi .net =
flf either
X is necessarily connected with Y ar.d
y is not nec-

essarily connected with X or X is not necessarily

connected with Y and Y is necessarily connected with
X
(Dj)

An iaea X is rictional
is hoc

x is inconsistent, or X

necessarily connected with at least one idea

contained in its tertiary content
(D6)

An idea X is nonfictional =
(Y)

dr

X
—

is consistent,

and

(if Y is a concept contained in X s tertiary con’

tent..

(D/)

then X is necessarily connected with

An idea

I

Y)

is analytically clear and distinct =

is nonfictional,

and

x has F necessarily,

(x)(F)

nj .
Q.l

—I

(if x exemplifies I and

then F is part of I’s tertiary

content)
On
AT! CL

{

07)

Descartes

’

idea of a triangle, is analytically clear

distinct if and only if the tertiary content of Descartes'
includes, for every necessary feature of triangles, a

cone apt representing that feature and nothing but concepts

repr eventing such features,
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Besides having analytically
clear and distinct ideas
of
universale like triangles, we
can have analytically
clear and
distinct ideas of individual
things. My idea of myself
is
analytically clear and distinct
provided that, for every necessary feature of me, the
tertiary content of my idea
contains
a concept representing that
feature and only concepts represent
i ng
such features.

—

ytiCall y SiSSE

Having arrived at

<I>7)

,

Mass

and analytically diet j net
ideas.

„e have a convenient way of
distinguish

mg

an analytically clear idea from
an analytically distinct
idea.
Descartes tells us that the distinct
contains nothing

but what is clear and that whatever
is distinct

A 1 though we cannot be sure whether Descartes

.is

clear. 61

is talking about

analytical clearness and distinctness here,
let us assume that
his remarks are applicable.
If this assumption is correct,
I think we can modify some
theories Gew.irth develops.
(D8)

An idea

i

is analytically clear =

(x) (?) (if

df
plifies I and x has F necessarily, then
1

(Df)

’

s

terti ary content °

x exom"

part of

^

An idea X is analytically distinct -

X is nonfic-

df
i

oral

'Compare with Gewirth’s analysis , p.

18 above.

I do not include as a condition that I must be consistent. Since an inconsistent idea cannot be exemplified,
the tin to cedent of the definiens will never be satisfied.
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cutting

(D8)

ana (D9)

together, we get (D7)

an idea X is

:

analytically clear and distinct
if and only if x/
content contains all and only
concepts X entails.

tertiary

s

Although an analytically distinct
idea does contain
nothing but what is clear, we
encounter difficulties with what
appears to be Descartes' belief
that distinctness entails
clarity.
But we can avoid this difficulty
in one of two ways.
We could change (1)9 to (B9
!

}

(° 9

)

)

:

An 1Qea ~ 1S analytically distinct =
O.X

tional and
But now (D9-)

_X

x is nonfic—

is analytically clear

is equivalent to

(D?)

f

and an idea is analytic-

ally clear and distinct just in case
it is analytically

tinct

fiis-

Although this result may seem odd, it is in
keeping

.

with Descartes

'

view that what is distinct is clear, for it

follows rrom this view. that every distinct idea
is clear and
distinct.

But if we do not want to modify (D7) and (D9) in

uhe way suggested, there is an alternative.

chapter
iiss s

.

1
I

tinctness

Later in this

will discuss a second aspect of clarity and distinctcal
.

l

this aspect

’

representational clarity and dis-

In Principle XLVI Descartes tells us that distinct

ness entails clarity, but he does not tell us why he thinks
thus entaxlr

?.nt

holds.

It might turn out that distinct ideas

are clear because all distinct ideas are representationally

distinct, and representational distinctness entails represent-

ational clarity.

If we adopt this view, then we avoid having

to introduce cumbersome revisions of

(D7)

and (D9)

.

For the

Sake ° f SimpliCitY

think it best to avoid these
revisions.

1

'

analytical clearness^ and distinctne
ss.
Having defined analytical
clarity and 'analytical distinctness', we can see that one
who has an analytically clear
or
analytically distinct idea may fail
to perceive
!2i£h

•

it to be

h±S lciea m:Lght

S °‘

'

for example, be non.fictional
since he

includes in its tertiary contents
only concepts representing
necessary features of the object of
his idea.
But he might
not recognize

,

for each concept included in the
tertiary con-

tent of hls idea

ma ^

m

*'°

a

that his idea entails that concept.

'

tiave an

He

analytically distinct perception he is

position to have.
VJe

can now define the expressions ’perceiving with
ana-

lytical clarity
(DIO)

1

and ’perceiving with analytical distinctness

A person A perceives his idea

clarity

I

I

with analytical

is analytically clear, and

(x) (F)

(if x exemplifies I and x has F necessarily,

then

A recognizes that x has F necessarily and that F is
represented by a concept included in I's tertiary
content)
(Dll)

A person A perceives his idea X with analytical dis-

tinctness

X is analytically distinct, and for

every idea contained in X

s

s

tertiary content, A

recognizes that X is necessarily connected with tha

j
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MINIMAL ANALYTICAL CLEARNESS
AND DISTINCTNESS
To acquire an analytically
clear and distinct
idea X,
must include in x'^“ tpri-is^r
rLlari content all the
concepts contained in X s secondary
content
cnr and oni
J
only such concepts
But
the concepts X's secondary
content includes
J-

4-

!

'

may,

be greater

m

for all *

number than the concepts
contained in the
tertiary content o £ mv iden
t mn,,
v
a/ have
an analytically clear
and distinct idea but be 'mahio
ab^e r.o Know with certainty
that
1 d °'
ReC ° gniZing this difficulty,
Descartes thinks we can
got by with less than
analytically clear and distinct
ideas
^
— v*
1
C cl
V
q
"
u
1Q dlstlnc t perception
What we need
oatisfy j.s waat Gewirth calls
a minimal requirement.

^

VX.

<51

J‘

/'x *1
v

1"

rj

•

,

4

,

e

M?

.g

ua te kiiowledqe,

In the Fourth Replies,

Descartes
tells Arnauld that we know an
object adequately only if we
know "all the properties which
exist in the thing known." 64
1 take Des ° artes t° be
usi »g ’in’ here in the technical
sense
elucidated above. 6 " Our knowledge is
adequate only if the
tertiary contents contain explicitly
all the essential concepts
and all the concepts these entail.
Although the explicit
tertiary contents will contain all the
essential concepts, the
concepts these entail may be infinite in
number so that I can
never be
a position to know whether the secondary
contents
or my idea exceed the tertiary contents.
I may perceive a

m

HR II, 97
to

S©e pp

.

1 9

2" 1.9 3 above

20 G

composite idea adequately
out ue
be ™-,m„
y but
unable ito know with certainty
that my perception is
adequate.

—

SaESSSSSEt for Clarity

.
Although we may
not be able to know with
certainty whether we are
perceiving
adequately, Descartes tells
us that «an adequate
knowledge is
to
not required. "
*«_ something
We- can settle for
less -- a knowledge that is complete and
not inadequate 67 Intuitively,
What W ° are a£ter are concepts
that will provide us with
no
mat-r..al fo. tuor than we
make judgements about the
objects
of these concepts.
I safeguard myself
against error when I
adjust the tertiary content of
my idea so as to make this conten
complete and not inadequate.
.

.

'-

Descartes

1

account of completeness is vague.

He tells

us unar. “by a complete thing
I mean forms or attributes
which
suffice to let me recognize that it
is a substance. 68
But he

qualifies his account by saying that
incomplete entities
properties -- can also be completely known. 5
Here Descartes
is speaking about complete and
incomplete entities, but r
wili extend his remarks so that we can talk
about complete
and incomplete concepts.
Although I am not sure what Descartes
means by ‘completeness
I will adopt an interpretation

—

'

!

,

p
uj,
r

r

t Jy

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

f

97.

f

pp.
p.

9

7-98.

93.

Gewirth

suggests

an idea is complete
gust in case its tertiary
con .
t-ent contains
explicitly all its essential
concepts. 70
:

in this sense all
ideas are, as I understand
Descartes,
complete.
Replying to Gassendi,
Descartes says:
In attacking mv

~

statement
S£?tina taken away from 'tlUutea^^f
co have attended
011 Sci 1

/0 ”

appear not
Philosophers
that the essence of thTn^q
V 2?
idee, represents ?he
For the
essence^f’
,10g
arid it somatiling is added to it
;,
or ~subtr-ct-d
Xt ls forth ”
with the idea of somethin7
so
J t
LS thus that
all false Gods ^re DO rt-^
the true God aright;
0
0
But" aiter th^iLrof^h^t^
"
uew Gj the tiue God
is once conceived
f
i. «i Ch
•£ 5* »•*«•*
-

araoa<?

•'

'

-•

-

-

~'

y

.

.

"

.

^®^

-

ssi.;s,ss ;sas

.

,

Here Descartes tells us that
our ideas "represent the
essence
of things.”
If we take away from or add
to the concepts representing essential features, our
idea becomes a representation
72
of something else.
nut are the essential concepts
of the idea contained
in the tertiary content, as I
believe? Descartes' remarks
~ogo'-.
t.:at. they are.
In the above passage, ho seems
to
Gewirth, pp. 260-2C2.
I distinguish essential conce-ea
* r m concepts that are entailed
-2
?
by 'but do not on-*
.
?atf^f
tar, the essential concepts.
See p. 2
above.
X is necwith its essential concepts and with the
"ftltd;- Recced
CS " en a l7"
'
But to be complete, X does not have to
- V
roncepts xn its tertiary contents.
Only the
f
esse.nc.ial
concepts must be contained.
,

.

: -

7

HP.

7?
l? 1

W(

c

1

'

>

II, 22 0.

tnout changing what our ides is s representation of,
course, add concepts the es nti<
concept
,
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be distinguishing between
the explicit and implicit
contents
of ideas.
"After the idea of the true
God is once conceived,"
we can detect in our idea
perfections that were "not
previously
noticed" and that do "not cause
any increase in the

idea."
We conceive the true God when
we conceive Him explicitly
as an
omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent,
and inflate being.
If I conceive Him otherwise,
it is not God my idea
represents.
But once I do conceive God
correctly, I can detect in Him perfections
necessary features
I did not notice before,
i discover tnat the
essential concepts contained in the tertiary content of my idea entail other
concepts.
These concepts,

—

—

which represent necessary features of
God, are then added to
out do not increase the tertiary content
of my idea because
these newly discovered concepts were
implicitly contained all
along
On my

complete:

1.0

ierpret ation of the above passage, all ideas are

they all contain their essential concepts as part

of their tertiary content.

besides.

But this content may contain more

It may also contain contents entailed by the essentia

concepts and contents representing features that are not necessarily connected with the object of my idea.
that

I

Recognizing

may have included fictional content among the tertiary

contents, I may try to improve my understanding by eliminating
any such content.

But if I use the wrong method,

I

could con-

fuse a fictional content either with an essential concept or
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with an idea an essential concept
entails.
To see whether an idea is or is not
necessarily connected
with a concept contained in its tertiary
content, I mast use
Descartes' method for ascertaining real
or quasi-real distinctions.
1
fail to use his method when I intellectually
abstract
7 5
necessarily connected ideas
Intellectual abstractions are
dangerous because I am liable to think that
ideas separable
in thought represent objects separable in
fact.
And if, as
*

.

a result of intellectually abstracting,

judge a non fictional

I

content of my idea to be fictional, then, in
Descartes' view,
I

render my complete knowledge inadequate

plete knowledge that is not inadequate,

I

4
.

must

To have a comhave, an

idea

thac contains in its tertiary content all the essential concepts

and only concepts these entail, and

I

must recognize, for each

such concept, that my idea is necesssrily connected with that

concept
Using the above analysis of Descartes' distinction between

complete and adequate knowledge we arrive at the following

definitions
(D12)

An idea X is minimally analytically clear ~ f X is
d
consistent, and X

s

s

tertiary content contains all

X'

essential concepts
(D13)

A person A perceives an idea X with minimal analytical

73

For a discussion of intellectual abstractions see
above
74

HR II

,

97-98.

p. 175

0

clarity =
flf

(Y) (if

X is minimally analytically
clear,

Y is contained in

XY s

1

and

tertiary content and

X is necessarily connected
with Y

,

then A recognises

that X is necessarily connected
with

Y)

A1 chough all ideas are minimally
analytically clear, not all
ideas are perceived with minimal
analytical clarity.

Minimal an^ vti ca l distinct ness
:

.

Although all ideas con-

tain all their essential concepts in their
tertiary content,
this content may contain more.
It may contain both fictional
content and content the essential concepts entail.
if fictional
content is included, an idea contains material
for error.
A

minimally analytically distinct idea excludes such
material,
however
(Dj. 4)

An idea X is minimally analytically distinct —
is consistent

X
df -

and X is necessarily connected with

.

every concept contained in its tertiary content

Combining (D12) and (D14)

,

we arrive at the view that an idea

X is minimally analytically clear and distinct, provided that X

is consistent,

and X's tertiary content contains all its

essential concepts and only concepts X entails.

Minimally analytically distinct ideas need not be perceived with minimal analytical distinctness, however.
CD 15)

A person A perceives an idea X with minimal analytical
distinctness =

X is minimally analytically distinct,
Cl A.

and for every concept contained in X

:

s

tertiary con-

tent, A recognizes that X is necessarily connected
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with that concept

A perception that is minimally
analytically distinct is also
minimally analytically clear.
Extending ana lytical clarity and
disti nctness beyond the
Once

clear and distinct idea,
ness beyond the minimum.

I

have a minimally analytically

can increase its clarity and
distinc

I

1

must be cautious, however,

if i
add to the tertiary content of my
idea concepts my idea does
not entail, I render my idea analytically
confused.
If, on the
other hand, I use Descartes’ method to
ascertain concepts

necessarily connected with my composite
idea and

I

add these

t0 the tertiary content, my idea
remains nonfictional and min-

imally analytically clear and distinct.
pe rtain ing to analytical clear ness and
J

(.1)

have two chief goals in this dissertation:

to see whether a satisfactory account of clarity and
dis-

i-ii'ic

-Dess can be devised,

and (ii) to see whether Descartes

gives us an adequate method by which these features can be

ascertained.
I

Half this goal has now been achieved.

Earlier

pointed out that there are two types of clarity and distinct-

ness.

T

have completed my examination of the type

ci.OoilyLj.ca-L

clarity and distinctness*

ented give us the account

I

,

The definitions pres-

have been looking for.

at this account by following Descartes'

call

I

1

arrived

investigation of the

composite ideas he had classified into types and subtypes.
Speaking loosely, we can say that the analytically clear and

distinct ideas are those having
tertiary contents containing
all and only concepts with
which our ideas are necessarily
connected and that the minimally
analytically clear and distinct
ideas are those having tertiary
contents containing all
the

essential concepts and only concepts
these entail.
To find out whether ideas are
minimally analytically
clear and distinct, Descartes uses
his method for ascertaining
real and quasi -real distinctions.
This method is an introspective method of analysis that is
applied to ideas and their contents.
Those ideas whose objects our minds
are unable to conceive as existing apart are, Descartes
thinks, necessarily
connected; those that can be conceived as
existing apart are
Pot necessarily connected.
Descartes uses his method for ascertaining real
and
quasi-real distinctions in t.he Medi tatio ns, and

it is to this

method that he referred Gassendi,

is Descartes guilty of

psychologism in using this method, however?
ainly does contain

a

psychological element.

Ills

method cert-

What we are unable

to conceive as existing apart may in fact be able to
exist

apart.

On the other hand, Descartes' method is not psycholog-

ical in the sense that it is arbitrary.

The inability of the

mind to conceive the objects of certain ideas as existing
separately depends at Least in part on the contents of the
ideas under consideration.

Logical relations holding between

215

the contents of ideas are

determining factor in whether
the
mind is or is not able to
75
disjoin the ideas it has.

75

a

On this point
point, see Gewirth, pp. 276-277.
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CHAPTER VII
REPRESENTATIONAL CLARITY AND DISTINCTNESS

Although we have succeeded in defining
what we mean when
we say an idea is ‘analytically clear
and distinct', there
is

another type of clarity and distinctness
we must now consider
representational clarity and distinctness.
To develop an
account of this mode of clarity and distinctness,
I will first
consider Descartes* notion of material falsity,
a key notion
in his dus cuss ion of clear and distinct
ideas.
To elucidate
what Descartes means by material falsity and to
assist me
in developing an account of representational
clarity and dis-

tinctness,
ideas

.

will focus on what Descartes says about simple

I

concentrate on the simple ideas because Descartes’

I

diseu.osi 0 n

.-3

the account

cf them, provide the best material for developing

want to give of representational claritv and

J

d i s t i n c t n ess.

DESCARTES' CLASSIFICATION OF THE SIMPLE IDEAS

1.

Descartes' best discussions of the simple ideas occur in

passages in the Rules and the Principles

.

In these passages

Descartes distinguishes five types of simple idea,
inteJ

1

Let as

actual
see.

f.R

common, mixed, and privative and negative

,

how Descartes describes each type:

I,

material,

2

38 and 41-12.

^
.

2.17

Material simple ideas are
simple ideas that represent Properties belonging
to material substance
alone.
As
examples Descartes cites the
ideas of figure, extension,
and
2
motion.
(1)

<2)

Intellectual simple ideas are simple
ideas that represent properties belonging to
spiritual substance

alone.
My
ideas of perception, volition,
knowing,' and willing are such
J
ideas
<3)

SiHElS ideas are simple ideas representing
properties that belong to both material
and spiritual

substance
Our ideas of existence, unity, and
duration are such ideas. 4
(4) Mixed simple ideas are
simple ideas that repr<
properties belonging to embodied spirits
but not to material
bodies and spiritual substances taken
separately.
Among these
mixed simple ideas are our ideas of
emotions like anger,
joy.

and sadness, and our ideas of sensations
like pain, color.
2 ..,
icfl/i

One can think of counterinstances to Descartes'
al “ rhat extension and motion are properties
of only material
substance. Time is extended and light is in motion.
I do
not know how Descartes would reply to these
criticisms, but
I think it is plausible that he would
claim that light is mat.erici... and mat
'extension' is used equivocally when predicated
op time.
By 'extension' he means "magnitude or extension
in
.length, breadth, and depth."
HR I f 233.
.

L

,

3

.

HR

4

238 and 41-42.

I,
.

1
in the Rules Descartes includes among
P
common simples a class of propositions he calls the common
),r
"
HR I, 41 - 42
In
common notions are, no longer included. '"'See MR I, 238-239.
Following his account in the P rinciples I exclude the common
not. ions from the. list of simple ideas.'
)1

t>ie
’

*

*

f

•

»

.

'

:

.

!

!

.

\

.

,

.

.
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odor, and taste.
(5>

or Erivative simple ideas
do not comprise
a distinct category of
simple idea. Ml ideas
have their corresponding negative or privative
ideas.
if the term <x' expresses my idea X, then 'not-x'
expresses the negative or privative idea corresponding to x 6
.
For Descartes the negations
or privations of simple ideas
are themselves simple ideas.
'.men such an idea is properly
classified, it belongs to the
same type as the idea of which
it is a negation.
strictly
speaking, Descartes recognizes
four, not five, general categories of simple idea.
II.

TYPES OF MATERIAL FOR ERROR
IN THE SIMPLE IDEAS

On the interpretation

I

am developing, there are three

types of material for error, but simple ideas
can have only
two of these.

h

?JL

material for error that simp le

.ideas

cannot

*ave*
a.re

Although on my interpretation of Descartes simple ideas
analyzable' and can be incorrectly analyzed, Descartes

thinks these ideas are epistemically preferential.

In the Rules

he tells us they are "known per se and are wholly free from
falsity.
°
6

6

He is speaking loosely here, however.

I bid

.

,

p

Ibid

.

,

p.

'See pp.

.

238.
42.

16 6-169 above

HR I, 42.

The context
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Of his remarks makes
plain the sense in which
he thinks simple
ideas are wholly free from
falsity.
In the Rules he
proposes
to contrast the simple
ideas with the ideas
compounded out
of them. Although the
simple ideas are "known
per se and are
wholly free from falsity," "the
union of these things one
with
another is either necessary or
9
contingent.
Apparently, simple
ideas are wholly free from
falsity in the sense that they
are
10
all nonf ictional
.

— Bu ria
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for e rror in simple ideas

l

Although
all simple ideas are nonfictions^
they are not free of every
,
sort of material for error:
they can be fictional, if we include in their tertiary contents
concepts they do not entail.
”?teri_al falsity in
cj.e.,r

s

imple ideas

.

.

But even analytically

and distinct simple ideas can contain
material for error.

For Descartes all ideas represent.

"There cannot," he says,

be any ideas which do not appear to
represent some
,,

,.11

u.mgs.
.

.

.

.

But what represents can misrepresent so that,

qua representations
k®

ft

nt at ion

,

1 1v

.ideas can be a

source of error.

They can

obscure or confused.

Descartes calls ideas that contain representational material

.tor

error 'materially false'.

Contrasting formal with

malarial falsity f he says, "Fox although

I

have before remarked

that it is only in judgements that falsity, properly speaking.
^XJh id

1C

11

See footnote 51 in Chapter VI above.

HR

I,

164.
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or formal falsity, can be
met with, a certain material
falsity
may nevertheless be found in
ideas, i.e. when they
represent
'•’hat is nothing as
12
though it were something.
Explicating
this passage, Harry Frankfurt
takes Descartes to mean that
an
materially false if it represents
something that does
x
l

Y :Laed 0± a v/xnged horse is such a mater-

ially false idea.
Descartes' comment on material falsity
is ambiguous.
It
is not clear whether Descartes
means to be stating a sufficient
or a necessary and. sufficient condition
for an idea to be materially false.
If he is merely stating a sufficient
condition, he is not giving ns the full account
of material falsity
that c need
Unfortunately, Descartes does not elaborate on
’

v,

.Qi.s

-

account

,

and we can only speculate.

We want to distinguish questions pertaining to
analytical
cj.ar.iuy

and distinctness from questions pertaining to the ex-

istence of the objects of cur ideas.

For any idea, except our

idea of God, we cannot by simply perceiving with analytical
cl ax icy and distinctness ascertain whether our idea represents

anything that exists.

If we perceive with analytical clarity

and distinctness, we can be sure that, if the object of our
idea exists, it has, as necessary features, the properties

the contents of our idea represent.

What we do not know is

whether our ideas represent anything that exists, and if they
""Ibid
Frankfurt, p. 129.
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do, whether they
represent them accurately.

In Descartes'
vrew we need to find out
whether our ideas are
materially true
materially false. But what
is material falsity?
As a first guess, we
can try attributing to
Descartes
the view that a materially
false idea is one that
provides
material tor °r->*r> rr De^ause
ho-’-u-pr .it
renredon-t-c?
Lt-eoents a particular that
CiOGo no
" Oorr becoUoe rt represents a particular
as existing in a manner in which
it does not.
If pains really exist 14
and I am in pain, then my
idea of my pain is not
materially
false because what my idea
represents exists. But if I form
the idea of my pain as existing
in my foot, then my idea
is
materially false, not because
it represents a particular
that
does not exist, but because
it represents a particular
as exo.-tmu
way it doss not.
a

-

l.

,

v

m

*.

4-

3.

tha strength of these
considerations, we could define
'a

materially false idea' as follows:
(bib a)

A person A has a materially false idea

I

=

(Ex)

[A takes I to represent x but x
does not exist,

or

takes 1 to represent x as having p but x

iE ¥)

does not have F)J 15
1

may b a

A.

tiie

’it

absisn Cc
CD j. o a. )

Gif

pie

an- d

CD1

rep l ose ntat j Q il
Thj s
i Peas can rep y C° ent ob ec
want to be. abl e co make s<
"
The r e. ex i sts an obj ect ip
does not exist
Th is api
pears in one disjunct of (DIG a)
o.c

.

:

i

!l

.

We deny the existence of an
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Against (D16a)

we can pose the following
alternative:
tD1Sb! * perSon *
® materially false
,

idea

t^F]
“

—

\.A

takes. I to
lepresenl x as
- u rpnrpfotvi-

does not have
D16a

1

,

df

„,
(E
_:/

t

having F but x

F)

and (D16b) diff^-r * n tne
i
following
respect.
On (DIG a)
I can have a mater i pin- f a
ol ° e ldea that represents
y
correctly.
•-f I have an idea
of a centaur that
LXiCl - 1
r ^k.e to
represent something that does not actually
exist, my idea represents
corrCCtlY bU " 18 r" aterlally false
nonetheless.
(DISa) makes every
unexemplified idea materially false.
On (1516b), however, my
idea of a centaur is not materially
16
false.
Although my idea
represents an object that does not
exist in the actual world,
my -dea represents its object
as not. existing.
Representing
(

)

i

3

,

‘

C
iCh We lava existentially
quantified. To avoid
(
this diff?^,Tt
T
ln <D16a) an<J < D16b > of a distincti on 4 -o be^fourd
n”r
De
rtes distinguishes two types of existence.
^'f
He tells
/
"
'° an e lst formally or objectively.
Sometimes
^
w -hink
umiK o.u tilings rhat
do not really exist or, as Descartes
wou...d say,, do not formally exist.
Yet every idea representse v/e ry idea is an idea of something
or other. When l’ have an'
^o.ocr or a centaur, my idea
represents something that does not
redily^exisi and has no formal reality. Yet there
is some-eing that my idea is an idea of. This
somethinis
the centcinr or which I am thinking.
Although the centaur does not
rprmally exist, Descartes would say it exists "in"
my idea:
it exists as an object of thought,
and it has objective existence out does not exist independently of the idea
containing
y
,

Using Descartes' distinction, I will take 'x in (D16a)
Go
to range over things having objective existence.
f

and

Dll.

•

T° highlight the difference between (DIG a.) and (D16b)
assume, that centaurs do not. exist.
As it turns out, Descartes
thinks this assumption is one I cannot discharge.
,

1

22 3

ito object

m

this way, my idea represents
correctly and is
not materially false.

We want to be able to adopt
the fol-

lowing definition of 'material
truth':

An idea X is materially true
~
“
y T rue —

(D.i.7)

-

v is
a
not materially
,

df

IE

false

To understand what we mean by
'material truth’, we need to
decide between (D16a) and (D16b)
Descartes gives us a little
help here, and I will be somewhat
arbitrary.
I will take (D1.6b)
to be the conect definition for
two reasons:
it opens the
possibility that one can have a materially
true idea
.

of an

imaginary object, and it avoids a difficulty
Frankfurt raises.
intuitively, I think it is reasonable to say
that my
ictea oi

Macbeth's dagger is less obscure and confused
than
Macbeth's idea of it. .Although Macbeth views his
idea as re-

presenting something that does exist,

I

view his idea as re-

presenting something that does not exist.
(D.I

60

or (D16b)

)

,

But whether

Macbeth's.

bi-speot.

adopt

it turns out that I have as good reasons to

suspect my own idea of being materially false as
wO

I

(D.!.

6 a)

and

(D.L 6 b)

I

have reason

lead to the same con-

clusion but for different reasons.
On

(,Di 6 a)

,

it comes as no surprise that my idea is ma-

terially false, for
dagger is
(D16b)

,

a

I

have good reason to believe that Macbeth's

figment of Shakespeare's imagination.

much more careful thought is required.

If

1

adopt

Taking my idea

of Macbeth's dagger to represent something that does not exist,
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believe my idea to represent
correctly.
I could be
mistaken,
however, and I have good
reason to think I might be.
If the
genius desires to deceive me,
he can make Macbeth and
his
dagger exist. In my view (D16b)
allows a more subtle and, I
think, more Cartesian analysis
of ideas of imaginary things.
There is a second reason for
adopting (D16b)
Frankfurt
argues that Descartes is committed
to a grotesque aprioriam
X

.

if his rule of evidence entails
that clearly and distinctly
per

ceived concepts are materially true.

Descartes would, Frank-

furt believes, be saddled with
the view "that a person need only
formulate a clear and distinct idea of
some type of object in

cider to

be.

^
certain that an object of that type
exists."

Although (D16a) leaves Descartes open to
this criticism,
boos not.

On

(D16b)

,

?

(D16b)

can have materially true ideas of par-

I

ticulars that do not exist.
an c? falsity as fun c tio ns of representation
:

When we discussed analytical clarity and distinctness,
we were
able to say that ideas can be analytically clear
and distinct

even though the person having these ideas does not recognize

them to be so.

Although the ideas are always modes of thought

and do not exist apart from the thinker having them, there is
a perfectly good sense in which we can say that analytical
c

ajrity

ymd distinctness are properties of

ideas.

.similarly, we can say that ideas are materially true or
'See p.

90 above

falSe

AlthOU9h a11 ideas

-

«e

representations and do not exist apart from the person
having them, this person
may not know
whether his ideas represent
correctly or incorrectly.
„ is

ideas will be either materially
true or materially false,
but
he will not. know which.
In acknowledging that there
is a good sense in which

we can say that ideas are materially
true cr false, we do not
want to ignore the role of the
thinker in making his ideas one
or the other
It is the thinker who interprets
his ideas and
constitutes them to be the representations
they are. On this
score, Gewirth is right. Viewed in
one way, ideas are materially false; viewed in another, they
are materially true. 18
if
.

take my idea of pain to represent a
particular existing in
my foot, my idea is materially false. If,
on the other hand,
i
take my idea to represent a sensation or thought,
I

it is

m ate r i all y t r ue
fals ity and Gewirth s account.
5

We

are now in a position to give a fair assessment
of Gewirth

account.
d.i-st

r

s

Gewirth was right when he realized that clarity and

inctness is a function of how we interpret our ideas.

'

All ideas represent, and all ideas have what Gewirth calls an
in ter pi

e< -

lk

/?

content 20

See pp

.

.

They also have

7-8 above

1.9

Ibid
20

See pp. 8-9 above.

f

Gewirth believes

,

a
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direct content. 21
the idea

On my view this direct
content is the an-

what the idea contains
implicitly and

explicitly

Cewirth thinks that clarity and
distinctness is a function of the relation between
direct and interpretive contents.
He is mistaken. Although there
are two distinguishable contents in ideas, clarity and
distinctness does not consist in
a relation between the two.
Rather, these two

2

types of con-

tents give rise to two separate
aspects of clarity and distinct
ness:
(i) that aspect that
pertains to the analysis of the
idea and concerns analytical clarity
and distinctness and (ii)
thst aspect that per ,.ains to the
interpretive contents of ideas
and concerns representational clarity
and distinctness.
On
my account an idea, is clear and distinct
if and only if it
is bo'ch analytically and representational
ly clear and distinct,

—

PJL

-~1-

our strategy

considering can now be resolved.

I

,

One issue we have been

inquired as to whether Des-

cartes recognizes any types of simple idea every
instance of

which is materially true.

My answer is that he recognizes

no such types among those he lists in his classification.

Idea;

falling under each category can be materially false depending
on how we view them.

But now we have another problem.

We

want to avoid those interpretations that make our ideas mater21 Ibid.
22

See pp

.

7-8 above.

ially false, and we want
to
C adont
v
dJopt rn-ii,,
onl y tb
°se interpretations
that make them materially
true.
But how can we tell which
are the right interpretations
to adopt?
Descartes recommends
the method of doubt.
a

the method of doubt cannot
be usee! to ascertain material falsit*. Using the
method of doubt, we cannot
ascertain
VJhv

whether our ideas are materially
false.
When I apply the
method of doubt to my ideas, I
try to conceive of a reason
for doubting that ray idea
represents correctly. Employing
the method of doubt against my
idea of Macbeth's
dagger,

find that

1

have good reason to doubt the
adequacy of my interpretation. The evil genius might
have made Macbeth's dagger exist so that, for all I know,
my idea of Macbeth's dagger
misrepresents and is materially false. On
the other hand,
1 have not shown my idea to
be materially false.
Although 1
have a reason to suspect that my idea
misrepresents, ray suspicion is, for ail
know, unfounded.
X

_l

2

iil .se

ide as r egar ding which we shou ld with-

Although the method of doubt does not show me

-----

that my idea of Macbeth’s dagger is materially
false, it does
to

how

^

can avoid errors of judgement due to the material

falsity of ideas.

Recognizing that

the existence of Macbeth's dagger,
f rom

any proposition that

I

I
I

have a reason to doubt
can withhold judgement

recognize either to entail that

his dagger exists or to entail that it does not exist.

Re-

22 8

Stricting my judgement in
this way,

—

I

protect myself from error.

with using the metho d of
doubt to
ascertain material truth. Although
the method of doubt c ».
not tell us which of our
ideas are as a matter of
fact materially false, Descartes thinks
we can use this method
EE2i>.lem

to ident-

ify some materially true ideas.

An idea is materially true

provided that it does not misrepresent.

To show that our idea

does not misrepresent, we cannot
consult the world directly
to see it it is as we represented
it.
But we can use the
method of doubt to find out whether
there are any good reasons
for suspecting that our idea
misrepresents. And if we find
out that there are none, then Descartes
thinks we know with
certainty that our idea is materially
true ^
.

But can the method of doubt really
show us that there
are no good reasons for doubting that our
idea represents correctly? At first glance it seems that the
method of doubt

cannot do this much.

To use this method, it appears that

must canvass possible reasons for doubting, and
any of these are good reasons.

After a

I

must see if

diligent but unsuc-

cessful effort to conceive a good reason for doubting,

conclude that there are no such reasons.
taken.

But

There could always be a good reason
of how careful

Regara.L-e.ss

doubting,
23

I

X

I

1

I

I

might

could be mis-

have overlooked.

am in searching for reasons foy

cannot know with certainty that

I

have canvassed

Here we encounter Descartes' view that what is indubitable is true and can be known with certainty to be so.
See
HR X, 158-159 and HR II, 41.
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all the possibilities.

If

can use the method of
doubt effectively only If X can be
sure I have not overlooked
any possible reasons for doubting,
then I cannot use the
method’ of
doubt to identify my materially
true ideas.
I

Although Descartes was never
faced with the above arcument, he would, I believe,
have disputed its soundness
if if
had been brought to his
attention. He could have replied
that
we can identify materially
true ideas without canvassing
all

the possible reasons for
doubting that we have represented
correctly, what wo need to be
able to construct is an argument showing that any doubt we
could adduce must be a bad
reason for doubting. Since
Descartes never was confronted
With the criticism I am imagining him
to refute, he gives no
explicit illustrations of the kind of
argument we are looking
for.
But his cogito argument and his proof
of God's existence
the Fifth Meditations seem to me to
indicate a line of raa24
son ng he co u 1 d adop t

m

_

.

.!.

Taking his idea of himself to represent an
existing
thing, 2 5 he could have argued in the following
way.
•

us interpreting correctly or he is not.
24

.

.

.

Either he

If he is interpret-

,

.Lvcerature on the cogito argument and the ontoloqver Y extensive and the interpretations
numerous
It is not my intention to offer a new
interpretation
fitese- passages here.
I merely use what Descartes says in
them to illustrate the sort of arguments Descartes could have
c on o true cod if he had wanted to show his ideas of
himself and
Cod to he materially true.
i

lit;

.

„

,

assume chat Descartes is representing hemself only
as an existing thing here.
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ing correctly, then he
doesb exist
ex-i^

Tf u
If
he is misinterpreting
•

*

thon he is deceived, and
he exists.

He does not have to can-

vass every doubt one could
adduce in order to gain
the assurance he needs. Whatever doubt
he could bring forward,
if it
is a good reason for doubting,
then he is deceived, and
he
exists
So there are no good reasons
for doubting.
He has
-ul .uea or himself, and he
can use the method
of doubt to ascertain his idea
to be materially
.

.1

true.

in this respect Descartes'

idea of himself is not unique.

Descartes also thinks his idea of God
represents something
that exists.
Could he be misinterpreting his
idea, however?
He could argue as follows.
His idea of God contains the idea
of having all perfections.
And existence is a perfection. So
God has existence as one of his attributes 26
These considerations would, I believe, suffice to satisfy
Descartes that he
cannot be mistaken when he takes his idea of
God to represent
an existing thing 27 His idea of God
is, he could hold, materi ally true,
.

.

Altl.ougu Descartes did net. explicitly offer
arguments to
:

%R
J

I,

180-183

I do not. know how Descartes would respond
to the
menu rhat he. could not be mistaken if he represented his arguidea
o.k the joeriect island as existing.
He might argue that the
rdea of a perfect island is analytically confused because its
secondary content contains everything its primary contents
entail. The primary contents are the concepts of. being perfect
ano. being an island.
But islands are necessarily imperfect so
that the secondary contents of Descartes' composite contain
contradictory concepts. The idea of a perfect island is analytically confused.
tl
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his ideas of himse]
Sel±f “-"na
nd God to be materially
true, he
certainly believed they were
^re. hut
>c^ are
But fh
these
not the only matcrially true ideas Descartes
believed himself to have. Let
us apply Descartes' method
of doubt to the various
types of
simple ideas to see what
interpretations make them materially
true and what interpretations
warrant our withhoding judgement
regarding the objects of these,
ideas.
^-ow

.

v

IV.

~

r

THE METHOD OF DOUBT WHEN
APPLIED

——

TO SIMPLE IDEAS
SZ SBilS. S2*

serial

falsity in mixed and mate r-

Our next task is to apply the
method of
doubt to interpretations of the
various types of simple idea.
In his wax example Descartes
applies his method of analysis to
the concepts his composite idea of wax
contains explicitly.
Descartes' aim is to distinguish between
those concepts that
represent necessary features of matter from
those that do not.

ViHPiE i$2S£-

Descartes applies the heat to the wax so that he can
show that there is a possible state of affairs
in which properties he ascribes to wax are not necessary
features of it 28

Proceeding

this way, Descartes is able to identify general

.in

necessary features of matter
place,

duration, etc.
2

HR I, 154.

23 Ibid.

,

p.

146

"

—

extension, figure, number,

Although the physicist who studies
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these features is studying
properties "that are very
simple
and general
Descartes thinks physics is
not as reliable a
science as mathematics.
Mathematicians, he tells us,
"only
treat of things that are very
simple and very general,
without
taking great trouble to ascertain
whether they actually exist
or not.
The physicist, on the other
hand, believes
the properties he studies to
exist.
He thinks physics gives
hrm a description of the material
world. But the method of
analyse.., that identifies for
us necessary features of
matter
cannot tell us whether the material
world exists.
.

.

What it can tell us is whether
properties are necessary
or contingent features of matter
if matter exists.
Telling
us th .is much, the method of analysis
allows us to anticipate
what will happen when we apply the
method of doubt
to the

mixed and material simple ideas.
contingent properties and

I

take these ideas to represent

existing particulars, then even if
wox.ld exists,

1

If these ideas represent

I

assume

the external

will be able to devise good reasons for doubt-

ing chat my ideas correctly represent.
w.uil no w

that,

On the other hand,

be aole to conceive such doubts when the properties

represented as existing are necessary features of material
substance
30

I

Ibid.

•*«

Ibid.

,

p.

147.
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The method of doubt when
applied to mixed simple ideas 32
Descartes thinks that most of us
believe our ideas of sensation
to represent particulars that
really exist, that exist in
material substance, and that resemble
the ideas representing
them.
Interpreted in this way, our ideas
are, for all „ e know,
materially false on three counts. As
the example of heat and
cold showed, we cannot be sure that
our mixed simple ideas
are not privatives representing
nothing that really exists.
But even if our ideas of sensation
represent existing
particulars, our ideas might still be materially
false.
As
Descartes' example of pain shows, we could be
mistaken if we
tnink our pain is located in our body. Amputees
have been
known to claim that they feel pain in their foot
even though
.

tiiey

have no foot for their pain to be in.“^

Lescartes can also be deceived if

lie

thinks his idea

Gi P a:Ln represents a particular that resembles his idea.

Descartes has some plausible theories about the physiology
of perception.

m

changes

a

Sense perceptions may result from complex

nervous system that acts not only as a transmitter

but also as a transformer of external stimuli.
uli.

Since the stim-

are transformed, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose

that the causes of our ideas of sensation do not resemble the
I confine ray discussion to simple ideas of sensation,
but it wi.ll be evident that among the rational doubts applicable to ideas of sensation are doubts applicable to mixed simple
ideas general ly
gj

"

O

HR

I,

189

.

234

ldeaS they cause

-

As Descartes says, the wise
man will "never

assert that the object has passed
complete and without any
alteration from the external world
to his senses, and from
hxs senses to his imagination.
.

.

If the wise man does not take his
simple ideas of sensation to resemble the particulars they
represent, how does

the wise man interpret his ideas of
sensation?

He will, Des-

cartes says, view these ideas as representations
of sensations
or thoughts.
And what is true of his idea of pain is
true of
ideas of mixed simples generally. Descartes
writes:
But in order that we may here distinguish
that which is
clear from that which is obscure we ought to
observe that
we nave a clear and distinct knowledge of pain, colour,
and other things of the sort when we regard them simpiv
o sens a u ions or thoughts.
But when we desire to "judge
Oj. such matters as existing outside
of our mind, wo can
in no wise conceive what sort of things they are.^
.

Descartes' point is that our mixed simple ideas represent

correctly if we view them as representing our sensations 01
thoughts
‘I

he method of doub t whe n applied to materi al simple idea

the material simple ideas are those that represent properties

belonging ro material substance alone.
cartes’

ideas of primary qualities

place, duration, number, etc.

—

-

Among these are Desextension, figure, motioi

If we take these ideas to repre-

sent properties existing in external material substance, are
3

35

Ibid., P

.

44.

Ibid., p. 248.
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our ideas materially true
or materially false?
In Descartes' considered
opinion, these ideas are materially true. Although I can
conceive of reasons for thinking
the external world does not
exist, I cannot conceive of
good
reasons
The dream and evil genius
hypotheses are in Descartes'
view inconsistent with other
beliefs Descartes thinks he has
no good reason to doubt:
that God exists and that He is no
deceiver.
Descartes puts the point as follows:
.

And the whole strength of the
argument which T have
t0 Pr e thG existence of God
consign this
?hat
't' ac l1: ls
not passible that my nature
v
should be
S
and lndeed tbat 1 should have in
t) a
3 ° f a God
lf God did n ot veritably exist
T sa 7
"
whose idea is in me, i.e. who possesses
a.i chose supreme perfections of
which our mind mav indeed
have some idea but without understanding
them all 'who
is liable to no errors or defect
[and who has none of aH
-hose marks which denote imperfection]
From this it is
manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since
the light
of nature teaches us that fraud and
deception necessarily
proceed from some defect.

£

JhMf

V

'

'

'

'

'

.

App_i.yj.ng

these considerations to the dream hypothesis, Des-

cartes says, "And

ought to set aside all doubts of these

I

past days as hyperbolical and ridiculous, particularly that
very uncommon uncertainty respecting sleep, which

distinguish from the waking state.”"

I

could not

Continuing, he says.

"Because Cod is in no wise a deceiver, it follows that

not deceived in this
Aiid if

30’.Ibid.
3

I

am

.

Descartes is not deceived, the physicist is not
pp.

170-171.

Ibid., pp.

198-199.

,

'
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deceived either.

To the extent that his
ideas represent necessary features of matter as
existing, the physicist's
ideas
are materially true.
He could make his ideas
materially false,
however.
If he thinks that his ideas
represent properties

belonging to a mode of substance
that has no first cause, then
his idea is materially false, for
God exists and created the
material world.

—

-

—

when a pplied to intelle c tual simples.

Intellectual simples represent properties
pertaining to thinking substance alone. .Among these simple
ideas
are my ideas

o.i

imagination

,

willing, feeling, sensation, and the
like.

If

take these ideas to represent properties
that belong to think
ing substance, I represent correctly. 38
Descartes thinks we
cannot conceive of a possible state of affairs
where willing
I

goes on without there being a thinking substance
which is

doing the willing.
or thought,
e-hat

Willing is, Descartes believes, a mode

and for Descartes there is no good reason to hold

chinking can go on unless there is a thinker.

^

One can, of course, misinterpret his intellectual simple
j.de.c-.s

and mane tnem materially false.

is essentially a body,

If he thinks that he

then he will believe that thinking in

its various forms is a mode of material substance.
Jb

Ibid.

,

p.

Commonly,

240.

'"'-'Russell thinks that Descartes has not shown that
thoughts need a thinker. Bertrand Russell, A His tory of
Wes tern Philo sophy (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 19457", p
567'.
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people talk as if they believe
it is their brain that
thinks
and remembers
If they think that their
idea of remembering
represents a mode of a brain, then
in Descartes' view
their
idea j-S materially false.
.

The method of doubt when applied
to common s imples
Descartes does not say a great deal
about the common simples
that will help our analysis. He
does mention his ideas of
duration, order, and number
attributes that are common to
oor.h material and spiritual
substances.
And he suggests that
our ideas would be materially false
if we viewed them as reprerenting a substance rather than a mode. 41
.

—

Perhaps Descartes does not say a lot about
his ideas
01 common simples because we can
easily infer what he believes
fj: om. what he has already
said about material and intellectual
simples.
To the extent that his ideas represent
necessary
features of both spiritual and corporeal substance, 41
his ideas
are m.at.c.rially true rf he takes them to
represent existing

properties belonging to either spiritual or material
substance.
Sjiice j/es cartes thinks he has no good reason
to doubt that

ne exists as a thinking thing'

and since we have already shown

that he believes he cannot with good reason doubt that matter
exists, he has no good reason, to doubt that necessary features
4o im i,
41

42
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He can use his method of analysis to find out

HR

I,

1

51-152

23 8

ox both spiritual and corporeal
substance exist.

when he

represents such features as existing,
he represents correctly,
:C

—

r--^

^terj.ajL falsi ty in ideas.

The review

we have given of material truth
and falsity in simple ideas
was not meant to be complete or
penetrating.
It was simply

meant to show that no type of simple
P j ej.erential to any other type.
.

idea, is

epistemically

Although Descartes thinks

the mixed simples are especially
troublesome because we have

pxejudices

at induce us to misinterpret them,

"''’

these dif-

ficulties are not inherent in mixed simple ideas.

Our pre-

judices result from a faulty education which fails
to provide
us with an adequate method for distinguishing
what pertains
to mind from what pertains to body 44
.

But Descartes thinks

f nese prejudices of youth can be corrected if one
uses the

method of doubt and avoids giving his ideas interpretations
he has the slightest good reason to suspect.

Mater j a l truth and
ently

f alsity

in compos ite ideas.

Inher-

the composite idea of a winged horse is not any more

,

materially false than an idea of

a triangle.

If

T

view my

idea of a winged horse as representing an existing object,

my idea is materially false, but if
senting

a

43,.

HJi

substance, then my

I,

I,

view it simply as repre-

materially true. 45

237 and 24 7.

4* 4
IIP.,

idea, is

I

See Part
144-14 5

I

of the Discourse.

HP I, 81-87.

See also

,

45

In the same way that Descartes applied his method of
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Similarly, my idea of a triangle
would be materially false
if I interpreted my idea to
represent a triangle existing 111
material substance. Every particle of
matter is extended in
three directions, but the lines
making up the sides of t.riangles have no width.
Rel at on ships bet ween a nalytically
clea r and distin ct
ideas a nd m aterial truth
'There is no
.

necessary connection

.

between analytical clarity and distinctness
and material tr uth
on the one hand, or between analytical
confusion and mater al
falsi cy on the other. An analytically clear
and distinct
,

.Ldea can be

materially false.

Simple ideas are good illustra-

tions we have already discussed.

But analytically clear and

distinct composite ideas can also be materially false
as the

example

I

just gave of my idea of a triangle shows.

Similarly

,

analytically obscure

be materially true.

I

a.nd

confused ideas can

could include in the explicit content

of my idea of wax ideas representing contingent properties.

Although analytically confused, my idea is materially true if
1

take it to represent a material substance.
VII.

DEFINITIONS RELATING TO REPRESENTATIONAL
CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS

analysis to bis idea of wax, he can apply his method to his
idea of a winged horse.
He will as a result identify necessary features of winged horses. Among the necessary features
will, of course, be necessary features of matter.
-i

substance

do not take my idea to represent an existing material

however
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When we attempt to define
what „e mean by a representational clear and distinct idea', we
encounter difficulties.
Descartes uses the terms 'clarity'
and 'distinctness' and
ooscurrty' and 'confusion' in
contexts where it is plain
he
is talking about what v.e
have referred to as 'material
truth'
and 'material falsity '.47
Yet 1I can
r.
>
discern no erfort on his
part to distinguish between those
ideas chat are representation
ally clear or obscure, on the
one hand, and those that are
•

M

representationally distinct or confused,
on the other. And
tnere seem to be no clear patterns
to his usage that would
indicate bow he draws the relevant
distinctions. We could
draw these distinctions arbitrarily,
but I see no point in
oexng unduly conjectural.
clea.i.j.y

Slid

Descartes' Rule tells us that what

distinctly perceived is true.

Even if we can-

not make out the distinction between
representational clarity
and representational distinctness, we have
accomplished a great
aeul if we can identify the representationally
clear and dis-

tinct ideas.

Having defined

’a

materially true idea

H°
'

I

define

'representationally clear and distinct idea' as follows:
Oil 8)

a person A has a representationally clear and distinct idea X

An

X is materially true

that is not representationally clear and distinct will

.idea

7

48

See

HP.

I,

See (D17)

2

37 and 241

above, p. 223

241

TePresentationally obscure

or confused.

We will not know

which, but we will know it
is one or the other or
both.
For
the purpose of utilizing
Descartes' Rule, however, we
may have
all the information we need.
P erceiving with re
presentational clarity and distinct ness..

A person who has

a

representational^ clear and distinct
idea may not perceive it with
representational clarity and

distinctness
(D19!

A person A perceives an idea X with
representational
clarity and distinctness =
X is

representational^

flf

clear and distinct, and A recognizes
that there is
no good reason for doubting that X
represents
cor-

rect ly
Tii

the same way that

a

person cannot perceive his idea with

analytical clarity and -distinctness if his idea
contains an
infinite analysis, a person may be unable to perceive
with

representational clarity and distinctness
idea be has.

a

materially true

He may be unable to prove that there are no good

reasons for doubting that his idea represents correctly.

The

proof required, may be so long or so complicated that only God
can supply the demonstration.
lo.r

with,

our purpose, however, we do not need to perceive

representational clarity and distinctness.

What we need

are perceptions that insulate us from the representational

material for error in ideas.

We need perception that we can
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call -minimally representational^
clear and distinct'.
pimal r e quirement for perceiving
with representationai clarity and distinctness.
If I believe that 1 am unable to show that an idea I have
is materially true, I
insulate
myself from error if I refrain from
judging that my idea is
as I represented it.
I withhold my judgement
in this way because I recognize that, for all I know,
my idea misrepresents.
1 could be mistaken, of course,
and if I am, I miss out on
the opportunity to make some true
judgements 1 would otherwise be prepared to assent to. But one
of Descartes' aims
is to protect us against making any
false judgements. And
when we perceive with both minimal analytical
and represent-

—

—

.

ational clarity and distinctness, we are in a
position to

avoid making such judgements.
I
i

:.v

define 'perceiving with minimal representational clar-

ana drs t j nctness
(D20)

’

as follows:

A person A perceives an idea

I

with minimal repre-

sentational clarity and distinctness ~
I_

or

.

..

A perceives

with representational clarity and distinctness,
(.Ex)

(EF) [A

takes

I_

to represent x as having F ,

but A recognizes that he does not know whether there
is a good reason for doubting that x is F,

and A

with holds judgement as to whether x is or is not
on

F]

CD2G } we can perceive with minimal representational clarity

and distinctness ideas that are representational ly obscure
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or confused.

If Macbeth's idea of his
dagger is materially

false, Macbeth can still perceive
his idea with minimal representational clarity and distinctness
if he appropriately withholds his judgement.

G^sendi's criticism and rep resentational
clari ty and
^iEii^tness. Having given an account of representational
1

«^y

and distinctness, we can turn our
attention

criticisms

.

r.o

Gassendi's

Plainly, Descartes did give Gassendi a
method

the method of doubt

clar

—

for distinguishing representat ionally

clear and distinct from representationally
obscure and confused
ideas.
Admittedly, this procedure is not mechanical.
It

requires thought and may be employed with varying
degrees of
success.

But even where the method fails to reveal whether

our ideas are materially true or false, we are enjoined

against falling back on subjective conviction.

On the contrary

we should witnliord judgement and settle for perception that
is minimally representationally clear and distinct.

Although we avoid errors of judgement if we use the

method of doubt correctly, this method has a psychlogical component.

People can differ about what constitutes a good rea-

son for doubting.

Descartes thinks his idea of matter repre-

sents something that exists.

He thinks God would be a deceiver

if it burned out that Descartes was misinterpreting his idea.

This consideration suffices to convince Descartes that he can
conceive of no good reason for doubting that he is representing
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nib idea correctly.

But another person
might argue that our
errors should not he attributed
to Cod.
This person, an idealist, might claim that
God in His goodness did
not create the
material world, and He gave
us adequate mental
capacity to
discern that “*
ft^ a
;
r
-wT
c
Clia not
If we misrepresent our
idea and.
uiink that the exteTnal
da exi 3
nai wrvr
7 ° rld
ts, we are
p,

.

'

i

at fault, not.

•

God.

Descartes adopts this sort of
strategy himself in his
discussion of error in Meditation
IV.
If i make a mist£ko
f-.u_t is mine, not God's.
God has given me a will that
can judge before the mind fully
understands 49 Descartes
thinks we encounter this difficulty
whan we believe that our
idea of heat represents a property
of material
.

bodies.

But.

someone else could counter that our
idea of heat is correctly
interpreted. We have a very strong
inclination to believe

our idea represents correctly.

God allows this strong inclin-

ation to be in us, and He would be a
deceiver if as a matter
cf fact our idea misrepresents.
If Gassendi accused Descartes of psychologism,
he is
in a sense right.

him to decide whether to regard his ideas as
materially

allov/s
tr-ue or
v.ii.i

i

vr-i

Although each individual has a method that

false, the same method used by someone else could
yield

e iL

conclusions

.

Since the method of doubt

i.s

the.

only

Descartes gives us for ascertaining representational

me. l. hoc.!

' oV
<\

}.11R

I,

171-179.

clarity and distinctness
and since an idea is
clear and distinct only if it is
representational^ clear and
distinct, „e
have completed one of
the major tasks of this
dissertation.
We set out to determine
whether Descartes could
be vindicated
from the charge of
psychologism
He cannot
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C H A P T E R

VIII

CLARITY AND DISTINCTNESS AND
DES CARTE S' RULE
This chapter has two sections.

In section I,

define
the terms 'clear idea' and
'distinct idea'.
In section II, I
make use of my overall account to
give an interpretation of
Descartes' Rule and to explain the
sense in which his Rule
can be said to be true.
I

DEFINITIONS RELATING TO CLARITY AND
DISTINCTNESS
The second major task of this
dissertation concerns our
CjJ.o.r
to clarify what Descartes means by
'clear' and 'distinct
Because Descartes' definitions were
hopelessly vague, we purb ue a a strategy of examining
how Descartes actually uses these
terms. Although the strategy we adopted has
led us to
1.

i:

the

distinction between analytical and representational
clearness
ano distinctness, it does not accomplish as much
as we might
hope.

Since we are not able to draw a distinction between

representational clarity and representational distinctness,
we will noc be able to distinguish, between clarity and distinct
ness per so.

We can, however, elucidate what it is for an

idea to be clear: and distinct.
(D2.1)

An idea X is clear and distinct
—

==

df

x
— is analytical

and representationally clear and distinct

Having (D21)

,

we can define 'perceiving an idea with clarity

ly
2

247

cmd distinctness' as follows:
^D22)

a person A perceives an idea X with
clarity and distinctness =
A perceives X with both analytical
df
cmd representational clarity and
distinctness

re quirement

Since the analysis of analyt-

.

ically clear and distinct ideas can be
infinite, we introduced
a minimum requirement that would allow
us to ascertain which
of our ideas are minimally analytically clear
and distinct.
We required that ideas contain explicitly all
the essential
concepts and only concepts these entail.

Similarly, when we

considered representational ly clear and distinct ideas,
we

introduced the notion of perceiving with minimal representational clarity and distinctness

Putting the minimal require

meats together, we arrive at an account of what it is to perceive.

with minimal clarity and distinctness:

(D23)

A person A perceives an idea X with minimal clarity
and distinctness =

A

perceives X with minimal

analytical clarity and distinctness, and A perceives
X with minimal representational clarity and dis-

tinctness

Exte ndi ng cl arit y and
l-f

t

•equ rem en t

.

tve

d ist inctness

beyond the minimal

have already discussed how we can increase

analytical clarity and distinctness beyond the minimal require
jTieht

.

There is a sense in which we can also increase the
See p. 213 above

representational clarity and
distinctness of our ideas.
P.epr
sentational clarity and
distinctness can vary in
degree.
One
can take his idea X to
represent something that
exists, to
represent something that exists
in corporeal substance,
to
represent something having a
corporeal substance

as its cause,

and so on.

Assuming that X is being
interpreted correctly,
it seems reasonable to say
that as one adds new
interpretive
content to his idea, he increases
its representational clarity
euid distinctness.

Since we can increase the
representational clarity and
distinctness of our ideas, I think we
can say that person A
increases the clarity and distinctness
of his perception of
an idea X beyond the minimal
requirement provided that A
perceives X with minimal analytical and
representational clarand distinctness, and either A adds
to X's explicit tertiary content concepts X entails or A adds
to X's interpretive
contents and A continues to perceive X with
minimal representdtional clarity and distinctness
II.

DESCARTES’ RULE

We have now completed our account of clarity and
distinctOr- this point Descartes' definition
of 'being distinct’
is suggestive.,
I-Ie says,
"But the distinct is that which is
to precise and different from all other objects that
it contains within itself nothing but what is clear."
See HR I.
--esc ax 1 es
remarks suggest that we increase the distinctness of our idea as we increase its interpretive content. His
""

v

/

•

j

remarks also suggest that a representationally clear idea has
as its interpretive content a subset of the interpretive con-
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ness, and we can turn
our attention to the
use Descartes roake3
aild dlstlnct ldeas
He tells us that
<

whatever is
clearly and distinctly
perceived is true.
But what is it that
Descartes thinks is true
when clearly and
distinctly perceived? Narrowing
the stupe
scone oi
of this question
fox us, Frankfurt asks;
ts »+ ldeab or
^
1S
Propositions that Descartes thinks are true?

w,

•k)

^

If he thinks it is idea«s
->v-^ *
1
a J tnat are
true , he is using
true' in an unusual sense
„ u
Frankfurti.iank..urt considers
the possibility
than Descartes ms ans bv t--luc
rue
Y
materially true'. 3 He rejects
this interpretation because
he thinks it saddles Descartes
'

-

•

1

*

j

-

with a "grotesque apriorism"
of material truth,
or Descartes'

5

,

.

'

On the analysis I have given

Frankfurt is rejecting a bad
interpretation

Rule for the wrong reason.

We can have unexempli-

tied materially true ideas.

Although Frankfurt
h~.

draws is correct.

5

s

argument is unsound, the conclusion

Descartes' Rule is not meant to tell

us that

whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is
materially true in the sense in which we have
defined
a

true .idea'.

'materially

Since ideas are clear and distinct only if
they

tent of a representational.lv distinct idea.
But we have no
cine as to v:hat the content of a representationally
clear idea
See pp. 83-90 above

Bee p. 90 above
i)

See p. 223 above
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are representational
ly clear and distinct and since
ideas are
representational ly clear and distinct
if and only if they are
materially true, Descartes' Rule
e a Rule
i* it
it is
v
about
material
truth, is pointless.
To use Descartes' Rule, we
need to find
our ideas' are clear ana distinct,
but to find
out whether our ideas are
clear and distinct, we have to ascertain whether they are materially
true.
-

Prankfurt^s

i nterpretation

of Descarte s

'

Rule

.

Frank-

furt '-hulks that Descartes' Rule
guarantees the formal truth
of propositions. He holds this view
because he thinks that
one has a clear and distinct idea of
something only if, for
every necessary feature of that thing,
he clearly and dis-

tinctly goroElives that that thing has that
property. 6

We

clearly and distinctly perceive an idea only
if we clearly
ond distinctly perceive, some proposition about
that idea.
On my view Frankfurt is with minor variation
giving us
an account of analytically clear perception,'
lie

is making is correct, nevertheless.

I

But the point

perceive an idea X

with analytical clarity and distinctness only if, for every
concept included in X

s

s

tertiary content,

I

clearly and dis-

tinctly perceive that A entails that concept.

To perceive an

idea x with, analytical clarity and distinctness,
t!

'

tee pp.

90

S

above.

See p. 206 above.

1

must clearly

251

and distinctly perceive that

about X.

j>,

where

j>

But now a new question arises:

is some proposition

What is involved

in clearly and distinctly
perceiving that ?
E

—

iH^SJvt.

ment Descartes recognises,
an act of will.

There are two types of judge-

a judgement proper results from

One affirms or denies that
p.

2 can be ap-

prehended without being affirmed or
denied, however.
Descartes
distinguishes what he calls inner cognition
from the judger.-.i ..al faculty
I cite below one passage
from
.

the Rules and

one from the Replies.

In the passage in the Rules.

Descartes

is talking about knowing simple ideas
by acquaintance.

But

the reader will recall that in the Rules
Descartes counts what
he calls the common notions
propositions
among his sira-

—

pie ideas.

s

—

Regarding these ideas, he says:

Ae

t h a t sj- 1 these simple natures are
known per se
and are wholly free from falsity.
It will be easy" to
snow this, provided we distinguish that faculty of our
un.aei standing by which it. has intuitiv e awareness
of
anct knows them, from that by' which *TF‘Judgei~mak
ing use of affirmation and denial.
,

In the Rep lies he says

No one can be sure that he knows or that he exists, unless
he knows what thought is and what existence. Not that
this requires a cognition formed by reflection or one
acquiree by demonstration
it is altogether enough
or one. to know it by means of that inte rnal cog nition
which, always precedes reflective knowledge7~~antr^whichl
when the object is thought and existence is innate in all
men
^

L

.

.

8
9
2

HR

.

41-42

I,

Ibid.
0

.

,

p.

4

HR II, 241.

Emph a s

.1

s

mine

Emphasis mine.

This distinction between

111

^
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tW° paSSa5eS D

—

tes recognises two types
of know-

je.

rhrough. his inner cognition
a person can know that
p
before he affirms that
£ so that the proposition

p can be pre-

sent in the mind before
the

win

affirms or denies it. Wc
can say that a proposition
p can be perceived before
judgement
is passed on it.

Making this distinction, we
can talk about clearly and
distinctly perceived propositions
and clearly and distinctly
perceived judgements.
In the R ules Descartes
tells us to
"reduce involved and obscure
propositions step by step to those
that are simpler, and then
starting with the intuitive apprehension oi all those that are absolutely
simple, attempt to
ascend to the knowledge of all others
by precisely similar
„11
Seeps.
For the purposes of the analysis I want
to
give,

I

will suppose that a molecular proposition
is clearly and disjiidgeTCen ta i

knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance is recoazea
Romance languages and in German but not in
English
xn irenen, for example, ’savoir' means
'to know that such a Ad
tne Ca G wnila Ic onnaitr e means to know
by acquaint-os cartes recognizes this distinction
in
his
most ex^ :
r.ed passage
regarding simples. Throughout that oassaae
Descartes reserves for appropriate forms of
’connaitre’ what
ilaldane and Ross translate variously as
cognrtI^7~~apnrehend
r.now
discerned', ‘knowledge', 'known per se'
and intuiv.rve awareness
When, on the other hand, Dei^artes refers
lo judgemental knowledge and judgemental
knowing, he uses
forms of the infinitive savoir
For his use of ’connaitre',
co.opaie Rules
pp 4Q— 42 with Rene De.s cartes Les
Regies e Pour
s~
ri.
SJ
lij L Es prit in Oeuvres et Le t tr e
TLlbrar i
Ga.tld.mard, 1352}
pp. 80 — 82, and for his use of 'savoir' compare his headings regarding both his knowledge of~the external
world and^the relation of mind and body in the Principles,
pp. 254-255 with Rene Descartes, Les Principles De La Philosophle in O euvres et Le tt res pp .~ 611-612*.
LL

m

211

1

5

!’

|

^

.

,

;

’

,

1

^

,

!

.

'

'

.

.

,

’

,

,

HR

I,

14.

•
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tinctly perceived if
and only if the simple
proposltions
o fclixch it can be
reduced, or propositions
recognized to be
equivalent to them drS
olearl Y and distinctly
perceived.
not know which Djro r^o fi -,0
poslfclo ns Descartes
1
takes to be
absolutely simple, however,
- 1 xncipie X,
Principle
.
x he refers
to the
cogito as a proposition
and says
it "is
y
~s the
tne first
fir*- and most
certain which presents
itself to those who
philosophise in
orderly fashion." 12 But
he goes on to indicate
that there
are "notions of the simplest
hind" whicKmust be known
before
philosophising car. begin. 13
Descartes uses the term 'notions'
co refer to both ideas
and propositions, however. 11
Of the
examples he gives, only one
"In order to think we must
oe"
is clearly a proposition.
But
do not know why Descartes
considers this proposition to
be perfectly simple, and
I do
not know what others he. might
also consider to be so. Yet
without such information it is difficult
to give a perfectly
satisfactory account of what it is to
perceive that o clearly
and distinctly.
'

i

<

o'i

r'iv

m

-

—

J.

To offer what is at least a plausible
account, I need
to make some assumptions.
I assume that Descartes
believed
there are simple propositions or equivalents
of them that
have a subject-predicate form. This
assumption seems to me
i

2

“"HR
1

3

'

14

I

f

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

222.

,

pp.

41-42.
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to be Plausible, and
it suffices to give
us a partial account
of clearly and distinctly
perceiving that p_.
if in addition
I as suite that all
simple propositions are
equivalent to pro-

positions having

a

subject-predicate
plicate torm,
form

plete account we want.

t
1

car-

give the com-

tW

The view tnat a11
an
propositions are
reducible to subject-predicate
propositions has a long trarn uhc history of philosophy
and is in Russell's view
particularly important for substance
ontologists like Deccartes.
Descartes may not have held this
view, however,
and I am not attributing it to
him.
On the other hand, for
purpc.-es

will be easiest if we suppose
that he clid.
But if in point of fact he aid
not, then the account I give
is incomplete and needs to be
augmented.
j.t

Where p is a simple proposition of
subject-predicate
form, I arrive at the following:
.^2.)

A

pv-.i.

p

’

oon A clear ly and distinctly perceives
that

df ~ P arce ives p's subject concept clearly and

distinctly, and A recognizes that p’s predicate

concept is contained in either the tertiary or
the

interpretive content of p’s subject concept/’' 6

Si^2P?'3X
12 .
.

p

Bertrand Russell, A Criti cal Exposition Of The ph.ilGeorge Al.lei'T"T"*Uli^n~Ltd'7‘' T91T7) '
91 .iLe.lbniz (London.
.

Since A can never ascertain with certainty whether
he is. clearly and distinctly perceiving p’s subject concept,
w- need to add a definition for ’perceiving that p with minimal clarity and distinctness
I omit this definition,
1

however
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(D25)

A person A clearly and
distinctly judges that P =
df
A clearly and distinctly
perceives that p, and A

affirms or denies

p_

on the basis of his clear and

distinct perception that p

Having

CD 2

'1

)

and (D25)

,

we can define what we mean when

we say a person knows that
p.
(D2S)

A person A knows that d

A clearly and distinctly

judges that p

nince Descartes would hold that A knows
that p only if p
true, we can now give an account of
Descartes’ Rule.
Rule.

’

Strictly speaking, it is propositions

that are true or false.

They are true or false regardless of

whether they are affirmed or denied.
“c

ur

-'

-*-

s

i3

Either what they state

case or it is not.

In the language we

are using, a proposition that is not a judgement will still

be true or false.

Every clearly and distinctly perceived proposition is
true

,

however.

Given assumptions I have made,

distinctly perceive that p if and only if

I

clearly and

clearly and

I

distinctly perceive p’s subject concept, and

1

recognize that

p's subject concept contains p's predicate concept in either
its tertiary or its interpretive content.

If p's predicate

concept is contained in the tertiary content of p's subject
concept, p is true because it predicates of the object of p's
J

-

Ibid
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subject concept a necessary
feature of that object.
If D 's
predicate concept is contained in
the interpretive content
of E 's subject concept,
then E is true because there
is no
good reason to doubt that
E 's subject concept represents correctly.
Every clearly and distinctly
perceived proposition
is formally true.
But when Descartes states his Rule,
he does not say that
every clearly and distinctly perceived
proposition is formally
t " LUe
instead, he says that whatever is clearly
and distinct]
*

perceived 13 true. 18

As Frankfurt points out both concepts

ana propositions are clearly and distinctly
perceived.

Does

Descartes' Rule mean that both concepts and
propositions are
true?
At the very least it is meant to establish the
truth
of propositions

however

,

.

Descartes may have put his Rule loosely,

because of the close relationship between perceiving

a concept clearly and distinctly and perceiving a proposition

ciearly and distinctly.

A clearly and distinctly perceived

concept provides no material for error.
strict sense of 'material truth’.
sense

,

We have adopted a

But if we admit a loose

we can also say that Descartes’ Rule guarantees the

material truth of clearly and distinctly perceived ideas.
In this sense a materially true idea is one that provides no

material for error.
18

HR

I

,

158.

This sense appears in the Fourth Replies

2

57

where Descartes mentions
'material falsity'. Here he
says,
"Certain ideas are false materially,
i. e
according to my
interpretation, that they supply the
judgement with material
for error. ''19 Besides ideas
that are representations!
ly clear
and distinct and materially true
proper, ideas that are anal.

ytically clear and distinct provide
no material for error.
They are, in this loose sense,
materially true so that we can
say that every clearly and distinctly
perceived idea is mater5-ally true.

lising this loose sense of

'material truth'

interpret Descartes' Rule as follows;

.

we can

Every clearly and

distinctly perceived proposition is formally
true, and every
clearly and distinctly perceived concept is
materially
true.

19

.

HR

I X,

105.
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CHAPTER

IX

CONCLUSION
will now review the ground we have covered
and null
together any loose ends that remain
I

I

GEW1RTH

.

Gewirt.h sets out to defend Descarte s against
wasseno.i

and against a criticism he himself raises in
advocate.

role as devi

hi.s

s

1

To defend Descartes, Gewirth makes use of a dis-

tinction between direct and interpretive contents.

Although

the article in which Gewirth observed that Descartes recognizes

two types of contents in ideas first appeared in 1943, Gewirth

'

observation has been virtually ignored.
In part commentators have ignored Gewirth'

because of the use he makes of it.

s

distinction

Thinking he can vindicate

Descartes only if he makes clarity and distinctness consist
in a relation between direct and interpretive contents, Gewirth

developed

a

cumbersome and false interpretation.

in my critical remarks in Chapter I, Gewirth

for simple ideas.

‘

s

As

I

showed

account fails

Basically, his account fails because it

relies on the method of difference to tell us whether our ideas
represent correctly or incorrectly.
3.

See above

Pp

6

7

Applying the method of

259

difference to simple ideas. Gewirth draws
the conclusion that
simple ideas are clear and distinct
But he himself gives
several examples of simple ideas that are
obscure or confused
so that his account is inconsistent.
*

Bo account for simple ideas

Gewirth'

s

we were forced to abandon

approach and view clari ty and disti.nctness
T

,

not as

a relation between direct and int erpretive
contents. but as

the product of correct analysis and interpretation

KENNY

II.

Kenny argued that Descartes' account of clearness and

distinctness is incoherent.

Although there seem to be three

—

separate elements in the perceptual situation

the pain,

the perception of the pain, and the judgement about

chinks there are really only two
In my chapter on Kenny,

I

—

it,-'

Kenny

the pain and the judgement

criticized particular arguments

Kenny raised to show that the perception is not a genuine in-

termediary between the pain and the judgment,
cover the same ground twice.
ation

I

*

and

1

will not

In the light of the interpret-

have given, however, there are some additional points

to be made.

p rem i ses in K enny
See p.

64

‘

ar gum ent to show that the pe rception

above.

See pp. 64-68 above.
•1

1

For my criticism, see Chapter II, Section II.
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~ -- ***& ^

distinct from the pain.

Kenny thinks Descartes is inconsistent because he
holds the following:
CD When a man feels great pain, he has
a very clear
perception of pain."
(2)

We have a very clear perception
of pains only if we
restrict our judgement about them and
that "this is
5
a condition most difficult to
observe."

On the analysis
In

I

have given, there is no contradiction
here.

Descartes is saying that we perceive our
simple idea
of pain with analytical clarity and
distinctness.
(1),

In

(2)

he is saying that we perceive our idea
of pain clearly only
if we interpret it correctly.

Prem ises in Kenn y
P&3J

.'r.fL®.

^he dis

1

s

arg u ment to show that the p ercep t ion

is nor distinct from the judgement,

-

Criticizing

motion between the perception of pain and

the judge-

ment about it, Kenny says:
On the one hand, we learn that 'we are by nature so disto give our assent to things we clearly perceive,
that we cannot possibly doubt their truth*. ^ Yet, on
the other hand, does not the whole procedure of methodic
douot suppose tnat one can withhold one's judgement even
1
pose!.)

about what seems most clear

.

One can certainly withhold one's judgement in the sense that

one can turn his attention away from
5
6

5 e e p.

frb

a

proposition he

above.

.

Cited from AT VIII, 21; HR

?See

o.

67 above.

I,

236-

lias
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clearly and distinctly perceived.
for

But he cannot doubt it,

m

doubting it, it is before his mind and
if, while it
is before his mind, he clearly and
distinctly perceives that
proposition, he recognizes that its predicate
concept is contained in either the tertiary or the
interpretive content of
tne subject concept.
He recognizes that, his proposition is
true
un ^ °£ clarity and distinctness

.

Believing

ne has argued convincingly that the perception
of the pain
is not a genuine intermediary between the pain
and the judge-

ment, Kenny gives the following account of clarity
and distinctan idea is clear just in case it is manifest and dis-

ness.*

tinct just in case judgements formed about it are true.
Ii we keep in mind that Kenny intended to give us an

account of clarity and distinctness for just simple ideas,
ni s account is in a sense innocuous.

8

On my interpretation

Kenny is

not.

per se.

Instead, he is giving us an account of analytical

giving us an account of clarity and distinctness

clarity and representational distinctness.

Every simple idea

is analytically clear because it is itself contained in its
t ex t i arv c o n t en t

Regarding distinctness, however, Kenny says an idea is
distinct just in case judgements formed about it are true.
In a loose way he is talking about the representational

'

See p

63

above
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distinctness of an idea.

Our simple ideas are distinct if

and only if they are materially true,
i.e. if and only if
they are correctly interpreted. Kenny's
account of clarity

pertains to analytical clarity; his account
of distinctness,
to representational distinctness.
Failing to distinguish
these two aspects of ideas, Kenny gives us
an interpretation
that is incomplete and confused.
c riticism

of Descartes; Rule

DescarL.es of arguing in a circle.

On the

Kenny accuses

.

hand, Descartes

one.

tells us that what he clearly and distinctly perceives
is
true.

On the other hand, he seems to be saying that he ident

ij-u-Go

his clear and distinct perceptions by ascertaining whe-

cjiei

he perceives 13 true.
,

wnat.

.

9

Strictly speaking, there is no circularity here.

If

I

clearly and distinctly perceive that £, then
£ is true. On
my view I clearly and distinctly perceive that p only if I

clearly and distinctly perceive £'

subject concept.

s

clearly and distinctly perceive £'

subject concept,

to make true judgements about that concept.

that a, where g is not identical with p
to ascertain that p is true before

perceive that d.

..

So

I

need

have to judge
I

do not have,

can clearly and distinct

There is no circularity.

See pp. 80-81
See p. 131 above.
10

I

1°

I

But to

Ashworth makes the same criticism.

Since g is about p s subject concept and not about
subject, g cannot be identical to p.
.

’
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Although Descartes is not guilty
of arguing in a
circle, we could try to amend
Kenny's criticism so that Descartes is caught in a vicious
regress.
If i have to know that
2 iS true before 1 can cl «“ly
distinctly perceive that
E
then I also have to clearly and
distinctly perceive that o.
,

But, then,

need to judge truly about g's
subject concept,
and so on ad infinitum.
Let us look at this argument in
more
concrete terms.
Suppose p is "All bachelors are unmarried."
I

To clearly and distinctly perceive
that p,

I

distinctly perceive the concept Bachelors.

must clearly and

My explicit con-

tent consists of the concepts Unmarried
and Men,

I

use the

method of analysis to ascertain whether my
concept Bachelors
is necessarily connected with its contents.
Using this
method,

I

ask myself whether there is a possible state
of

affairs involving

a

bachelor who is married or not male.

there cannot be such a state of affairs, and
P s subject concept is

content."

Now

J

judge that q:

But is q true?

perceive that q.
I

see

necessarily connected with its explicit

To find out if q is true,

only it

I

I

I

I

must clearly and distinctly

clearly and distinctly perceive that a

clearly and distinctly perceive q's subject concept.

must recognize that

r:

"My concept of the concept Bach-

elors is necessarily connected with the concept of being nec-

essarily connected with the concepts Unmarried and Men."
to find out whether r is true,

I

But

must perceive that r clearly

and distinctly, and the regress is underway.
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We embark on this regress because
we assume that the
only way to perceive a proposition
to be true is to clearly
and distinctly perceive it.
But Descartes' Rule states a
sufficient not a necessary, condition for
ascertaining that
a proposition is true.
Stating his Rule in. this way,
,

Descartes leaves open the possibility that
there are other
avenues, besides clear and distinct perception,
for ascertaining what is true. 11 Frankfurt explores this
possibility when
he discusses the evidential bases in virtue of
which one clearly
and distinctly perceives. Among the evidential
bases Frankfurt recognizes are self-evident propositions.
aiv:.

sU'^h pi

opositions

But if there

their truth is manifest, and we do

,

not need to clearly and distinctly perceive them in order to

ascertain that they are true.
III.

FRANKFURT

have already disputed Frankfurt's discussion of material

I

falsity and his narrow interpretation of Descartes' Rule. J/

What

want to do now is concentrate on his account of cJear

f

and distinct perception that such and such is the case.

Why Fr ankf urt
criticism.

1

s

ac c ount is itself sus ceptible to Kenny's

Frankfurt tells us that we clearly and distinctly

i
"]

'This point has obvious relevance when one considers
the traditional Cartesian circle.
3

2

For Frankfurt's interpretation, see Chapter III,
Section I above. For my interpretation of Descartes' Rule,
see above pp. 255-257.

2(5

conceive

5

concept if and only if we clearly and
distinctly
perceive that <£, some proposition about our
concept. 13 we
can now see that Frankfurt and I are using
'clear and distinct
perception that' in different senses: When I talk
about
clearly and distinctly perceiving that
p, I am talking about
a

proposition based on

a

suoject. concept.

a

clear and distinct conception of n's

When Frankfurt talks about clearly and dis-

tinctly perceiving that c, he is talking about clearly
and

distinctly perceiving

a

proposition on which

a

clear and

distinct conception of a concept can be based.
In his view we ascertain a proposition a to be true if

and only if we recognize that certain relations hold between
2.

and an evidential basis for g.

a has an evidential basis e

provided that e excludes all reasonable grounds for doubtina
that

and e is self-evident or entailed by a proposition

that is self-evident

,

or e is an experience.

1^

But what are the relations that must hold between

position and its evidential basis?

a

pro-

Frankfurt specifies these

relations in his definitions of 'clear and distinct perception
that

1

,

A person A clearly and distinctly perceives that g

»

only if he re cognizes that
e

(i)

"1

J.

Li

for some e,

is an evidential basis for

13 See
PP
I.

,

•

90-91 above

See PP* 92-93 above

IT

See PP

•

S

4-95 above

cr,

and

Cii)

16
entails r if and only if
£ contains r>.
does A know that (i) and tii are
true? On Frankfurt'
Cri {e

)

account he must clearly and distinctly
perceive them. But
to clearly and distinctly perceive
that (i) , he must recognize
chat (Eej

[e

)

x

is an evidential basis for

(i)

J

Again he needs

ascertain that this proposition is true so he
must clearly
and distinctly perceive it as well. To clearly
and distinctly
perceive this proposition, he must recognize that
there is
<-o

an evidential basis for it, and we are embarked
on an infin-

ite regress once more.

£ HE

to Kenny

'

s

critic ism

definitions of 'clarity' and

.

Although Frankfurt's

distinctness

1

make Descartes

susceptible to Kenny’s criticism, his notion of an evidential
basis suggests a route we might pursue.
.is

An evidential basis

either self-evident,, entailed by a proposition that is

self-evident, or an experience.

There is nothing in Frankfurt

formulation to suggest that a proposition cannot be its own
evidential basis.
I

must: on

concept.

To clear y and distinctly perceive that p,
3.

my view clearly and distinctly perceive p's subject
In turn

I

must be able to ascertain that some pro-

position a about p's subject concept is true.

If

I

must

clearly and distinctly perceive that c in order to ascertain
that p is true, then

I

I

am embarked on an infinite regress.

*^There are further conditions Frankfurt specifies that
do not enumerate here.
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But if 2 is self-evident and its
truth is manifest to me
when
I consider
I
do not need to clearly and
a,
distinctly perceive
it to ascertain its truth, and
the infinite regress is averted
But is g. self-evident?

When

-dearly and distinctly perceive that
p where o
is "All bachelors are married," I
clearly and distinctly con1

ceive the concept Bachelors, and

recognize that it includes

is necessarily connected with the concept
Unmarried.

c,nd
cim

I

I

making two judgements
(q)

The concept Bachelors is necessarily connected
with

the concept Unmarried.
( .1 )

concept Unmarried is contained in the concept

--he

Bachelors
in judging

chat
---

-ha*..

I

C]

Slid

;

(q)

and that

nd out,

tnat r,

1

I

am

(r)

I

judging

truly?

must clearly and distinctly perceive

take the first, step in a regress.

But

do not need to clearly, and distinctly perceive these propos-

itions to recognize that they are true.
Every idea

I

They are self-evident

have has an explicit content that constitutes

it to be the idea it is.

If the explicit content of my idea

Bachelors is Unmarried Men,

r is

self-evident.

It is equivelai

to the judgement that "The concept Unmarried is contained in

the concept "Unmarried Men," and

understand what it is

I

cannot deny r while

I

am denying.

q is also self-evident.
ing:

I

It is equivalent to the follow-

"The concept Unmarried Men is necessarily connected with
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the concept Unmarried."

If

I

understand that q, and

I

under-

stand what it means for one concept to be
necessarily connected
w.-uh another
then I cannot sensibly deny q, for if I did
,

would be affirming that there is a possible state
of affairs
in which what is unmarried is married.
Like r, a is

I

self-evi-

dent

.

So far,

I

have shown that we can clearly and distinctly

perceive that p without having to clearly and distinctly perceive that q, some proposition about p's subject concept.
But in the example

£

I

used, p was an analytic truth.

is a contingent truth?

Let

p_

be "I exist."

tinctly perceive that p.
ceive the concept

1

We assume that

I

clearly and dis-

This assumption implies that

tertiary content only the idea itself.

.its

I

per-

with analytical clarity and distinctness.

But since this concept is simple, it follows that
in

What if

I

include

Consequently,

the concept Existence is not part of my analysis

'

.

This con-

cept is included in the interpretive content of my idea, how-

But is my interpretation of my idea right?

ever.

Is my idea

materially true and representaticnally clear and distinct?
To perceive my idea with representational clarity and

distinctness
(q)

J

,

I

must recognize that q;

My idea correctly represents.

He ranks
'existence' is a predicate.
ideas
ideas,
simple
common
his idea of existence among the
spiritual
that represent prope rti es of both material and
HR 1 41..
s ub stance.
^Eor Descartes,

,

269

But is a true?

And do

I

have to clearly and distinctly per-

ceive it in order to assure myself that
it is?
On Frankfurt's
71 ew
a clear and distinct perception is
not required.
If
"

'

I

understand a,

it,

I

i:ng,

I

do exist and

cannot doubt its truth because if
cr

is true.

and a is self-evident.

consider

cr

its o.1j.,

perceive that

2.

and

i

I

doubt

The denial of a is self-defeat"

To find out that q is true,

I

do not need to clearly and distinctly

or some other proposition about q.

There

is no regress.

General assessment of Frank f urt

*

account.

differs from Frankfurt ’s in important respects.

deempha s i z e s the rol

My account

Frankfurt

of clear and distinct conception becau

he recognizes that we clearly and distinctly conceive concepts

only if we perceive propositions about these concepts to be
true.

Concentrating on the notion of clearly and distinctly

perceiving that such and such is the case, Frankfurt makes
clear and distinct perception that £ consist in a relation

between p and an evidential basis for p.

Although he does

not rule out the possibility that, p is its own evidential
basis, p's evidential basis will typically be something other

than p.
ic

On my account clear and distinct perception that p

quite a different matter.

The relations that must hold

are not between p and its evidential basis but between com-

ponents of p, its subject and predicate concepts.
I

cannot say that my interpretation is right and
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Frankfurt's is wrong.

In Chapter III

I

pointed out that Frank-

furt's interpretation leaves Descartes
vulnerable to Gassendi's
vj.xt.cjsm.
iy account does little better,
however.
It does,

of course, avert the infinite
regress we have been discussing.
Cut beyond these considerations, I
think my account is more
true to the spirit of Descartes writing.
Descartes thinks
we understand the complex in terms of the
simple.
Propositions
1

are complexes, and

making them up.
t.o

think that

if

I

I

I

understand them if

I

understand the parts

It seems to me characteristically
Cartesian

clearly and distinctly perceive that
p only

clearly and distinctly perceive parts of
p.
But Frankfurt's account reverses Descartes’ usual ap-

proach.

In Frankfurt's view

I

clearly and distinctly conceive

a concept only if I clearly and distinctly perceive a pro-

position about it.

And

I

clearly and distinctly perceive

a

proposition by seeing whether certain relations hold between
it and an evidential basis for it.

propositions or experiences.

Evidential bases are

They are not concepts, and

I

do not have to clearly and distinctly conceive in order to

clearly and distinctly perceive that p.

On Frankfurt's

account one wonders why Descartes mentions clear and distinct
ideas at all.
ir

Yet the clarity and distinctness of ideas occupies Des-

cartes much more than the clarity and distinctness of
-^See pp. 104-105 above.

2

propositions or judgements.

m

ideas is manifest.

to simples,

On my account Descartes'
interest

Ideas are either simple or
reducible

and when we understand these, we are
then in

position to clearly and distinctly judge.
IV.

c,nd

71

a

Not before.

ASHWORTH

Ashworth's criticism of Descartes' account of
clarity
distinctness. Ashworth thinks Descartes confuses

sensa-

tions and concepts.

As a result of this confusion, Descartes,

Ashworth believes, equivocates on his usage of 'clarity'
and
distinctness*. When predicated of sensations, 'clarity' and
distinctness
another.

9

1

have one sense; when predicated of concepts,

Clear perception of a sensation is in Ashworth's

‘

view "some kind of immediate awareness '^ -1

the intensity of sensation. 21

a

function of

A concept, on the other hand,

is clearly perceived only if we can give a full definition of
a

term expressing that concept.

Considering 'distinctness',

Ashworth contends that Descartes holds
onry

rf

it is complete,

tains all

2 ~7

only concepts representing defining characteris-

cind.

S ee

pp

.

106-108 above.

20 lhid

•

/

P.

21 Ib id

.

,

p.

118.

Ibid.

,

p.

107

22

concept to be distinc

and it is complete only if it con-

tics of the object of our idea. 24
±'

a

23 Ibid

-

24 I Did

.

PP,

p.

119-120.
124.

A sensation, on the other
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hand, is distinct only if it is
complete and provides adequate
grounds for judgement."''
In my view Ashworth, makes too much
of Descartes

between sensations and concepts.

I

am not denying that Des-

tai oCs is guilty of this confusion.

he equivocated on his use of

’

confusion

What

claritv

I

am denying is that

and 'distinctness* as

a result.

Ashworth supports his view by arguing that Descartes'
account of obscure and confused sensation differs from
his
account of obscure and confused fictional ideas.
I

^

Although

would not put the matter quite in this way, Ashworth's

point jo in a sense right.
from his observation.

But he dr aws the wrong conclusion

Emphasizing Descartes' confusion be-

tween sensations and concepts. Ashworth fails to see that Descartes treats ideas of sensation differently from fictional
ideas because the former are simple and the latter complex.

Had Ashworth seen that the crucial distinction was between
simple and complex ideas rather than between sensations and
concepts, he would have been in a position to develop -the

interpretation
stood

the.

I

have given, and he would have better under-

facts he thinks require explanation.

As hworth

'

c riticism of Descartes

1

Buie.

cusing Descartes of the circularity which Kenny

^Ibid.,

pp.

119-120.

26ibid., p. 107.

Besides ac-
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discusses, 27 Ashworth
also argues that Descartes
has no waste justify his rule
of evidence. The
interpretation 1 have
g-tven provides such
a justification,
however.
Once we
understand what Descartes' Rule
asserts, we cannot reasonably
ooubt that his Rule is true.
A clearly and distinctly
percarved proposition d -is onp
one ah->+that uas a subject concept
that
i-> analy Licallv
_
cJear
o
anrJ aisanct
d
ano
and materially true and
that includes in either its
tertiary or its interpretive
content p's predicate concept.
If E 's predicate concept
-j

•*-

-j

—>

+.

-j

is in

the tertiary content of p's
subject concept, then
p is analyticaliy true.
if n’o
^
P 1£d iCa>-e concept
P- is
the interpretive content of p's subject
concept, then p's predicate concept is included in an idea that
correctly represents.
In
either case p is true.
,

V,

m

GASSENDI

Gassendi asked Descartes for

a

method for ascertaining

when we are clearly and distinctly perceiving.
responded that he had provided

the.

Descartes

method Gassendi required

•in its place, where I first discarded
all prejudices, and

tnen enumerated all the principal ideas and
distinguished
those,

which were clear from the obscure and confused." 28

Chapter
27

V,

J.

examined two interpretations of Descartes' reply

A criticism

^ See

in

p

.

I

have just discussed.

149 above
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One is Gewirth's.

He thinks that the place to
which Descartei
1S referring Gassendi is the
first three Meditations and

that
the method Descartes has in mind.
is the method of difference,
But this method is never used or
mentioned
the First M^d—
itation

m

if the method of difference sufficed
to distinguish the

clear and distinct from the obscure and
confused ideas, we
would not quibble with Gewirth over whether
Descartes was referring to rhe Second and Third Meditations
or to the first
three. -But the method of difference is not
adequate; it cannor tell us whether simple ideas are clear and
distinct, and
then e are substantial reasons for questioning'
Gewirth's

account

Against Gewirth’s account, we posed an alternative inc-erpre tat ion of Descartes’
afi'.iH

reply to Gassendi.

ia consistent wi tli Descartes’

remarks

•

This interpret—
On this inter-

pretation Descartes is referring Gassendi to Meditation

I,

but the only method mentioned or used in this Meditation is
the method of doubt.

This method is also problematic, however,

Descartes does clarify his ideas of God and matter in Meditations II and III, but the method he uses is the method of

difference, not the method of doubt.

Whether we adopted Gewirth's interpretation or the rival
account, of Descartes*

reply, we encountered difficulties.

Retreating from this dilemma, we adopted a strategy that had
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us examine the corpus of Descartes' work.

this effort is

The result of

Chapters VI, VII, and VIII, where

I

gave

my account of Descartes' notions of clarity and
distinctness
and how we ascertain them.

we can now give what

I

But having offered this account,

believe is the correct interpretation

of Descartes' reply to Gassendi.

Gewirth was right.
tc-

Descartes is referring Gassendi

the first three Meditations and to the method of difference,

or, what

I

have called,

'the method of analysis'.

But Des-

cartes is also referring Gassendi to the method of doubt,
“he method used in Meditation I.

Descartes' method for

ascertaining clarity and distinctness is a combination of

both methods.

An idea is clear and distinct if and only if

it is analytically and representationally clear and distinct.

To find out if it is analytically clear and distinct, we use
the method of analysis.

To find out if it is representation-

ally clear and distinct, we use the method of doubt.
VI.

REMAINING CHALLENGES

In Principle XLV, Descartes defines

'clarity'

and

'distinctness'.

The key defining expressions he uses are

'being present',

'being apparent', and 'being attentive

A1 though

I

1

.

have offered an account, of clarity and distinct-

ness that adheres closely to what Descartes says about clarity

and distinctness throughout the corpus of his writing,

1

am

276

no closer to being able
to offer a coherent
interpretation
ot what Descartes says in
Principle XLV. One obstacle
in the
way of providing such an
inte-Dre^Hnn ns my incomplete
-u.te^pretation
account of representational
rsrirssfintai'i
clarity and distinctness.
I was
unable to distinguish
representational clarity from
representational distinctness and
representational obscurity from
;

c,-.-, ..

n

representational confusion.

->

.

,

If such an account could
be

provided, we might have at our
disposal all the elements
-lO^ar.c to give a coherent
reading to Principle XLV. But
the
problem of providing such a reading
is one I air. not now
sole to resolve, and I defer the
problem for future consideratiou
„

•

2
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